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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,
Complaint
& Jury Demand
Plaintiffs,
v.

CivilNo. ^f07Mark E. Arnold, Duane R. Barney, Peter
Lanto, Eric A, Rasmussen, Gregory A. Page
& Norman M. Larson.

//£

Judge Anderson

Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, for causes of action against the defendants, allege as
follows:
Parties
1.

Plaintiffs are long term residents of Moab, Grand County, Utah,

2.

Defendants were, at all relevant times, residents of the State of Utah and

transacting business in Grand County.

Jurisdiction & Venue
3.

This case involves transactions concerning a proposed development of real

property located in Grand County, Utah. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-3-4.
4.

Venue in Grand County is proper pursuant to U.C.A. §78-13-1 & -78-13-7.
Facts Common to AH Causes of Action

5.

Plaintiffs were the owners of real property on North Highway 191 in Grand

County, Utah. (The "Norman property" or the subject property)
6.

Plaintiffs own and operate a water park on adjacent to the subject property.

7.

In 1995, the Normans were approached by defendants with a proposal to develop

a Holiday Inn Franchise on the subject property.
8.

Defendants claimed to have experience and expertise in such developments, as

well as the ability to obtainfinancingfor the project.
9.

On or about March 15, 1995, several of the parties executed a "Moab Land

Development Joint Venture Agreement," a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
10.

In addition to the plaintiffs, the Joint Venture Agreement was signed by

defendants Duane Barney, Peter Lanto and Eric Rasmussen.
11.

Although bound by the Joint Venture Agreement, upon information and belief,

defendant Rasmussen is the brother-in-law of Gregory Page who thereafter acted in the place of
Rasmussen. At all relevant times, defendant Page has held himself out to plaintiffs and others as
a member of the Joint Venture.

12.

Upon information and belief, Gregory Page may have filed for bankruptcy in the

intervening period. The status of that Bankruptcy and its effect on the claims set forth herein is
unknown.
13.

Pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement, the Normans contributed 8.33 acres of

property in Grand County. The contributions of Barney, Lanto and Rasmussen (Page) was to be
"Expertise and Consideration."
14.

The defendant joint venturers and their successors (Page for Rasmussen and

Arnold for Lanto) contributed nothing to the joint venture.
15.

Shortly after the execution of the Joint Venture Agreement, defendants Barney,

Page and Lanto traveled to Moab and convinced the plaintiffs to pledge their property in order to
obtain a loan of $40,000 which was needed to secure the right to acquire a Holiday Inn
Franchise.
16.

Defendants instead provided a Trust Deed on the plaintiffs' property secured by a

Promissory Note in the amount of $160,000. See, Exhibits 2 & 3, dated June 27,1995.
17.

The $160,000 came from Ann and Norman Young who were brought into the

transaction by defendant attorney Mark Arnold. Upon information and belief the Youngs are
friends and clients of defendant Arnold.
18.

In addition to the plaintiffs, the Promissory Note was initially executed by

defendants Barney, Lanto and Gregory Page. The Note included a signature line for defendant
Larson who executed it sometime later.

19.

Completely unknown and undisclosed to the plaintiffs was the nature and extent

of the other defendants' association with defendant Norman Larson.
20.

Upon information and belief, defendants had previously associated with Larson

with regard to the Moab Holiday Inn project.
21.

In fact, defendant Larson had previously obtained the right to secure a Holiday

Inn Franchise for the Moab project and he held personally. Larson paid $40,000 for the right to
develop the franchise through his company Western Empire Financial Advisors on June 16,
1995.
22.

After deceptively obtaining the $160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property,

defendants, contrary to the Joint Venture Agreement, and without the knowledge or consent of
the plaintiffs, immediately turned the money over to defendant Larson.
23.

Upon information and belief, defendant Larson was brought into the transaction

by his friend and attorney Mark Arnold.
24.

Upon information and belief, defendant Larson immediately paid himself $16,000

for "loan fees" which he did absolutely nothing to earn.
25.

Larson next paid himself $40,000 for the Holiday Inn Franchise Fee, however, he

did not transfer the Franchise interest to the plaintiffs or the Joint Venture.
26.

Over the next several months, Larson and/or other defendants expended the entire

$160,000, none of which was spent on purposes beneficial to the Joint venture. ($26,792.80 was
paid to the Youngs as interest on the note secured by plaintiffs' property.)

27.

Plaintiffs were not made aware of, nor did they approve any of the foregoing

expenditures.
28.

According to the Joint Venture Agreement, defendants Barney, Rasmussen (Page)

and Lanto (Arnold) were to provide "expertise and consideration." None of the defendants
provided anything to the Joint Venture.
29.

Upon information and belief, on or about October 31, 1995, defendant Lanto was

given $8,500, and on or about February 12, 1996, Greg Page was given $5,000 from the
$160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property.
30.

Since there had been no progress whatever on securing the Holiday Inn Franchise

or to otherwise "develop, manage and maintain" the subject property, plaintiffs, beginning in
1996, and continuously thereafter demanded the return of their property.
31.

On April 10, 1996, defendant Page, on letterhead of Senior Finance & Capitol

Company sent defendant Larson a letter that disclosed the following:
a.

Defendant Larson was brought into the project to "secure financing"

(without plaintiffs' knowledge or consent);
b.

The loan encumbering plaintiffs' property was in default and then had a

balance in excess of $178,000 including interest;
c.

Defendant Larson had become a "Partner," again without plaintiffs'

knowledge or consent;
d.

The entire $160,000 had be "entrusted to Larson's care," again without

plaintiffs' knowledge or consent; and
e.

Defendant Arnold had also become a Partner.

See, Exhibit 4.

32.

Thereafter, plaintiffs demanded a meeting to determine the status of the Joint

Venture.
33.

On May 1, 1996, a meeting was held in the office of defendant Arnold. Present

were Diane Norman, Robert Norman, Jr., Michael Hughes, Mark Arnold, Duane Barney & Greg
Page. At that meeting defendants disclosed the following, all of which had occurred without the
knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs:
a.

Mark Arnold had purchased the position of Peter Lanto for $8,500;

b.

Norman Larson had somehow become "President" of the venture;

c.

Defendant Larson had transferred $50,000 of the funds to "people in

Phoenix" for unknown purposes;
d.

All of the $160,000 borrowed against plaintiffs' property was gone, and

defendants could not explain where;
e.

Defendant Larson was also the client of defendant Arnold;

f.

Defendant Barney was a convicted felon and had previously been in

trouble for parole violations;
g.
34.

The note with the Youngs was in default.

At the same meeting defendant Arnold stated that the Youngs were his clients and

would not foreclose.
35.

At the same meeting defendant Arnold stated in effect, "I know who the people in

Phoenix are, Fve talked to them on the phone, Fve dealt with them. I can get the money back,
but I have to do it delicately."

36.

No Franchise was ever obtained from Holiday Inn.

37.

Nothing was ever done to develop, maintain or manage plaintiffs' property.

38.

None of the $160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property was ever returned.

39.

In December, 1996, defendant Arnold procured Jim Winkler to assume the

position of the Youngs on the Trust Deed Note.
40.

Thereafter, Mr. Winkler obtained 7.33 acres of plaintiffs' property which was

secured by the Trust Deed Note, and deducted the amount owing on the Note from the purchase
price, an amount in excess of $200,000.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Joint Venture Agreement)
41.

Paragraphs 1 -40 are incorporated by reference herein.

42.

At all relevant times, the Membership of the Joint Venture consisted of the

plaintiffs, Duane Barney, Eric Rasmussen, Greg Page, Peter Lanto, Mark Arnold and Norman
Larson.
43.

Defendants breached the Joint Venture Agreement in the following, but not

limited to the following ways:
a.

By failing to secure the Holiday Inn Franchise;

b.

By failing to otherwise develop, manage and maintain the property that the

plaintiffs had contributed to the Joint venture;

c.

By failing to contribute consideration, expertise or anything else to the

d.

By using plaintiffs' property to secure $160,000 which was then used by

Joint Venture;

defendants for purposes unrelated to the Joint Venture without the knowledge or consent of the
plaintiffs;
e.

By allowing other members (Page, Arnold & Larson) into the Joint

Venture contrary to its provisions, and thereby allowing them to exercise authority over Joint
Venture assets.
44.

As a direct and proximate result of defendants conduct as set forth above,

plaintiffs have suffered damages in excess of $200,000, the amount of which will be the subject
of proof at trial.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Default of Trust Deed Note)
45.

Paragraphs 1-44 are incorporated herein by reference.

46.

On or about June 27, 1995, the Joint Venture obtained $160,000, secured by 8.33

acres of property in Grand County, Utah owned by the plaintiffs.
47.

The proceeds were secured by a Trust Deed and Note signed by the plaintiffs and

defendants Barney, Lanto, Page and Larson.
48.

As set forth above, defendant Arnold purchased and/or acquired the position of

defendant Lanto.
49.

The note was thereafter in almost continuous default.

50.

In order to avoid foreclosure on the property, plaintiffs eventually sold the subject

property to a successor-in-interest on the Note, the purchase price of which was reduced by over
$200,000 that was then owing on the Note.
51.

The note, by its terms provides for joint and several liability in the event of

default, and recovery of the costs of collection including attorneys' fees.
52.

Consequently, defendants Barney, Lanto, Page, Rasmussen, Larson and Arnold

are each jointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs for default of the Note in an amount not less
than $200,000, plus the costs of collection thereon including attorneys' fees.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Punitive Damages)
53.

Paragraphs 1-52 are incorporated herein by reference.

54.

Defendant Arnold has stated that he was previously involved both as counsel for,

and in business with defendants Barney, Page and Larson.
55.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly and intentionally set out to take

advantage of them and use their property to secure funds which defendants would then use for
their own purposes.
56.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose

defendant Barney's status as a convicted felon involving other business scams, as well as the
involvement of defendant Larson who was expected to drain off the money secured by plaintiffs'
property for purposes unrelated to the development of plaintiffs' property.

57.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew and intended that money obtained against

plaintiffs' property would be used for purposes other than to develop, manage and maintain that
property.
58.

Plaintiffs allege that in the course of conduct set forth above, that defendants

knowingly and intentionally lied to them and misrepresented themselves, their conduct and their
intentions, thereby causing plaintiffs to suffer economic losses in an amount to be proved at trial,
not less than $200,000.
59.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages against each

defendant in such amounts as are proved to the satisfaction of the jury.
JURY DEMAND
60.

Plaintiffs hereby requests that the causes of action set forth herein be tried to a

jury. The fee required for this request has been paid at the time of the filing of this Complaint.
Wherefore, plaintiffs demand Judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally in
such amounts as are proved at trial, but not less than $200,000 on the first and second causes of
action, punitive damages as may be assessed by the jury, the costs of this action including
attorneys' fees and such other and further relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances.
Dated this l±^_ day of . V ^ / ^ A ^

, 1998.

<h

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
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All sums received from the Capita! Contributions f\r\i\ from
any distributions from Investments shall he deposited in the
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this Agreement.
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TR U ST

1)1 I D

W i t h As>''!iuntrp»* »d J V M K

THIS'MM'ST Ul -ED. made this 7-7 day of ^/jij'
( - \. _< F>J/:] _ between R< )BERT R. NORMAN
and A. D I A N E NORMAN, a*; l imlois, who ntc located in Moab'l HMII, AMERK AN ] .P.GAL T i l ! J7. L.C., as Trustee,
and A N N Y O U N ( ; and N( )RMAN YOUNG, as Beneficiary.
'''• *fj * "'ifyl.'f '.> v /> o l ^- .
5 -^ ' >

*"->«."••%

WITNESSETH: The Tnr.lor Conveys and Warrants »<» Tinker in lru<-.t with power of sale, the following
described property, situated in Grand County, State of Utah:
BEGINNING AT A ( (>RNER O N T ! IENORT1 1ERLY RICH I OF-WAY (>F U.S. HIGHWAY 191,
SAID CORNER HEARS NORTH 3S e 53' EAST 803.7 FEET FROM THE. SOUTH 1/t CORNER
S E C r i O N 2(\ TOWNSHIP 25 SOUTH, RANGE 21 EAST, SALT FAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN,
A N D PROCEEDING I HENCE WITH SAID RIGHT-OF-WAY NORTH 47°40' WEST 6<?7.<> FEET
TO A CORNER, IIIENCE NORTH 0°05 f EAST 223.1 I : EE I "TO A CORNER, THf : NCE SOUTH
89° 54* FAST 717 3 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 9*15' EAST >r,.r, FEET, THENCE, SOU III 38* 18'
W E S T ^ / O . M T . E F T O T H E POINT OF BEGINNI^^^
LESS. CORNERS ARE M O N U M E N T E D A S S H O W N ON THE A1TACIIED PLAT. BEARINGS
A R E BASED O N T H E NORTHERLY RIGHT-OF-WAY OF U.S. HIGHWAY F>| (BEARING
FROM ORIGINAL S U R V E Y = NORTH 4V<\iV WEST)

Together with all building, fixtures and improvements theieon and all water rights, rights of way, casements,
lis, issues, profits, income, tenements, hereditaments, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belonging, now or
rcaflcr used or enjoyed with said property, or any part thereof, SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the right, power and
.hority hereinafter given to and conferred upon Beneficiary to collect and apply such rents, issues, and profits;
FOR T H E PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of even
B herewith, in the^r jncijinlMini of $ | ^ ( [ ( ) p m made by Trustor, payable to the o r d r of Beneficiary at the times, in
manner and with interest as therein set forth, and any extensions and/or renewals or modifications thereof; (2) the
formancc of each agreement of Trustor herein contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or advances as
rafter may be made to Trustor, or his successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting
they arc secured by this Trust Deed; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced by Beneficiary under
ursunnt to the terms hereof, together with interest thereon as herein provided.
I
-^
•'
PROTECT T H E SECURITY O F THIS TRUST D E E D , TRUSTOR AGREES:

%%Yi ^

C

T o keep said property in good condition and repair, not remove or demolish any building thereon, to complete
store promptly and in good and workmanlike manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or destroyed
on; to comply with all lows, covenants and restrictions affecting, said property; not to commit or permit waster

_ ., /
'

thereof; not to commit, suffer or permit any act upon c irl i i o ?<• m \ in! t »JI of la ' , to do all other acts which from
the character or use of said property may be reason.ibl/ w c H \ < he r p'- n'ic enumerations hcicin not excluding the
general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any pait thereof i. brin" obtain 'I for the purpose of financing construction
of improvements on said property, Trustor further agrees(a)
T o commence construction promptly ;»nd to pursue same with reasonable diligence to
completion in accordance with plans and specifications « lOsfactorv t<» Beneficiary, and
(b)

T o allow Beneficiary to inspc< t said properly at all Junes during construction.

Trustee, upon presentation to it of an affidavit, signed bv H a i c f i n a ' . setting forth facts showing a default by
Trustor under this numbered paragraph, is authorized \o accept as true and conclusive all facts and statements therein,
and to act thereon hereunder.
2.
T o provide and maintain insurance, of siuh l\pc or fvpes and amounts as Beneficiary may require, on
the improvements now existing or hereafter erected or pla< cd on said property. Such insurance shall be carried in
companies approved by Beneficiary with loss payable clauses in favor of and in form acceptable to Beneficiary. In event
of loss, Trustor shall give immediate notice to Beneficiary, who may make p'oof of los, and each insurance company
concerned is hereby authorized and directed to make payn.cnt for such loss directly to Beneficiary instead of to Trustor
and Beneficiary jointly, and the insurance proceeds, or any part thereof, mav be applied by Beneficiary, at its option, to
reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair nf the property damaged.
3.

T o deliver to, pay for and maintain with Bciicfn iai v until the indebtedness secured hereby is paid in full,

such evidence of title as Beneficiary may require, including abstracts of fill*1 or policies of title insurance and any
extensions or renewals thereof or supplements thereto.
4.
T o appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof, the title to
said property, or the rights or powers of Beneficiary or Trustee; and should Beneficiary or Trustee elect to also appear
in or defend any such action or proceeding, to pay all costs and expenses, including cost of evidence of title and attorney's
fees in a reasonable sum incurred by Beneficiary or Trustee.
5.

T o pay at least 10 days before delinquency all (axes and assessments affecting said property, including

all assessments upon water company stock and all rents, assessments and charges for water, appurtenant to or used in
connection with said property; to pay, when due, all encumbrances, charges and liens with interest, on said property or
any part thereof, which at anytime appear to be prior or superior hereto; to pay all costs, fees, and expenses of this Trust.
6.
Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or
Trustee, but without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor
from any obligation hereof, may: M a k e or do the same in such manner and to such extent as cither may deem necessary
to protect the security hereof, Beneficiary or Trustee being authorized to enter upon said property for such purposes;
commence, appear in and defend any action or proceeding purporting to affect the security hereof or the rights of powers
of Beneficiary or Trustee; pay, purchase, contest, or compromise any encumbrance, charge or lien which in the judgement
of either appears to be prior or superior hereto; and in exercising any such powers, incur any liability, expend whatever
amounts in its absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor, including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and
pay his reasonable fees.
7.

T o pay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with

interest from date of expenditure at the rate of ten percent ( l ( ) " f ) per annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall
be secured hereby.

O'

) J

IT IS MUTUALLY ACRR-I) THAT:
8.
Should said property or any port thereof be talen 01 'l;iin;i<"-(l |>y reason of ;my public improvement or
condemnation proceeding, or damaged by fire, or earthquake, or in any of her manner, Beneficiary shall be entitled to
ill compensation, awards, and other payments or relief therefor, and s'edl be entitled at its option to commence, appear
n and prosecute in its own name, any action or proceedings, or in m:i!;r any compromise or sett lenient, in connection
vith such taking or damage. All such compensation, awards, damages, rights of action and proceeds, including the
proceeds of any policies of fire and other insurance affecting said pmprtiy, arc hereby assigned to Beneficiary, who may,
ftcr deducting therefrom all its expenses, including attorney's fees, apply \hr came on any indebtedness secured hereby.
Yuslor agrees to execute such further assignments of any compensation, awards, damages, and rights of action and
roceeds as Beneficiary or Trustee may require.

9.
At any time and from time to time upon written lemic*! of Beneficiary, payment of its fees and
cscntation of this Trust Deed an the note for endorsement (in case of bill reconveyance, for cancellation and retention),
thout affecting the liability of any person for the payment of the indebtedness secured hereby, Trustee may (a) consent
the making of any map or plat of said property; (b) join in granting an casement or creating any restriction thereon;
I join in any subordination or other agreement affecting this Trust Deed or the lien or charge thereof; (d) rcconvey,
Jiout warranty, all or any part of said property. The grantee in any reconveyance may be described as "the person or
rsons entitled thereto'', and the recitals therein of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof of truthfulness thereof.
istor agrees to pay reasonable Trustee's fees for any of the services mentioned in this paragraph.
10.
As additional security, Trustor hereby assigns Beneficiary, during the continuance of these trusts, all
Is, issues, royalties, and profits of the property afTcctcd by this Trust Deed and of any personal property located
xon. Until Trustor shall default in the payment of any indebtedness secured her by or in the performance of any
xment hereunder, Trustor shall have the right to collect all such rents, issues, royalties, and profits earned prior to
lult as they become due and payable. If Trustor shall default as aforesaid, Trustor's right to collect any such moneys
I cease and Beneficiary shall have the right, with or without taking, possession of the property affected hereby, to
xt all rents, royalties, issues and profits. Failure or discontinuance of Beneficiary at any time or from time to time
)Ilccl such moneys shall not in any manner affect the subsequent enforcement by Beneficiary to collect, shall be, or
Dnstrucd to IK, an affirmation by Beneficiary of any tenancy, lease or option, nor an assumption of liability under,
I subordination of the lien or charge of this Trust Deed to any such tenancy, lease or option.
11.
Upon any default by Trustor hereunder, Beneficiary may at any time without notice, either in person,
tnt, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointment of Beneficiary as
receiver), and without regard to the adequacy of any security for the indebtedness hereby secured, upon and take
SSion of said property or any part thereof, in its own name sue for or cost*; and expenses of operation and collection,
ling reasonable attorney's fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in such order as Beneficiary may
nine.
12.
The entering upon and taking possession of said propertwlhc collection of such rents, issues, and profits,
proceeds of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking, or damage of said
ty, and the application or release thereof as aforesaid, shall not cure or waive any default or notice of default
tder or invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice.
13.
The failure on the part of Beneficiary to promptly enforce any right hereunder shall not operate as a
of such right and the waiver by Beneficiary of any default shall not constitute a waiver of any other or subsequent
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14.
T i m e is oi Mi-.* C ' C i i r c iieieol. l."p<-n d'-.l.vs: ; • < ; u .: : m tl;<. .; ivuient of a:iv i n d e b t e d n e s s secured
h e r e b y or in (lie perform^!* c of any agreement h e r e u n d e r , .si' '"ii'-; se'-nj-d h e r 1 ' . / r.h.d! immediately b e c o m e due and

payable at the option of Beneficiary. In the event of such del .-mil, Uem-in i.-^y urr- execute or cnusc Trustee to execute
a written notice of default and of election to cause r-iid proper! v io be sol ! to satis'y the obligations hereof, and Trustee
shall file such notice for record in each county wherein said prnpejiv or some part or parcel thereof is situated.
Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all document':, evidencing expenditures secured hereby.
15.
After the lapse of such lime as may then be rcipmed by law following the recordation of said notice of
default, and notice of default and notice of sale having been given as then required by law, Trustee, without demand on
Trustor, shall sell said property on the date and at the time and place designated in said notice of sale, cither as a whole
or in separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine (but subject to any statutory right of Trustor to direct the
order in which such propeity, if consisting of several known lots or parcels, .shall be sold), at public auction to the highest
bidder, the purchase price payable in lawful money of the United Slat's at the time of sale. The person conducting the
sale may, for any cause he deems expedient, postpone the sale from time to time until it shall be completed and, in every
case, notice of postponement shall be given by public declaration thereof by such person at the time and place last
appointed for the sale; provided, if the sale is postponed for longer than one day beyond the day designated in the notice
of sale, notice thereof shall be given in the same manner as the original notice of sale. Trustee shall execute and deliver
to the purchaser its Deed conveying said property so sold, but without any covenant or warranty, express or implied. The
recitals in the Deed of any matters or facts shall be conclusive proof o\' the truthfulness thereof. Any person, including
Beneficiary, amy bid at the sale. Trustee shall apply the proceeds of the sale of payment of (1) the costs and expenses
of exercising the power of sale and of the sale, including the payment of the Trustee's and attorney's fees; (2) cost of any
evidence of title procured in connection with such sale and revenue stamps on Tmstcc's Deed: (3) all sums expended
under the terms hereof, not then repaid, with accrued interest at 100% per annum from date of expenditures; (4) all other
sums then secured hereby; and (5) the remainder, if any, to the person or persons legally entitled thereto, or the Trustee,
in its discretions, may deposit the balance of such proceeds with the County Clcik of the county in which the sale took
place.
16.
Upon the occurrence of any default hereunder, Heneliciary shall have the option to declare all sums
secured hereby immediately due and payable and foreclose this Trust Deed in the manner provided by law for the
foreclosure of mortgages on real property and Beneficiary shall be entitled to recover in such proceeding all costs and
expenses incident thereto, including a reasonable attorney's fee in such amount as shall be fixes by the court.
17.
Beneficiary may appoint a successor trustee at any time by filing for record in the office of the County
Recorder of each county in which said property or some part thereof is situated, a substitution of trustee. From the time
the substitution is filed for record, the new trustee shall succeed to all the powers, duties, authority and title of the trustee
named herein or of any successor trustee. Each such substitution shall be executed and acknowledged, and notice thereof
shall be given and proof thereof made, in the manner provided by law.
18.
This Trust Deed shall apply to, inure to the benefit of, and bind all parties hereto, their heirs, legatees,
devisees, administers, executors, successors and assigns. All obligations of Trustor hereunder arc joint and several. The
term "Beneficiary" shall mean the owner and holder, including any pledgee, of the note secured hereby. In this Trust
Deed, whenever the context requires, the masculine gender includes the feminine and/or neuter, and the singular number
includes the plural.
19.
Trustee accepts this Trust when this Trust Deed, duly executed and acknowledged, is made public record
as provided by law. Trustee is not obligated to notify any party hereto pending sale under any other Trust Deed or of
any action or proceeding in which Trustor, Beneficiary, or Trustee shall be a party, unless brought by Trustee.
20.

This Trust Deed shall be construed according, to the laws of the. Stale of Utah.
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On ( r u y / / - day of V / / , , , ^
, 19 / x T " , pcrsonnh'v appeared before mc ROBERT R. N O R M A N
A. D I A N E N O R M A N , the signcr(s) of ihc above instrument, who duly ncknowlcdr.cd to mc thai ROBERT R.
LMAN and A. D I A N E N O R M A N executed the same.

Commission Expires: /,J

~ /,J

Notary Public
,
Residing a t v ?/'/ <?s •//
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796 McCormlctc OWd.
Motb. Ut«h 6453?
My Comm4t8ion Expiree
D»o*fnb«# 12, 1997
STATE OF UTAH
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HELEN G. DAViS j
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EXHIBIT 3

NOTE SECURED BY DEEP Of TRUS^
DO NOTE DESTROY THIS NOTE: Khen paid, <his notn, with Trust Deed
securing same, must be surrendered to Trustee for Cancellation,
before reconveyance will be made.

$160,000.00

Moab, Utah
Juno£ Uh , 1995

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned jointly and severally
promise to pay to the order of ANN YOUNG "and NORMAN YOUNG the
amount of ONE HUNDRED SIXTY THOUSAND AND 00/100 DOLLARS
($160,000,00), together with interest from date at the rate of
EIGHTEEN PERCEUT (18%) per annum on the unpaid principal, said
principal and interest payable as follows:
Payment in full, including interest and principal,
to be made to Ann Young and Norman Young on or
before September 27, 1995.
If default occurs in the payment of said installment of
principal and interest or any part thereof, or in the performance
.of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed securing this note,
the holder hereof, at its option and without notice or demand, may
declare the entire principal balance and accruod interest due and
payable.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the
payment of principal or interest, either with or without suit, the
undersigned, jointly and severally, agree to pay all costs and
expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The makers, sureties, guarantors and endorsers hereof
severally waive presentment for payment, demand and notice of
iishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent of any and all
extensions of time, renewals, waivers or modifications that may be
jranted by the holder hereof with respect to the payment or other

provisions of this note, and to LIK? r»\i<^:^ -[L
part thereof, with or without subr;t i Lu!. ; en .

JlilV

S^'MIiM. f -

•./ '

This note is secured by a Trust; Deed o£ evcui date herewith

HOliER'A1 K. NORMAN
' A. IHANE NORMAH
pUA/JE R .

PETER 0 .

BARURi^,^

LANTO

/

'Jh?b±?/ J y^k

^ GREGORY/ A:-' PAGE

^

y 5 0 W W N M. LARS

P. 3
NOTE SECURED BY DEED OF TRUST
MOAB HOLIDAY INN
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Aplil 10, 1996

Mr. Norm Larson
Western Empire Advisors
7109 So. Highland Drive, suite 201
Salt Lake City. Utah 84121

R£:

Moab and Jeiemy Ranch, Utah Hotel Piojects

Dear Norm,
When we brought the above mentioned projects to you a \ear ago, to provide financing,
you told us you could secure the financing needed to complete the projects. In addition,
you said you would provide any additional capital needed to secure the financing in
exchange for a share of die ownership. As of this date you have been unable to provide
the financing, and the land in Moab, Utah is now encumbered with a $178,000 loan.
After conferring with the other partners, we have decided to terminate our agreement with
you to find financing for these projects immediately. In regards to your share of the
partnership, you can cither take over the debt on the land and release it of all
encumbrances, thus complying with our agreement that you would provide all additional
capital. Or you can decide to give up your share of the developments, and pay back the
fees you were paid on the loan and the fees paid out to your sources. You have 48 hours
until 4:00 PM Friday April 12, 199610 officially notify us in writing as to your decision
along with the outstanding funds.
Regardless of the decision you make about our partnei ship, we expect to receive by the
same time and date mentioned above the remaining balance of the funds entrusted to your
care with interest and copies of all checks draw) on the funds along with copies of the
bank statements showing the appropriate interest earned en these funds.

FRC
Mpr.

Sincere!)-.

gory- AVPage

Bob Norm/in
Duane Bamev
Mark Arnold'

10

1936
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr.5 & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,

j
First Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs,
v.
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson.

I
j

Civil No. 9807-116
Judge Anderson

Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby submit the following First Amended
Complaint wih an additional cause of action against Mark E. Arnold. Plaintiffs have previously
requested a jury and paid the required fee.
Parties
1.

Plaintiffs are long term residents of Moab, Grand County, Utah,

2.

Defendants were, at all relevant times, residents of the State of Utah and

transacting business in Grand County.

Jurisdiction & Venue
3.

This case involves transactions concerning a proposed development of real

property located in Grand County, Utah. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to U.C.A. §78-3-4.
4.

Venue in Grand County is proper pursuant to U.C.A. §78-13-1 & -78-13-7.
Facts Common to AH Causes of Action

5.

Plaintiffs were the owners of real property on North Highway 191 in Grand

County, Utah. (The "Norman property" or the subject property)
6.

Plaintiffs own and operate a water park on adjacent to the subject property.

7.

In 1995, the Normans were approached by defendants with a proposal to develop

a Holiday Inn Franchise on the subject property.
8.

Defendants claimed to have experience and expertise in such developments, as

well as the ability to obtain financing for the project.
9.

On or about March 15, 1995, several of the parties executed a "Moab Land

Development Joint Venture Agreement," a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
10.

In addition to the plaintiffs, the Joint Venture Agreement was signed by

defendants Duane Barney, Peter Lanto and Eric Rasmussen.
11.

Although bound by the Joint Venture Agreement, upon information and belief,

defendant Rasmussen is the brother-in-law of Gregory Page who thereafter acted in the place of
Rasmussen. At all relevant times, defendant Page has held himself out to plaintiffs and others as
a member of the Joint Venture.

12.

Upon information and belief, Gregory Page may have filed for bankruptcy in the

intervening period. The status of that Bankruptcy and its effect on the claims set forth herein is
unknown.
13.

Pursuant to the Joint Venture Agreement, the Normans contributed 8.33 acres of

property in Grand County. The contributions of Barney, Lanto and Rasmussen (Page) was to be
"Expertise and Consideration."
14.

The defendant joint venturers and their successors (Page for Rasmussen and

Arnold for Lanto) contributed nothing to the joint venture.
15.

Shortly after the execution of the Joint Venture Agreement, defendants Barney,

Page and Lanto traveled to Moab and convinced the plaintiffs to pledge their property in order to
obtain a loan of $40,000 which was needed to secure the right to acquire a Holiday Inn
Franchise.
16.

Defendants instead provided a Trust Deed on the plaintiffs' property secured by a

Promissory Note in the amount of $160,000. See, Exhibits 2 & 3, dated June 27, 1995.
17.

The $160,000 came from Ann and Norman Young who were brought into the

transaction by defendant attorney Mark Arnold. Upon information and belief the Youngs are
friends and clients of defendant Arnold.
18.

In addition to the plaintiffs, the Promissory Note was initially executed by

defendants Barney, Lanto and Gregory Page. The Note included a signature line for defendant
Larson who executed it sometime later.

19.

Completely unknown and undisclosed to the plaintiffs was the nature and extent

of the other defendants' association with defendant Norman Larson.
20.

Upon information and belief, defendants had previously associated with Larson

with regard to the Moab Holiday Inn project.
21.

In fact, defendant Larson had previously obtained the right to secure a Holiday

Inn Franchise for the Moab project and he held personally. Larson paid $40,000 for the right to
develop the franchise through his company Western Empire Financial Advisors on June 16,
1995.
22.

After deceptively obtaining the $160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property,

defendants, contrary to the Joint Venture Agreement, and without the knowledge or consent of
the plaintiffs, immediately turned the money over to defendant Larson.
23.

Upon information and belief, defendant Larson was brought into the transaction

by his friend and attorney Mark Arnold.
24.

Upon information and belief, defendant Larson immediately paid himself $16,000

for "loan fees" which he did absolutely nothing to earn.
25.

Larson next paid himself $40,000 for the Holiday Inn Franchise Fee, however, he

did not transfer the Franchise interest to the plaintiffs or the Joint Venture.
26.

Over the next several months, Larson and/or other defendants expended the entire

$160,000, none of which was spent on purposes beneficial to the Joint venture. ($26,792.80 was
paid to the Youngs as interest on the note secured by plaintiffs' property.)

27.

Plaintiffs were not made aware of, nor did they approve any of the foregoing

expenditures.
28.

According to the Joint Venture Agreement, defendants Barney, Rasmussen (Page)

and Lanto (Arnold) were to provide "expertise and consideration." None of the defendants
provided anything to the Joint Venture.
29.

Upon information and belief, on or about October 31, 1995, defendant Lanto was

given $8,500, and on or about February 12, 1996, Greg Page was given $5,000 from the
$160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property.
30.

Since there had been no progress whatever on securing the Holiday Inn Franchise

or to otherwise "develop, manage and maintain" the subject property, plaintiffs, beginning in
1996, and continuously thereafter demanded the return of their property.
31.

On April 10, 1996, defendant Page, on letterhead of Senior Finance & Capitol

Company sent defendant Larson a letter that disclosed the following:
a.

Defendant Larson was brought into the project to "secure financing"

(without plaintiffs' knowledge or consent);
b.

The loan encumbering plaintiffs' property was in default and then had a

balance in excess of $178,000 including interest;
c.

Defendant Larson had become a "Partner," again without plaintiffs'

knowledge or consent;
d.

The entire $160,000 had be "entrusted to Larson's care," again without

plaintiffs' knowledge or consent; and
e.

Defendant Arnold had also become a Partner.

See, Exhibit 4.

32.

Thereafter, plaintiffs demanded a meeting to determine the status of the Joint

Venture.
33.

On May 1, 1996, a meeting was held in the office of defendant Arnold. Present

were Diane Norman, Robert Norman, Jr., Michael Hughes, Mark Arnold, Duane Barney & Greg
Page. At that meeting defendants disclosed the following, all of which had occurred without the
knowledge and consent of the plaintiffs:
a.

Mark Arnold had purchased the position of Peter Lanto for $8,500;

b.

Norman Larson had somehow become "President" of the venture;

c.

Defendant Larson had transferred $50,000 of the funds to "people in

Phoenix" for unknown purposes;
d.

All of the $160,000 borrowed against plaintiffs' property was gone, and

defendants could not explain where;
e.

Defendant Larson was also the client of defendant Arnold;

f.

Defendant Barney was a convicted felon and had previously been in

trouble for parole violations;
g.
34.

The note with the Youngs was in default.

At the same meeting defendant Arnold stated that the Youngs were his clients and

would not foreclose.
35.

At the same meeting defendant Arnold stated in effect, "I know who the people in

Phoenix are, Fve talked to them on the phone, I've dealt with them. I can get the money back,
but I have to do it delicately."

36.

No Franchise was ever obtained from Holiday Inn.

37.

Nothing was ever done to develop, maintain or manage plaintiffs' property.

38.

None of the $160,000 secured by plaintiffs' property was ever returned.

39.

In December, 1996, defendant Arnold procured Jim Winkler to assume the

position of the Youngs on the Trust Deed Note.
40.

Thereafter, Mr. Winkler obtained 7.33 acres of plaintiffs' property which was

secured by the Trust Deed Note, and deducted the amount owing on the Note from the purchase
price, an amount in excess of $200,000.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Joint Venture Agreement)
41.

Paragraphs 1-40 are incorporated by reference herein.

42.

At all relevant times, the Membership of the Joint Venture consisted of the

plaintiffs, Duane Barney, Eric Rasmussen, Greg Page, Peter Lanto, Mark Arnold and Norman
Larson.
43.

Defendants breached the Joint Venture Agreement in the following, but not

limited to the following ways:
a.

By failing to secure the Holiday Inn Franchise;

b.

By failing to otherwise develop, manage and maintain the property that the

plaintiffs had contributed to the Joint venture;

c

By failing to contribute consideration, expertise or anything else to the

d

By using plaintiffs' property to secure $160,000 which was then used by

Joint Venture,

defendants for purposes unrelated to the Joint Venture without the knowledge or consent of the
plaintiffs,
e

By allowing other members (Page, Arnold & Larson) into the Joint

Venture contrary to its provisions, and thereby allowing them to exercise authority over Joint
Venture assets
44

As a direct and proximate result of defendants conduct as set forth above,

plaintiffs have suffered damages in excess of $200,000, the amount of which will be the subject
of proof at trial
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Default of Trust Deed Note)
45

Paragraphs 1-44 are incorporated herein by reference

46

On or about June 27, 1995, the Joint Venture obtained $160,000, secured by 8 33

acres of property in Grand County, Utah owned by the plaintiffs
47.

The proceeds were secured by a Trust Deed and Note signed by the plaintiffs and

defendants Barney, Lanto, Page and Larson
48

As set forth above, defendant Arnold purchased and/or acquired the position of

defendant Lanto
49.

The note was thereafter in almost continuous default

50.

In order to avoid foreclosure on the property, plaintiffs eventually sold the subject

property to a successor-in-interest on the Note, the purchase price of which was reduced by over
$200,000 that was then owing on the Note.
51.

The note, by its terms provides for joint and several liability in the event of

default, and recovery of the costs of collection including attorneys' fees.
52.

Consequently, defendants Barney, Lanto, Page, Rasmussen, Larson and Arnold

are each jointly and severally liable to the plaintiffs for default of the Note in an amount not less
than $200,000, plus the costs of collection thereon including attorneys' fees.
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach Of Fiduciary Duty vs. Defendant Arnold)
53.

At all times herein defendant Mark Arnold was a duly licensed attorney and

member of the Utah State Bar.
54.

In the Fall of 1994, defendant Arnold commenced an attorney-client relationship

with co-defendant Larson which continued throughout the period relevant to this lawsuit.
55.

In the Spring of 1995, defendant Arnold commenced an attorney-client

relationship with an entity known as 4-D Development. 4-D Development was comprised of
Greg Page, Duane Barney and Pete Lanto.
56.

At about the same time defendant Arnold commenced an attorney-client

relationship with Robert and Diane Norman and lasting through 1996, concerning the Moab
development.

57.

Defendant Larson was brought into the group to obtain financing from outside

sources for Holiday Inn projects in Moab and Park City, with promises of an equity position plus
fees if the funding were obtained.
58.

Neither Arnold, Larson, 4-D Development or its members were willing or able to

put up any money to advance the projects.
59.

On or about June 17, 1995, Defendants Arnold and Larson approached Ann

Young, another client of defendant Arnold and "negotiated" a loan of $160,000.
60.

The terms of the note were $160,000 at 90 days at 18% interest, secured by 8.33

acres of prime commercial property owned by the Normans.
61.

The loan was virtually risk free.

62.

The loan proceeds were deposited in a trust account controlled by defendant

Arnold, and then immediately transferred to defendant Larson without the knowledge or consent
of the plaintiffs.
63.

By their negotiations, defendants Larson and Arnold allowed Ann Young $3,200

from the loan proceeds for "points" and split $16,000 among themselves for "loan fees." These
amounts were paid on or about June 21, 1995.
64.

Both the interest rate and points and fees were grossly excessive and represent

self-dealing among defendant Arnold and his clients, contrary to the plaintiffs' interests.
65.

At the same time, defendant Arnold had commenced an attorney-client

relationship with 4-D Development and others concerning another Holiday Inn in Park City.

66.

On June 21, 1995, defendant Larson gave defendant Arnold another $10,000 for

an earnest money deposit on land in Park City for that development.
67.

Plaintiffs had no knowledge or interest in the Park City project, and did not

consent to this expenditure of the loan proceeds.
68.

With regard to the Young loan, defendant Arnold prepared or caused to be

prepared a Trust Deed and Note regarding the encumbrance of plaintiffs' property.
69.

As previously stated, plaintiffs were pressured to execute these documents under

false pretenses. The documents were not executed and recorded until June 27, 1995, after
approximately $70,000 of the loan proceeds had already been disbursed.
70.

On October 27, 1995, defendants Arnold and his client Larson (through his

company Western Empire Advisors, Inc.) purchased the interest of Pete Lanto in the venture for
$8,500. (See exhibit designated "NL72" attached.) The purchase price was negotiated by
defendant Arnold even though Lanto had contributed nothing to the venture.
71.

Plaintiffs had no knowledge of and did not consent to this transaction.

72.

By its express terms the document makes defendant Arnold personally liable

under the Trust Deed and Note on the Young loan.
73.

By March, 1996, the entire loan proceeds of $160,000 had been expended without

any productive result. All expenditures had been made by defendant Larson in consultation with
his attorney-partner defendant Arnold.
74.

Included in these expenditures was a wire of $50,000 to an Arizona financial

entity which was supposed to provide funding for the Moab project.

75

When the funding did not materialize, defendants Arnold and Larson went to

Anzona to "conduct an investigation " They came away believing the money had basically been
stolen
76

As counsel for the joint venture, defendant Arnold promised he would retrieve the

money, and made the same promise to the plaintiffs in a face-to-face meeting He subsequently
made no effort to do so
77

In August, 1996, defendant Arnold brought in another client, Mr Jim Winkler to

assume the Youngs position on the Trust Deed and Note
78

Defendant Arnold thereafter (acting as counsel for the plaintiffs) secured an

extension of the Holiday Inn Franchise

He thereafter made the Franchise available to Mr

Winkler without so much as offering the opportunity to acquire it to the plaintiffs
79

This and other conduct throughout his representation of and business relationship

with the plaintiffs constituted a severe conflict of interest intended to benefit himself and other
clients at the expense of the plaintiffs
80.

An attorney acting for, or purporting to act for a client owes a very high duty to

look after and protect his clients' interests The duty is both personal and fiduciary in nature
81.

By his conduct set forth above and other non-enumerated acts defendant Arnold

breached his fiduciary duty to the plaintiffs
82.

As a direct and proximate result of his breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs

suffered loss and damage in excess of $200,000

83.

This liability is separate from and in addition to defendant Arnold's liability under

the Trust Deed and Note.
Wherefore, plaintiffs seek Judgment on this cause of action against defendant Arnold for
such damages as proved at trial, not less than $200,000, for the costs of this action including
reasonable attorneys' fees, and for such other damages, relief or sanctions as may be appropriate
in the circumstances.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Punitive Damages)
84.

Paragraphs 1-83 are incorporated herein by reference.

85.

Defendant Arnold has stated that he was previously involved both as counsel for,

and in business with defendants Barney, Page and Larson.
86.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly and intentionally set out to take

advantage of them and use their property to secure funds which defendants would then use for
their own purposes.
87.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants knowingly and intentionally failed to disclose

defendant Barney's status as a convicted felon involving other business scams, as well as the
involvement of defendant Larson who was expected to drain off the money secured by plaintiffs'
property for purposes unrelated to the development of plaintiffs5 property.
88.

Plaintiffs allege that defendants knew and intended that money obtained against

plaintiffs' property would be used for purposes other than to develop, manage and maintain that
property.

89.

Plaintiffs allege that in the course of conduct set forth above, that defendants

knowingly and intentionally lied to them and misrepresented themselves, their conduct and their
intentions, thereby causing plaintiffs to suffer economic losses in an amount to be proved at trial,
not less than $200,000.
90.

Plaintiffs are therefore entitled to an award of punitive damages against each

defendant in such amounts as are proved to the satisfaction of the jury.
JURY DEMAND
91.

Plaintiffs hereby requests that the causes of action set forth herein be tried to a

jury. The fee required for this request has been paid at the time of the filing of this Complaint.
Wherefore, plaintiffs demand Judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally in
such amounts as are proved at trial, but not less than $200,000 on the first and second causes of
action, punitive damages as may be assessed by the jury, the costs of this action including
attorneys' fees and such other and further relief as may be appropriate in the circumstances.
Dated this ^_
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Attorney for the Plaintiffs
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Mr. Craig Howe
Attorney for Norman Larson
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2215
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pro se defendant
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Duane Barney
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IN THE SEVENTH J l JDICI 41 DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GR 4NDCOI II i I V S I I I EOF I ) I I. 1 1

ROBERT NORM:AN, SR., & DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,

PENDANT ARNOLD'S MOTION
TIAL SUMMARY J UDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
REC,

L FOR HEARING

vs.
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M.
LARSON,

v!r R. Anderson

Defendants.

Pursuani to Rule -1-501(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Rule 56 of the
Utah Rules ot

..., h ^ c d u i v , * ^ k n d a n t Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") hereby moves this Court

for an Order granting partial sumiiur
of plaintiffs Robert and Diane Norman's ("the N o n
judgment in this action si lall. in additi : i 11 : < mi i] mai
follows:

SORENSAVSLCM 294.54

i
Amended Complaint, such that final
imul iii ui.il, AW mil iinlgiuciii as

1.
Arnold is not liable to the Normans for breach of contract
as alleged in the Normans' First Cause of Action;
2.
Arnold is not liable to the Normans for breach of fiduciary
duty as alleged in the Normans' Third Cause of Action;
3.
Arnold is not liable to the Normans for punitive damages as
alleged in the Normans' Fourth Cause of Action.
This motion is made upon the ground that there are no triable issues of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to partial summary judgment on these three causes of action as a
matter of law. This motion is based upon the memorandum of points and authorities, the
statement of material undisputed facts, the affidavits and exhibits, all of which are concurrently
filed and served herewith.
Arnold respectfully requests hearing on this matter, to be scheduled for a date and time
convenient for the Court.
DATED this

day of May, 2000.
SNELL &

WILMERLLP.

£<^*<^<r

MattKew L. Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold

2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on this 30th day of May, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Steve Russell, Esq.
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab,UT 84532
James C. Haskins
Haskins & Associates
357 South 200 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Matthew L.Lalli (#6105)
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
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Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK E. ARNOLD

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No.: 9807-116

MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

SORENSA\SLC\l 29438

Mark E. Arnold, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am a real estate and land use lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Utah

and a defendant in the above-entitled action. I am competent in every respect to make this
affidavit, and do so on the basis of my personal knowledge.
2.

I am a partner at the law firm of Arnold & Wiggins, L.C. Neither my law firm

nor I have ever provided legal services of any kind to Robert or Diane Norman individually.
3.

Neither my law firm nor I have ever received payment for legal services of any

kind from Robert or Diane Norman individually.
4.

I am not a signatory to the March 15, 1995 joint venture agreement at issue in this

5.

I never sought nor received the consent of the joint venture partners to become a

action.

partner of the Moab Land Development joint venture.
6.

In 1995, Norman Larson introduced me to Greg Page and Duane Barney, who

were partners in the Moab joint venture. Subsequently, I performed various tasks for the joint
venture.
7.

I introduced the joint venture partners to Ann and Norman Young. The Youngs

provided the joint venture with initial financing in the form of a short-term loan for $160,000,
payable in 90 days, at 18 percent interest and with loan fees totaling 12 points.
8.

As collateral for the short-term financing, the Normans agreed to pledge the 8.33

acres of property they had previously contributed to the joint venture, and signed a deed of trust
on the property in the Young's favor. The loan proceeds were placed into a trust account owned
by Larson, and only Larson had signature authority.

SORENSA\SLC\l 29438

2

9.

Larson obtained the Holiday Inn franchise and over the next year Page and Larson

attempted to obtain financing, but were unsuccessful. I persuaded the Youngs to extend the
promissory note several times. When Larson's financing efforts failed, I believed that
foreclosure proceedings were imminent.
10.

In an effort to help the joint venture avoid foreclosure, I introduced the Normans

to Jim Winkler, who purchased the property from them and paid off the Young note.

Ttr
DATED this ^ _ day of May, 2000

Mark E. Arnold

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to this £ f _ day of May, 2000.
A^6_^L-.
NOTARY PUBLIC ,
KAREN A. BUTTON
m East Broadway #900
Salt Lake Cty Utah 84111
Commission Exptres

June 10 2000
<iTATK O F U T A t j
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Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on this 30th day of May, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to:

Steve Russell, Esq.
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab,UT 84532
James C. Haskins
Haskins & Associates
357 South 200 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

fLu;Tc^
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Matthew L.Lalli (#6105)
S N E L L & WILMERL.L.P.

Gateway Tower West
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800

IT > . . _

.
".U!V

Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT ARNOLD'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

vs.

Civil No.: 9807-116
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") moves this Court for an order granting partial
summary judgment on the First, Third, and Fourth Causes of Action in plaintiffs Robert and
Diane Norman's (the "Normans") amended complaint.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This lawsuit arises out of a failed real estate joint venture formed in 1995 to develop a
Holiday Inn motel in Moab, Utah. The members of the joint venture were Robert and Diane
Norman, Duane Barney, Pete Lanto, and Greg Page.1 Each of these individuals had a particular
role to play. The Normans were to donate the real property, Page was to arrange for financing,
Lanto was to construct the Holiday Inn, and Barney was to oversee the operation and
management of the Holiday Inn once construction was complete. Page hired Norman Larson to
assist in obtaining financing. Larson in turn introduced the joint venture partners to Mark
Arnold, who performed various tasks for the joint venture.
The first step toward development was to obtain $40,000 to purchase the Holiday Inn
Franchise and another larger sum of money to cover miscellaneous up-front costs and to use as
seed money to obtain a construction loan. Since none of the joint venture partners had that kind
of cash, and because they were in danger of losing the franchise to a competing bidder, Arnold
introduced them to Ann and Norman Young for short-term financing. The Youngs agreed to
make a short-term loan for $160,000, payable in 90 days, at 18 percent interest, and with loan
fees totaling 12 points. The Normans, Page, Barney, Lanto, and Larson all signed the
promissory note. The Normans agreed to pledge their property as collateral, and signed a deed
of trust in the Young's favor. The loan proceeds were placed into a trust account owned by
Larson, and Larson was the only person with signature authority.

1

Greg Page's brother-in-law, Eric Rasmussen, signed the joint venture agreement on Page's behalf,
although the Normans acknowledge that Page was the real joint venture partner. Am. Compl. H 11, a true
and correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1.
1
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Larson obtained the Holiday Inn franchise and over the next year Page and Larson
attempted to obtain financing, but to no avail. Although Arnold persuaded the Youngs to extend
the promissory note several times, when Larson's financing efforts failed, foreclosure seemed
imminent. In an effort to help the joint venture avoid foreclosure, Arnold introduced them to Jim
Winkler, who purchased the property from the Normans and paid off the Young note. At the
closing on Winkler's purchase, $212,000 of the sales proceeds was paid to the Youngs for
release of their trust deed.
On September 23, 1998, the Normans filed suit against Page, Barney, Lanto, Rasmussen,
Larson, and Arnold for breach of the joint venture agreement and default on the promissory note
and trust deed. On November 9, 1999, the Normans filed an amended complaint adding a new
cause of action against Arnold for breach of fiduciary duty. The amended complaint takes the
focus off of the joint venture partners and signatories on the promissory note, presumably
because most of them are impecunious or bankrupt. The two outsiders, Larson and Arnold, now
appear as the primary targets, no doubt, because they are perceived deep pockets.
The Normans assert four causes of action against Arnold, claiming that he (1) breached
the March 15, 1995 Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement (the "Agreement"); (2)
is liable for default on the Young promissory note and trust deed as a successor to Lanto; (3)
breached a fiduciary duty of undivided loyalty to the Normans; and (4) is liable for punitive
damages. It is unfortunate that the promissory note to the Youngs went into default and the
Normans lost money on the failed venture. Under the terms of the promissory note and the
Agreement, that loss arguably should be divided among the parties who jointly and severally
obligated themselves on the promissory note: Barney, Lanto, Page, Larson, Robert Norman, and
2
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Diane Norman. That joint and several liability on the defaulted note is the subject of the second
cause of action, which is not part of this motion and is the only one that should survive for trial.
As shown in more detail below, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on the first,
third, and fourth causes of action because he was not a party to the Agreement nor was he a joint
venture partner, and therefore could not be liable for breach of the Agreement. Arnold was not
the Normans' lawyer, and therefore did not owe them a fiduciary duty. Finally, because the only
conceivable claim against Arnold sounds in contract, the Normans are not entitled to punitive
damages as a matter of law.
II.

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

A.

Background.

1.

On March 15, 1995, the Normans, Barney, Lanto, and Rasmussen executed a

document entitled "Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement" (the "Agreement.") A
true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached as Exhibit 2.
2.

The members of "the group," the original joint venture partners, were Robert and

Diane Norman, Duane Barney, Pete Lanto, and Greg Page. 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 24:17-25:8,
true and correct excerpts from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 3.
3.

Each of these individuals had "a different role" to play. Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D.

Norman Dep. 34:20-23. The Normans were to donate the real property, Page was to "arrange for
financing," Lanto was to construct the Holiday Inn, and Barney was to oversee the "operation
and management" of the Holiday Inn once construction was complete. IdL at 34:20-36:1.
2

Unless otherwise indicated, the exhibits referred to in this memorandum are authenticated by the
Normans' deposition testimony. Deposition excerpts authenticating the exhibits are located immediately
behind each exhibit.
3
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4.

Page hired Norman Larson to assist in obtaining financing. Larson in turn

introduced the joint venture partners to Mark Arnold, who became the lawyer for the joint
venture. Affidavit of Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold Aff."), a true and correct copy of which is filed
concurrently herewith.
5.

The first step toward development was to obtain short-term financing to purchase

"two things": the Holiday Inn Franchise for $40,000 and another larger sum of money to cover
miscellaneous up-front costs and to use as seed money to obtain a construction loan. Ex. 3, D.
Norman Dep. 59:24-60:5; see also 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 61:2-7, true and correct excerpts
from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 4. Arnold introduced the joint venture partners to Ann
and Norman Young, who would provide this short-term financing. Arnold Aff., f 7; Ex. 4,
3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 32:13-19.
6.

The Youngs agreed to make a short-term loan for $160,000, payable in 90 days, at

18 percent interest and with loan fees totaling 12 points. Arnold Aff, 1f 7. A true and correct
copy of the promissory note is attached hereto as Exhibit 5. The Normans, Page, Barney, Lanto,
and Larson all signed the promissory note. Ex. 5; see also Ex. 1, Am. Compl., K 18.
7.

The Normans agreed to pledge their property as collateral, and signed a deed of

trust in the Youngs' favor. Arnold Aff., f 8. A true and correct copy of the deed of trust is
attached hereto as Exhibit 6. The loan proceeds were placed into a trust account owned by
Larson, and Larson was the only person with signature authority. IcL
8.

On October 27,1995, pursuant to a "Purchase Agreement," Lanto purported to

sell his interest in the joint venture to Mark Arnold and Western Empire Advisors, a company

4
S0RENSA\SLC\12Q777 1

owned by Larson, for $8,500. Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 64:22-66:13. A true and correct
copy of the purported purchase agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.
9.

Larson obtained the Holiday Inn franchise and over the next year Page and Larson

attempted to obtain financing, but to no avail. 8/25/99 B. Norman Dep. 52:13-23, true and
correct excerpts from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 8; Arnold Aff. f 9. Although Arnold
persuaded the Youngs to extend the promissory note several times, when Larson's financing
efforts failed, foreclosure seemed imminent. Arnold Aff. ^ 9; Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep.
65:5-18.
1.0.

In an effort to help the joint venture avoid foreclosure, Arnold introduced them to

Jim Winkler, who purchased the property from the Normans and paid off the Young note. Ex. 4,
3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 71:14-73:4. At the closing on Winkler's purchase, $212,000 of the
sales proceeds was paid to the Youngs for release of their trust deed. Ex. 8; 8/25/99 B. Norman
Dep. 133:6-134:16; see, also 5/22/98 Winkler/Norman Settlement Statement, a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 9.
B.

The Normans Did Not Consent to Arnold's Admission as a Partner.

11.

The Agreement provided that "[additional Joint Venturers may be added to the

Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint Venturers." Ex. 2
(emphasis added).
12.

Mr. Norman has twice testified that "[n]obody asked [him] about" Arnold

becoming a member of the joint venture, and that he never consented to Arnold's admission:
Q: [By Mr. Lalli]
You never gave your consent for Mark
Arnold to become an owner in the hotel part?

5
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Arnold to become an owner in the hotel part?
A: [By Mr. Norman] Nobody asked me about that.
Q: Okay. So because nobody asked you, you therefore never
consented, right?
A: Right.
Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 71:7-13.
Q: [By Mr. Howe] Did you ever give your consent for any other
individual to become a member of the joint venture?

A: [By Mr. Norman].... The answer is no.
Ex. 8, 8/25/99 B. Norman Dep. 28:23-29:3.
13.

Diane Norman also testified that she never consented to Arnold becoming a joint

venture partner.
Q: [By Mr. Lalli].... Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold
becoming a partner?
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Never.
Q: Okay. Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold purchasing
Lanto's interest?
A: Never.
Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 95:13-18.
C.

Arnold Was Not the Normans' Lawyer.

14.

Both Bob and Diane Norman have repeatedly testified that Arnold was "the

lawyer for the group," not for the Normans themselves:
Q: [By Mr. Lalli]
You believed that Arnold was just the
lawyer for the entire group?

6
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A: [By Mr. Norman] That's right That's the only contact I had ..

Q: In the event that your interests became different from say Page
or Barney, did you believe that Arnold would then represent your
interests rather than Page or Barney's?
A: No, I was just - as the group is the only thing.

Q: Did you think about whether Mr. Arnold would look out for
your interests rather than Page or Barney's in the event your
interests became different from Page's and Barney's?
A: I don't think it would be singled out - that I would be singled
out as being shown any favor, it was strictly for the group, that's it.
Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. at 10:12-15; 11:1-17; see also Ex. 4 at 24:20-23; 36:22-37:3.
15.

Diane Norman further testified that Arnold "never" represented the Normans

individually:
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] . . . . You've told me that you believe that
Arnold was the lawyer for the group; right?
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Uh-huh.

Q: [Arnold] represented the group, and do you know if he
represented Page, Barney, or Lanto individually?
A: No, I don't.
Q: And he did not represent you individually?
A: Never.
Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 24:17-20; 25:14-20.

7
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16.

In fact, the Normans' "principal contact" for information about the joint venture

was Page, not Arnold:
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Well, within the group, isn't it true that each
member had different responsibilities?
A: [By Mr. Norman] I assume that, but I - the main contacts I had
was with Duane Barney and Greg Page, and primarily Greg Page
was the principal individual that was giving me answers when he
was available to give answers.
Q: And wasn't Greg Page's primary responsibility to get financing
for the project?
A: I can't single him out as being the one that's responsible for the
financing when the whole group was involved, they each had jobs
to do, but Greg Page was my principal contact.
Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. at 20:4-14.
17.

Similarly, the Normans testified that Page, or Page and Barney, were the joint

venture partners solely responsible for communicating with Arnold about the joint venture's
representation:
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Was there one member of the group whose
responsibility it was to interact with Mark Arnold?
A: [By Mr. Norman] Greg Page I would say would be the lead
individual that we would try to get ahold of.
Q: Okay.
A: And Duane Barney.
Q: And during this period of the intended development, was it
your understanding that Page and Barney were Mark Arnold's
contacts with the group?
A: That was my understanding.
Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. at 23:14-24:1.
8
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18.

Diane Norman also had the "expectation" that Page and Barney would make and

receive communications with Arnold on behalf of the joint venture.
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Did you expect that Page and Barney would be
the ones who would communicate with the group's lawyer?
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Yes, and with the financial people and
whoever.
Q : . . . . Was it your expectation that whatever legal work needed
to be done, Page and Barney would communicate it to Arnold on
behalf of the group?
A: Yes.
Q: And was it also your expectation that the communication
would flow back the same way?
A: Yes.
Q: That is if Arnold is the group's lawyer and had information to
communicate to the group, he would tell Page and Barney?
A: Right.
Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. at 37:16-38:10.
19.

Diane Norman further testified that it was reasonable for Arnold, as the group's

attorney, to communicate with Page and Barney as representatives of the joint venture:
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Well, and I think you just told me that it was
your expectation that if the group's attorney wanted to
communicate with the group, he would have done so through Page
and Barney; right?
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Yeah, he's not going to call all of us to say

Q: Right. And you think that's reasonable?
A: I think that's reasonable as a group attorney.
Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. at 43:11-21.
9
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20.

The Normans further testified that they spoke with two attorneys of their own,

Mr. McConkey [sic] and Mr. Hughes, for advice and counsel in their individual behalf during the
joint venture's existence. Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 37:4-39:3. When the Normans wanted
representation "personally" during this time frame, they retained counsel of their own.
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Would you say that you hired Mr. McConkey to
be your lawyer?
A: [By Mr. Norman] Yes, sir.
Q: And when you're talking about your lawyer, are you talking
about Bob Norman personally or a lawyer for the group?
A: No, personally, to find out why we weren't getting any answers
from the group.
Id at 39:1-8.
III.

ARGUMENT

The judgment sought in a motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Under this standard, as
demonstrated below, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on the Normans' First, Third, and
Fourth Causes of Action.
A,

Arnold Is Not Liable for Breach of the Joint Venture Agreement Because He
Did Not Become a Joint Venture Partner As a Matter of Law.

In the first cause of action, the Normans contend that Arnold breached the Agreement in
a number of ways. As a predicate to establish liability for breach of the Agreement, however, the
Normans first must prove that Arnold became a party to the Agreement and voluntarily assumed
10
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the rights and obligations under the Agreement. See, e.g., Vasels v. LoGuidice. 740 P.2d 1375,
1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (observing that mutual assent of parties to a contract is "essential" to
create binding contract); Bunnell v. Bills. 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) ("[a] binding contract
can only exist where there has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be
bound by its terms.") The undisputed facts negate this fundamental element of the Normans'
breach of contract claim, and conclusively demonstrate that Arnold was not a party to the
Agreement and never became a partner in the joint venture.
It is undisputed that Arnold never signed the Agreement or assented to its terms. The
face of the Agreement itself demonstrates that Arnold is not a signatory. See Ex. 2. Neither is
there any evidence that Arnold signed or assented to any amendment to the Agreement. Thus,
there is no evidence on which the Normans can base a claim that Arnold expressly became a
party to the Agreement.
Even if Arnold had signed the Agreement or intended to become a partner in the joint
venture, the undisputed facts further demonstrate that Arnold was not a partner as a matter of
law. In Utah, "subject to any agreement between them . . . [n]o person can become a member of
a partnership without the consent of all the partners." Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-15(7) (supp.
1999); see also 59A Am Jur.2d §§109, PARTNERSHIP ("[N]o person can become a member of a
partnership without the consent of all partners.") In Folsom v. Fernstrom, 134 P. 1021,1024
(Utah 1913) the Utah Supreme Court upheld a verdict for the plaintiff finding that the defendant
had not become a member of the plaintiffs failed real estate partnership because there was
insufficient evidence that the plaintiff had consented to the defendant's admission to the
partnership. In so doing, the supreme court observed that "[o]f course [defendant] could not
11
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become a member of the partnership without the consent of both [the plaintiff] and [the codefendant], the original members of the firm." Folsom, 134 P. at 1024.
Here, the Agreement specifically provides that "[additional Joint Venturers may be
added to the Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint
Venturers." Ex. 2, Article 1.7 (emphasis added). Mr. Norman has twice testified that "[n]obody
asked [him] about" Arnold becoming a member of the joint venture, and that he never consented
to Arnold's admission. Def.'s Statement Undisputed Material Facts ^ 12. Likewise, Diane
Norman testified that she "never" consented to Arnold's admission as a joint venture partner. Id.
at ^f 13. In addition, the Normans' breach of contract claim itself specifically acknowledges that
if Arnold became a joint venture partner, he did so "contrary to [the Joint Venture Agreement's]
provisions." Ex. 1,^31(e), 43(e).
It is undisputed that the Normans did not consent to Arnold becoming a joint venture
partner. As a result, the Agreement and Utah Code § 48-1-15(7) provide that Arnold cannot
claim membership in the joint venture, and cannot have any rights or obligations whatsoever
under the Agreement. It is black-letter law that Arnold cannot breach a contract - the Agreement
- to which he was never a party, for an obligation he never undertook. See, e.g., Soule v.
Weatherbv, 118 P. 833, 834 (Utah 1911) ("[i]n the obligation assumed by the defendant is found
his duty, and his failure to comply with the duty constitutes the breach"); Bunnell v. Bills, 368
P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962).

12
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As a result, the Normans' claim for breach of the Agreement against Arnold fails as a
matter of law.3
B.

The Normans' Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim Fails As a Matter of Law
Because It is Undisputed that Arnold Was "Never" the Normans9 Lawyer.

In the third cause of action, the Normans claim that Arnold owed and breached a
fiduciary duty. The fiduciary duty the Normans claim Arnold breached is the duty of undivided
loyalty. Specifically, they allege that Arnold is liable for having conflicts of interest or for
engaging in self dealing by (1) negotiating a loan from the Youngs to the joint venture with
terms favorable to the Youngs and himself (Ex. 1, Am. Compl.ffl[59-64); (2) allowing loan
proceeds to be spent without the Normans' knowledge or consent (Ex. 1, Am. Compl.ffi[66-67;
70-71; 73); and (3) introducing the Normans to another of his clients, Jim Winkler, for the
purchase of the Normans' property. Ex. 1, Am. Compl. ^fl[ 77-80.
Of course, this claim that Arnold breached a fiduciary duty presupposes Arnold had such
a duty in the first place. The Normans claim Arnold owned them a personal fiduciary duty
because he was their personal lawyer. The Normans allege that "defendant Arnold commenced
an attorney-client relationship with Robert and Diane Norman . . . . " Ex. 1, Am. Compl. ^ 56.
3

Although Arnold did not become a party to the Agreement or a partner in the joint venture under the
undisputed facts and the law, there remains a question about whether Arnold and Western Empire
Advisors, Larson's company, are obligated to indemnify Lanto for any liability he has under the $160,000
promissory note. On October 27, 1995, Arnold and Larson signed a Purchase Agreement under which
they purported to purchase Lanto's interest in the joint venture and purported to indemnify Lanto against
his share of any liability under the promissory note. See Ex. 7. Whether Lanto has any liability under the
promissory note that he could pass along to Arnold and Larson under the Purchase Agreement is the
subject of the second cause of action, in which the Normans effectively seek contribution from the other
signatories on the promissory note. Arnold has not moved for summary judgment on that cause of action,
and any liability of Arnold, Larson, and the other signatories should be assessed and apportioned under
that second cause of action. However, any potential liability of Arnold and Larson to Lanto under the
second cause of action and the Purchase Agreement should not be confused with the Normans' first cause
of action for Arnold's breach of the Agreement, to which he was never a party.
13
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They further allege that Arnold, as "[a]n attorney acting for, or purporting to act for a client owes
a very high duty to look after and protect his clients' interests. The duty is both personal and
fiduciary in nature." Id. at ^ 80.
Indeed, to recover for breach of fiduciary duty in an action against a lawyer, the first
thing the purported client must prove is the existence of an attorney-client relationship.
Kibatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). While it is
true that a lawyer owes his clients a fiduciary duty, including a duty of undivided loyalty, it is not
true that Arnold ever had an attorney-client relationship with the Normans. Therefore, Arnold
never owed the Normans a fiduciary duty.
That Arnold never acted as the Normans' lawyer and thus never owed the Normans a
fiduciary duty is evident from the Normans' own testimony. Both of the Normans have
repeatedly testified that (1) Arnold "never" acted as their lawyer (Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep.
25:18-20); (2) he was at all times "the lawyer for the group," (Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep.
10:12-25; 11:10-17; 36:22-37:3; Ex. 3, 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 24:17-20); (3) that Arnold's
representation of the joint venture was "strictly for the group, that's it" in the event any of the
individual joint venture partner's interests diverged (Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 11:1-17);
and that (4) when the Normans wanted representation "personally" during the existence of the
joint venture, they retained counsel of their own. Ex. 4, 3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 39:1-8. See
Undisputed Facts IflJ 14-20. Thus, the plaintiffs themselves have testified that Arnold was not
their lawyer, and because there was no attorney-client relationship there was no fiduciary duty.
See Kilpatrick v. Wilev. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283,1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(enumerating elements of cause of action for legal malpractice breach of fiduciary duty). As a
14
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result, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on the Normans' claim for breach of a fiduciary
duty.
As a lawyer, Arnold's only fiduciary duty was to his client, the joint venture, which is a
"distinct and separate" legal entity from the individual joint venture partners. See Salt Lake
Knee & Rehabilitation. Inc. v. Salt Lake Citv Knee & Sports Medicine. 909 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah
Ct. App. 1995). Nor does the Normans' belief that Arnold acted as counsel for the joint venture
provide them with standing to maintain a cause of action against him for breach of fiduciary
duty. Instead, as with the representation of corporations, "a lawyer who represents a partnership
does not thereby become counsel for or owe a duty to the partners." Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey
M. Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24.8 (4th ed. 1996); Bieter Co. v. Blomguist 132 F.R.D. 220,
224 (D. Minn. 1990) (law firm's representation of joint venture did not constitute representation
of individual joint venturers). As Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.13 further states, "[a]
lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization acting through its
duly retained constituents." (Emphasis added.) This rule is the same regardless of the
organizational client's corporate form or of the relative importance of the constituent to the
organizational client.
Under analogous circumstances in Hopper v. Frank. 16 F.3d 92, 97 (5th Cir. 1994), a
general partner of a partnership sued the partnership's law firm, but in his individual capacity.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendant law firm because plaintiffs
status as general partner of the law firm's client did not establish an attorney-client relationship
between the law firm and the general partner in his individual capacity. As a result, the court
found that the plaintiff general partner lacked standing to sue for breach of fiduciary duty. In so
15
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holding, the court observed that mere "broad and conclusory assertion^]" in the plaintiffs'
affidavits stating that the [law] firm undertook an affirmative duty to represent plaintiffs
separately from the partnership were insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to
the existence of an attorney-client relationship. Here, as in Hopper, the Normans "fail to meet
the burden of showing, through specific and pertinent facts, the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact regarding the absence of an attorney-client relationship between [the law firm] and
[the partners], as individuals . . . . " Id. at 98.
In short, the Normans' claim for breach of fiduciary duty fails as a matter of law because
they cannot demonstrate the first element of the cause of action, the existence of the attorneyclient relationship. Kilpatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App.
1996). Because there was no attorney-client relationship, there was no fiduciary duty.
Therefore, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on this cause of action.
C.

The Court Should Dismiss the Normans' Claim for Punitive Damages
Because Punitive Damages Are Not Available Here As a Matter of Law.

The Normans' fourth cause of action purports to set forth an independent claim for
"Punitive Damages," alleging that "defendants knowingly and intentionally set out to take
advantage of [the Normans] and use their property to secure funds which defendants would then
use for their own purposes." Ex. 1, Am. Compl. ^ 86. The Normans and their attorney advance
this theory, despite the absence of evidence that Arnold intended to or did take money for his
own purposes, for the obvious purpose of gaining leverage in settlement discussions. As much
as they would like to impose the threat of punitive damages, however, this simply is not a case
for punitive damages. This case is about an investment in a joint venture that failed. Because

16

the Normans ended up taking the loss on the defaulted promissory note, they may be entitled to
contribution from the other co-obligors on that promissory note. But that does not translate into
a punitive damages claim against Arnold.
As demonstrated above, the only claim the Normans may have against Arnold is for
breach of contract - the "default of trust deed note" claim- set forth in their second cause of
action. In Utah, however, as elsewhere, "punitive damages cannot be awarded for a breach of
contract." Highland Constr. Co. v. Union Pacific R.R.. 683 P.2d 1042, 1049 (Utah 1984);
Jorgensen v. John Clav and Co.. 660 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1983) ("The general rule is that
punitive damages cannot be awarded for a breach of contract.") Moreover, a claim for punitive
damages is not a cause of action in itself, but must be predicated on an independent tort. In Hal
Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica. Inc.. 657 P.2d 743, 750 (Utah 1982), the Utah supreme court
upheld the trial court's determination that "no factual basis" existed "support[ing] the allegations
of other tortious conduct" against the defendants warranting an award of compensatory damages.
As a result, "having found no independent tort," the supreme court saw "no basis for the award
of punitive damages in this contract case" and "affirm[ed] the denial of punitive damages by the
trial court" on that basis. Hal Taylor Assocs., 657 P.2d at 750.
The Normans' complaint contains only one cause of action sounding in tort - the breach
of fiduciary duty claim against Arnold. Thus, their claim for punitive damages necessarily is
predicated on it. As shown above, however, it is undisputed that Arnold was never the Normans'
personal lawyer, and as a result he owed them no fiduciary duty. Hopper v. Frank, 16 F.3d 92,
4

Of course, Arnold denies any liability for the Normans' second cause of action, which is contract claim
for contribution on the promissory note. However, that cause of action is not the subject of this motion,
and should be reserved for tnal.
17
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94 (5th Cir. 1994). Thus, the Court should dismiss the Normans' claim for punitive damages
because the independent tort on which it is based fails as a matter of law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this motion for summary judgment is to focus the court and the jury on
the real issue for trial. That issue is whether Arnold and others are jointly and severally liable on
the defaulted promissory note, and therefore should have to share in the Normans' loss
associated with that default. The Normans are entitled to their day in court on that issue, but they
are not entitled to assert claims for breach of the joint venture Agreement, for breach of fiduciary
duty, and for punitive damages because Utah law and the undisputed facts demonstrate that
Arnold was not a party to the Agreement, did not become a joint venture partner, was not the
Normans' personal lawyer, and did not owe the Normans a fiduciary duty. Therefore, Arnold is
entitled to summary judgment on the first, third, and fourth causes of action.
DATED this £ O day of May, 2000.
SNELL &

WILMERLLP.

MatSew L. Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,

Plaintiffs,

Response to Defendant Arnold
Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment

Civil No. 9807-116
Mark E. Arnold & Norman 1VL Larson,
Judge Anderson
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby respond to defendant Arnold's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment. Defendant requests that the Court award Summary Judgment on
Plaintiffs' 1st Cause of Action - Breach of Joint Venture Agreement, 3 rd - Breach of Fiduciary
Duty; and 4th - Claim For Punitive Damages. As will be demonstrated below, the Motion is so
wholly without merit as to justify an award of plaintiffs' costs and attorney's fees incurred in
filing this response.
Summary of Plaintiffs9 Response
With regard to defendant's breach of the joint venture claim, defendant Arnold contends
that he should be granted summary judgment because he was not a Member of the Joint Venture.
Arnold's position is controverted by the fact that he bought in to the venture when he purchased
"any and all interest... in the Holiday Inn venture" from Pete Lanto. (Def. Exh. 7) That he did

so without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs should not now work to his advantage as a
defense. In any event, for all practical purposes, the terms and conditions of the Moab Land
Development Joint Venture Agreement (Def. Exhibit 2) were never observed, and Mark Arnold,
more than anyone, was responsible for the demise of that agreement. It is clear that the project
was taken over by "the group'5 which included Page, Barney & Lanto (4-D Development),
Arnold as counsel/partner, Larson in the financial role and the Normans. When the Normans
learned that Arnold had become a member of the group, they assented and allowed him to
continue in his dual capacity.
Defendant seeks summary judgment of plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim on the
contention that he was not the Normans' personal attorney. While that may be technically true,
Arnold admits that he was counsel for "the group" which included the Normans. Arnold testified
that he represented the parties "individually, as members of the group." Moreover, Arnold was
aware that the Normans had very substantial personal interests at stake - were in fact were the
only parties at risk in the venture, and states that, as counsel, he was trying to help them. In fact,
his conduct as counsel was completely negligent, frought with conflict and directly adverse to
the Normans' economic and personal interests. It is exactly the type of conduct that legal
malpractice claims are designed to remedy.
The Court should take into account that throughout the course of events the plaintiffs
were not informed, lied to and taken advantage of. Their case has been fleshed out through
discovery with new revelations continuing to be made. To the extent necessary the plaintiffs are
entitled to a ruling that the pleadings be deemed amended to conform to the evidence. Given the
dozens of questions of material fact that will arise from a great deal of evidence, the jury should
be allowed to determine Arnold's liability on the relevant issues.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

As an introduction to plaintiffs' response to defendant Arnold's Motion, the following
basic time-time is offered:

"NL" designates documents received in discovery by defendant

Larson; "BN" designates documents submitted in discovery by the plaintiffs;
Pre-1995
Greg Page, Peter Lanto and possibly others are already working on
a Holiday Inn project to be located in Park City.
January, 1995
The Normans meet Page, Duane Barney and Lanto for the first
time. Discussions ensue regarding a possible Holiday Inn project in Moab.
March 15, 1995
Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement is executed by
the Normans, Rasmussen (Page), Barney and Lanto. (Def. Exhibit 2)
April 27, 1995
Letter, Norman Larson to Page. Evidence that Larson is already
looking around in Arizona for financing. (NL 57)
April 28, 1995
Larson Service Agreement to provide financing is executed with 4D Development. The Normans are not members of 4-D Development.
(NL 1-4)
June 6, 1995
Letter from Larson to Bruce Holman (Trust Guarantee). Identifies
Mark Arnold as "attorney for the project." (from Arnold discovery responses - attached)
June 8, 1995
to have $100,000 in Trust.

Letter from Holman to Larson (att'n Arnold), stating that they need
(NL55)

June 16, 1995
Letter from Larson to Holman stating that the joint venture had
$100,000 on hand.
(NL54)
June 15-16, 1995
Larson obtains Holiday Inn Franchise for Moab. Fee owners of
Normans' land is listed as 4-D Development. Larson signature on the Franchise Agreement is
witnessed by Arnold. Larson $40,000 check for Franchise Fee is sent from Arnold's office.
(NL 6, cover page only)
June, 1995
Arnold negotiates 90-day, $160,000 loan from his client, Ann
Young at 18% interest, and pledges the Norman property as collateral.
June 17, 1995
Arnold.
(NL 53)

$160,000 deposited in American Legal Title Trust Account by

June 19, 1995
$160,000 deposited in Larson's Western Empire Advisors account.
Larson pays himself $40,000 for Holiday Inn Franchise fee.
(NL 105)
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June 19, 1995
Arnold and I.arson form Venture Properties II, L.C (attachment obtained by plaintiffs' counsel from State of Utah - not provided in discovery)
June 20, 1995
(NL107)

WEA Check to Mark Arnold for $8,000.

-Loan

finders

fee."

June 21, 1995
(NL 109)

WEA Check to Norman Larson for $8,000. "Loan finders fee."

WEA check to Ann Young for $3,200. "Loan points." (NL 111)
WEA check to for $10,000 to Robert Morris & Ass. (attachment obtained by plaintiffs' counsel from Robert Morris- not provided in discovery)
For earnest money on Park City property. (Larson paid himself back out of the loan proceeds on
June 30, 1995)
(NL115)
At this point, Larson and Arnold had already spent $69,200 of the loan proceeds.
June 27, 1995
Normans execute Trust Deed and Note prepared by .Arnold.
(Def. Exhibits 4 & 6 - there are actually several copies the note with different dates, etc.)
July 25, 1995
Letter, Arnold to David Schori (Robert Morris & Ass.) Requesting extension of Park City property closing, (from Arnold discovery responses attached)
July 28, 1995
Robert Morris returns $10,000 earnest money check to Venture
Properties, II, L.C. Check is endorsed by Arnold and Larson.
(attachment - obtained by
plaintiffs' counsel from Robert Morris- not provided in discovery)
September 29, 1995 Larson wires $50,000 to Trust Guarantee in Arizona.
October 4,1995
in the amount of $50,000."

(NL 119)

Letter, Arnold to Holman. "We have wired earnest money to you
(from Arnold discovery responses - attached)

October 20, 1995
Letter, Larson to Holman (Holman apparently wants the other
$50,000) "Mark Arnold the attorney has been reluctant about releasing the other $50,000. "
(NL 139)
October 25, 1995
WEA check for $8,500 to buy out Lantos. (Larson subsequently
reimbured WEA out of the Young loan proceeds on October 31,1995.)
(NL 121)
October 27, 1995

Fax, Arnold to Larson, including:
Letter from Greg Page to Barney and Lanto dissolving 4-D; and
Arnold's Purchase Agreement of Lantc's interest. (NL 70-72)

October 31, 1995
Arnold prepares and notarizes General Power of Attorney from
Duane Barney (going to prison) to Greg Page, (from Arnold discovery responses - attached)
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November 3, 1995
Letter, Larson to Holman: "Mark Arnold, the attorney and myself
vt /// come to Phoenix with a check when you can confirm a closing date for this (Moab) project
and the purchase of the land in Park City. We are very anxious to proceed since we own an
equity position in both projects and 1 have the franchise. " (NL 68)
February 12, 1996
WEA check to Page for $5,000 from Young loan to reimburse
Page for Larson's initial fee under the 4/28/95 Service Agreement.
(NL 127)
April 3, 1996

Larson's "Income and Expense Reconciliation" showing that all of

the $ 160,000 from the Young loan is gone. (NL 91)
Apnl 5, 1996

WEA check to Page for $2,000 from the Moab account. (NL 135)

April 10, 1996
Letter, Page to Larson terminating Service Agreement and
demanding reimbursement of loan proceeds, plus interest, cc. Arnold.
(BN 61-62)
May 1, 1996
Meeting in Arnold's Salt Lake office. Arnold states he purchased
Lanto's interest, that the loan proceeds are unaccounted for; that $50,000 was sent to Arizona
and "losf' - but that he (Arnold) can get it back.
(BN 70-71)
June 18, 1996
partner and joint liability.

Letter, Arnold to Larson - establishes Arnold's involvement as a
(BN 85-86)

August 21, 1996
(BN 92-93)

Young Trust Deed assigned to Arnold client Jim Winkler.

November 21, 1996 Letter Arnold to Kent Johnson re: competing project immediately
adjacent to Normans' property.
(BN 95)
May 22, 1998
Winkler purchases the subject property from Normans receiving a
credit of $212,000 for the balance on the note assumed from the Youngs. (BN 99-100)
These documents are attached chronologically and labeled "Timeline Documents. "

H.

RESPONSE TO UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
& ADDITONAL MATERIAL FACTS

1.

Plaintiffs do not dispute fact numbers 1-4,7-8, 10-13 & 20.

2.

Fact Nos. 14-19, merely provide a small portion of the Normans' deposition

testimony. The testimony is accurately recorded but does not tell the whole story which will be
illuminated herein.

3.

With regard to defendant's fact #5, the Normans have testified as follows:
a.

They were told that the Promissory Note would be $40,000 and was

necessary to acquire the Holiday Inn Franchise. (Diane Norman depo. at 49-50, 59-64, 79-81.)
b.
$160,000;

They have testified that the Note they signed was for $40,000, not

Id
c.

The Promissory Note and Trust Deed were prepared by Mark Arnold's

Office pursuant to his instructions;
d.

(Arnold depo. at 43-44)

The note and trust deed were signed by the Normans on June 27, 1995.

(See, defendants Exhibits 4 & 6) As of that date, Norman Larson had already acquired the
Holiday Inn Franchise. This fact was known by defendant Arnold, as the $40,000 payment for
the franchise was sent from his office on or about June 16, 1995. However, the true status of the
Franchise and Larson's role was never disclosed to the Normans. (See, timeline and supporting
documents)
4.

With regard to defendant's fact #6, defendant Arnold had secured the $160,000

from his clients the Youngs, and had spent or authorized the expenditure of nearly $70,000 of the
proceeds prior to the Normans' execution of the Trust Deed and Note. The plaintiffs were not
advised of these facts. (See, timeline and supporting documents)
5.

With regard to defendant's fact #9, defendant Larson had acquired the Holiday

Inn Franchise before the Normans signed the Young Promissory Deed and Note or were even
aware of his existence. (See, timeline and supporting documents)
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11(a) PLAINTIFFS5 ADDITIONAL UNDISPUTED FACTS
The Testimony of Co-Defendant Norman Larson Raises Numerous Issues
Of Material Fact Precluding Summary Judgment
The testimony of Norman Larson raises questions of fact as to Arnold's involvement in
the joint venture, and/or assumption of liability under the Trust Deed and Promissory Note, as
well as his conduct as counsel which preclude Summary Judgment in favor of Arnold. Larson
testified as follows:
Q.
project?
A.
depo. at 17.
Q.
A.

What was your business relationship with Mr. Arnold on the Moab Holiday Inn
Mr. Arnold was handling the legal affairs and other documentation. Larson
Do you know what happened to (Lanto's) participation in the project?
Yes. It was purchased by Mr. Arnold.
Id. at 23.

A.
Mr. Arnold, being an attorney and representing the project, and myself, went to
Phoenix Arizona (for due diligence on the lender that received $50,000) . . . we realized the
funds weren't going to be forthcoming. I began a class action suit against National Acceptance
Corp. and the principals to recover the $50,000 that we had given them. I was asked to leave the
joint venture because I had not performed and I asked Mr. Arnold if I should pursue the class
action and he said that he would handle that.
Id. at 27.
(Arnold) just reminded me that the reason we went to Phoenix was not to do due
diligence on the company, we had done that otherwise, but to lay claim on the money and
demand that we get it returned because it was supposed to sit in a trust account.
Q.
So they gave you a long story but gave you additional assurance that the money
would come back?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Was there any follow-up that you are aware of?
A.
I don't know. Right after that was when I was asked to leave the project, and Mr.
Page and Mr. Arnold and Mr. Barney were to take whatever action was necessary to get the
money back.
Id. at 36-37.
Q.
Did you ever transfer the franchise to the joint venture or to any other party other
than yourself?
A.
Yes I did.

Q.
When did you do that?
A.
It was in 1996 when I was requested to do so, so that they could keep the
franchise, they being Mr. Page, Mr. Arnold and Mr. Barney.
Id. at 42.
Q.
How did you come to talk with Mr. Arnold about (the Young loan)?
A.
Mr. Arnold was my attorney and he had indicated that he had clients that were
willing to loan what they call hard money loan, high interest loans, fairly quickly.
Id. at 44.
Q.
Do you know why you signed the note?
A.
Mr. Arnold asked me to sign the note as additional security for the Youngs.
Q.
And you were OK with becoming obligated on it?
A.
He was my attorney and I took his recommendation, or requirement. . .
Q.
I'm getting confused about Mr. Arnold's role in this transaction now. Are you
saying now that he represented you in the Moab Holiday Express project?
A.
He played two roles. One was representing me and one was representing the
project
Q.
And actually there was a third hat of Mr. Arnold because he purchased Mr.
Lanto's share in the partnership, did he not?
A.
Actually the purchase was not consummated because the money to purchase Mr.
Lanto's share came back to the partnership and he was credited whatever the cost was, $8,500
through legal efforts. So that was the understanding that we had.
Q.
I don't understand that.
(Arnold) was going to accumulate legal time and expenses to offset the $8,500 for
Mr. Lanto 's equity position.
Q.
But nevertheless he acquired Mr. Lanto's position?
A.
I don't know if he acquired it or if it was an attempt to acquire it. I can't answer
that.
Was that discussed (with Arnold) earlier today?
Q
A
Yes.
M a t 47-48.
Loan fee is $16,000?
Q
Yes.
A
What is that?
Q
For hard money loans, the accepted fee is 10%. Mr. Arnold and I provided
A
$160,000 in hard money capital into the project. We each got $8,000 in fees.
And what did you do for those fees?
Q
Specifically, when I met with Mr. and Mrs. Young . . . I'm the one that presented
the project to them for approval. Mr. Arnold and myself worked together in providing an
equitable loan for the Youngs and also for the partnership, or the joint venture, whatever it was
called, and for that I was paid $8,000 and Mr. Arnold was paid $8,000.
Q.
Do you know if that expense was approved by the joint venture?
A.
I don't know . . . Every check that was written was approved by the joint venture.
So I don't think that this was not approved by the joint venture.
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Q.
Who wrote the checks9
A.
1 did. But writing the checks and getting approval to write the checks are two
different things. I wouldn't have written the checks had I not gotten approval from the joint
venture. You asked me if I had gotten approval from the joint venture. I can't say specifically
that I did. The fact that I wrote the checks indicates that, yes, I did get approval from the joint
venture.
Q.
Is there any documentation of the approval?
A.
Not to my knowledge, unless Mr. Arnold has it.
Q.
How would that approval have been communicated to you?
A.
Verbally.
Q.
Were you required, since you had control of the funds, to contact anyone before
you wrote the checks?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Who did you contact?
A.
/ would always go to Mr. Arnold. He was representing the joint venture.
Q.
Do you know of anyone else other than yourself and Mr. Arnold that were aware
of the payment of these loan fees?
A.
No.
Id at 54-58.
Q.
What was your deal if you were able to put together financing, what would you
have received for that?
A.
Approximately 25% equity in the project.
Q.
And was there something in writing that was provided to you that said that?
A.
I don't recall. I don't have documentation to that effect.
Q.
Lets return to Exhibit 1 for a minute. It's the Moab Land Development Joint
Venture Agreement.. . The page following the signature page is Schedule A which lists the joint
venturers and their percentage of interest... so your testimony now is that if you had received
financing this would have changed?
A.
I was told that the document would have changed had I provided financing.
Q.
Who told you that?
A.
Mr. Arnold, Mr. Barney and Mr. Page.
Id. at 59-60.
A.
/ worked almost completely with Mr. Arnold, and Mr. Arnold was working, had a
direct relationship with those people.
Q.
Did Mr. Arnold represent them?
A.
The project or them personally?
Q.
Personally.
A.
I don't know.
Q.
The answer is sort of included in what you just said, but did you ever discuss any
of these expenditures with Mr. Norman?
A.
No. I didn't discuss anything with Mr. Norman, other than our first meeting, and
that was just an introduction.
Id. at 63.
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Q.
Who approved the two points ($3,200 to Ann Young)?
A.
Again, it would have had to have been approved by everyone or she wouldn't
have been paid the 2%. She was Mr. Arnold's client and so Mr. Arnold negotiated directly with
her.
Q.
When you say that it would have - I want to know what you actually know. You
say it would have had to have been approved by everyone involved. That's what you would
hope had happened?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Do you know whether that happened?
A.
I don't know that that happened. I know that none of the checks would have been
written without the approval of the other parties. To my knowledge, I have no documentation to
that effect.
Q.
(T)he person you discussed these expenditures with was Mr. Arnold?
A.
Yes.
Q.
And so are you saying that Mr. Arnold told you that everyone had approved of
these (expenditures)?
A.
I don't recall. I didn't speak with Mr. Barney, I didn't speak with Mr. Page, and I
didn't speak with Mr. Norman.
Q.
So you are making an assumption?
A.
/ relied on Mr. Arnold...
Id. at 64.
Q.
In performing (your) function - which was to obtain financing for a Holiday Inn were you working for or with the Moab Land Development Joint Venture, which was in
existence in March, 1995, or were you working with 4-D Development?
A.
It's my understanding I was working for 4-D Development. I had no knowledge
of the (Joint Venture Agreement) nor these people.
Q.
You had no knowledge of Robert Norman then?
A.
No.
Q.
Robert Norman is not involved with 4-D Development, is he?
A.
He's not. I don't think he's involved. I think those are the joint venture partners.
But I haven't seen documentation to that effect. What you showed me was an exhibit of the
Moab Land Development Joint Venture, and the first time I saw that is when the Complaint came
in. I had no knowledge of this document or these people, until that time.
Id. at 70-71
Q.

And this other project in Park City . . . Do you think Mr. Norman had any interest

in that?
A.
Consequently
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Yes. It's my assumption that he was a fourth party in 4-D Development.
he'd have an interest in that project.
That's your assumption?
Yes.
Do you have anything to back that up?
No.
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Q.
Were the principals of the Park City project any different than the principals of
the Moab project?
A.
Not to my recollection.
Q.
And you were told that the $160,000 you received could be used for either of
these projects?
A.
I don't recall being told that.
Q.
But since you assume that all of these payments were approved, then somebody
approved the $10,000 (earnest money on Park City property) payment?
A.
That's true.
Q.
What was Mr. Arnold's involvement in the Park City project?
A.
He assisted the joint venture - whatever it was called, in negotiating the
land.
Id. at 73-74.
Q.
Returning to Exhibit 6, Line #7, dated October 31, 1995 - Pete Lanto $8,500,
what was that for?
A.
That was to release him from the partnership, or their 4-D Development company.
That was the price that was negotiated by Mr. Arnold and Mr. Lanto.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

What had Lanto contributed to the joint venture at that point?
I can't answer that. I don't know.
Do you know of anything?
No.

Q.
Did anyone tell you why Mr. Lanto was being paid to leave the joint venture?
A.
It was his request.
Q.
I can ask you for $20,000 right now too. Did anyone tell you why . . . they felt it
was appropriate to pay Mr. Lanto to leave the partnership?
A.
I don't recall.
Q.
Do you recall talking to anyone specifically about writing this check.
A.
Specifically, Mr. Arnold... the check was to purchase his interest back in the
Holiday Express project, for $8,500, his 25% interest, or whatever it was at the time.
Q.
Who had it after that?
A.

legal fees.

/ think it went back into the partnership and it was to go to Mr. Arnold in lieu of

Id. at 84-87.

Q.
Does (the Purchase Agreement - NL 72) clarify the issue in your mind as to
whether or not Mr. Arnold bought Mr. Lanto's interest in the Moab Express project?
A.
Arnold and Western Empire bought Lanto's position... that was the intent.
Id. at 90.
Q.
Does having established Mr. Arnold as having bought . . . Mr. Lanto's interest
have any impact on your testimony that he was representing you as your counsel in these
matters?
A.
No.
Id. at 94.
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Q.
After you sent Holiday Inn the $40,000 check and obtained the franchise - which
was issued to you individually, right?
A.
Yes.
Q
-- did you then receive this Holiday Inns Franchising, Inc., new development
license agreement?
A.
Yes.
Q.
Are you familiar with this agreement?
A.
Not specifically. I know it was sent to me.
Q.
Is it assignable?
A.
I don't know if it is or not.
Q.
Did you ever intend to assign it?
A.
It was my intention to use the agreement collectively for the partnership whether
it be assigned or not. Assignment was never an issue until I was asked to assign it or write a
letter discontinuing my involvement in the franchise agreement so that Mr. Arnold, Mr. Barney
and Mr. page could work directly with Holiday Express. Under what arrangements, I don't
know.
Q.
Did you write such a letter to Holiday Inn?
A.
I didn't write the letter. Mr. Arnold faxed me a letter and I signed it and faxed it
back to him.
{Page 34 of the document states that 4-D Development is the fee owner of the
Normans' property.)
Id. at 101-103
Q.
After you received this (April 10, 1996) letter did you talk to Greg Page?
A.
I don't recall talking to him about it. I talked to Mr. Arnold and asked him to talk
to Mr. Page. As you look at the letter, they had a meeting and I wasn't invited to the meeting.
So Mr. Arnold was their spokesman.
Q.
. . . since the letter came from Page, I'm just wondering why you went to Arnold
and not to Page.
A.
Mr. Arnold was acting attorney, my attorney, but he was also acting as legal
counsel for the property, or the project
Id. at 111-112

n
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The testimony of Diane Norman is relevant to both aspects of defendant's Motion. It
establishes that Arnold was perceived to have an integral role in the joint venture, and that the
Normans personally looked to him, as counsel for the group, to protect their interests.
Q.
Do you understand that the consequence of not getting the loan is that the project
would never have gone forward?
A.
No. (T)hat wouldn't have been a problem. The project could have still gone
forward, because we wouldn't have had to pay a $40,000 franchise fee, and they could have gone
in a different direction which they chose not to do.
Q.
Who is they?
A.
They, the whole group. I mean, they could have called and said,. . . this loan - if
they had been honest and upfront and said this is $160,000 and we're going to have to pay all
this stuff, and we need to get the franchise. All we were looking at at the outset was $40,000 and
our land. Once it got to this exhorbitant amount, and we didn't even find this out until May
(1996) - this was history know to them, and we were never notified of all this stuff, and that's
the thing that was - this one piece of paper here was the thing that out of everything that ever
came out is that they - // shows they already were wheeling and dealing with our life and our
money and our land without any regard for me and my husband and that's the thing tfiat just is
not right.
Would you kike me to call the names now at this point for each individual? Mark
(Arnold), Norm, Greg, Duane and Pete Lanto giving up his position - they pay off this $8,500,
and Mark Arnold says he is now a partner.
Diane Norman depo. at 75-76,
Q.
What is it, if anything, that Mark Arnold did to cause the project to fail?
A.
Well, I think just his manipulation of funds. I think his manipulation of becoming
a partner. I think his being the lead person for us to talk to at his convenience on stuff that he
wanted us to know and keeping quiet on the other parts that were dishonest.
Mat 104,
This is only a very small sample of Diane Norman's testimony.

Her deposition is

appended in full should the Court find it help to peruse her testimony.
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HI.

PLAINTIFFS' THEORY OF THE CASE

As a context for this Motion and to assist the Court in making its determinations, it may
be helpful for the Court to have a basic overview of the case.
The active and inactive defendants (Greg Page, Duane Barney, Larson & Arnold) are the
kind of persons who go around looking for ways to make money without having to work or
assume any risk, and all the better if the risk falls on someone else. Greg Page, Duane Barney
and Peter Lanto had been in business before. They were trying to develop a Holiday Inn in Park
City prior to ever meeting the Normans. They had formed 4-D development, from which
plaintiffs were excluded, for the Park City Holiday Inn project.

They had, through 4-D

Development and unknown to the plaintiffs, entered a "Service Agreement" with defendant
Larson on April 28, 1995, to provide funding for both the Moab and Park City projects.
Defendant Larson had already negotiated for and would soon receive the franchise for the Moab
Holiday Inn which he would hold solely in his name.
The defendants were all unwilling or unable to contribute anything to the joint venture or
assume any risk. Nevertheless, they needed some money in order to create an illusion that they
had assets, or to pay financial institutions to loan them greater amounts of money. Defendant
Larson contacted his attorney Mark Arnold "who knew people who could loan money (at a very
high rate of interest) for this type of project." None of the defendants were willing to pledge any
collateral for the loan - thus the need for the Normans. The Normans would put up their
property (assume all the risk) in order to give the defendants money so they could try to secure
more money. If the project worked, the defendants had arranged it so they could make a bundle.
If it failed, well, nothing ventured, nothing lost. That would be the Normans' problem.
Arnold's first act was to make sure he and Larson made a nice profit regardless of what
happened. Arnold and Larson each took an $8,000 "finders fee" from off the top of the Young
note, and Young got $3,200 as points for providing an oversecured 18% loan. Arnold then gave
Larson $40,000 for the Holiday Inn Franchise, which Larson would nevertheless retain. The
Normans were completely uniformed of these events.
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Nor were the Normans informed that the money secured by their property would also be
used for the Park City project of which they had no knowledge or interest. On June 19, 1995,
Mark Arnold and Norman Larson formed Venture Properties II, L.C. and took money from the
Young loan to submit as earnest money to purchase the Park City property. Incredibly, all these
transactions and payments took place before the Normans ever signed the Promissory Note and
Trust Deed, which tends to support their contention that they were fraudulently induced to sign a
note for $40,000 which was later changed to $160,000.
By October, 1995, Arnold and Larson had spent almost all of the $160,000. Duane
Barney, the "manager and administrator" for the joint venture was a convicted felon for fraud.
He was returned to prison on a parole violation. Arnold prepared a Power of Attorney for Greg
Page to conduct Barney's business. No one told the Normans. Greg page dissolved 4-D
development, and was paid the $5,000 he had advanced Larson for the Service Agreement out of
the money secured by the Normans property. No one told the Normans. Mark Arnold, counsel
for the joint venture, negotiated and acquired Peter Lanto's interest in the Joint Venture. The
acquisition was made, not with his own money, but with money from the Young note secured by
the Normans property. All of these events took place in mark Arnold's office. No one told the
Normans.
Sensing that the deal had gone sour and having contributed absolutely nothing, the joint
venturers basically slunk away. Lanto took $8,500 that he may or may not have invested in the
Park City project (he did nothing for the Moab project), and was at least smart enough to require
Arnold to indemnify him for the liability almost sure to come. Page, who had done nothing, took
his $5,000 back and then hid behind bankruptcy naming the Normans as creditors in the amount
of $160,000. Barney, who had done nothing, took a similarly easy out. Larson made halfhearted and unsuccessful attempts to save his own skin until the rest of the money was gone.
Arnold, acting as counsel, kept the Franchise alive, again, incredibly, only long enough to offer it
to other neighboring landowners of the Normans and his client Jim Winkler.
The Normans, facing foreclosure, had to sell the property to Winkler and fully absorbed a
$212,000 loss on the note, plus additional fire-sale losses on the property. The defendants
walked away with fingers crossed. Too bad Bob and Diane. Sorry about that.
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IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Claim of Arnold's Breach of the Joint Venture Agreement Presents
Questions of Fact for the Jury.

Defendant's Motion on Plaintiffs' First Cause of Action is easily resolved. Arnold
admits that, prior to the Normans' execution of the Promissory Note and Trust Deed he "became
the lawyer for the joint venture." (Def. Undisputed Fact #4) Indeed, Arnold secured the loan
from his clients, transferred it to his client and business partner Norman Larson and prepared or
caused to be prepared the Note and Trust Deed - all without the Normans' knowledge or
consent.
The sole purpose of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture was to " . . . develop,
manage and maintain . . . the (Normans') 8.33 acres north of Moab, Utah." (Def. Exhibit 2,
if 1.2) Peter Lanto was among the original joint venturers.

(Def. Undisputed Fact #2) On

October 27, 1995, Arnold acquired "any and all" of Lanto's interest in the joint venture. (Def.
Undisputed Fact #8; Def. Exhibit 7) That is enough to defeat defendant Arnold's Motion for
Summary Judgment on plaintiffs' First Cause of Action.
Defendant's claim that he is entitled to Summary Judgment because the Normans never
consented to his entry in the joint venture is untenable. Plaintiffs will produce evidence from
which a jury would be entitled to believe that Arnold was double-dealing arid self-dealing, both
as counsel for and as a member of the joint venture from its inception. That he continued in that
type of conduct by making a secret and grossly unfair deal to acquire Lanto's interest without
paying for it, hardly seems justification to grant him Summary Judgment. In other aspects of the
case, Arnold attempts to excuse his conduct by alleging that he communicated with Page and
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Barney and relied on them to communicate with the Normans. If that is true, then, since Page
and Barney knew of his deal on Lanto's interest (Arnold depo. at 101-02J, it would have had to
have been his presumption that the matter was communicated to the Normans and not objected
to. That, of course did not occur, but defendant must not be allowed to hide behind his own
misdeeds and breaches offiduciaryduty as a means of avoiding liability for his conduct.
Arnold's hands are most unclean. A main aspect of plaintiffs' case is that Arnold and
Larson intentionally set out to take advantage of and dupe them at every opportunity. Arnold, as
the admitted counsel for the joint venture, unquestionably had a duty to make sure the other
partners were aware of his acquisition of an interest, particularly since it was paid for with joint
venture funds secured solely by the plaintiffs' property. It will be plaintiffs' contention that
Arnold's acquisition of Lanto's interest was intentionally kept secret from the plaintiffs.
Therefore, the jury will be entitled to conclude that Arnold intentionally prevented the plaintiffs
consent by his own inappropriate conduct.
To grant defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment under these circumstances would be
an unconscionable injustice.
Nevertheless, the plaintiffs did subsequently learn that Arnold had acquired Lanto's
interest and thereafter allowed him to continue to act as a partner. By the Spring of 1996 when,
unknown to the plaintiffs, defendants Larson and Arnold had already spent most if not all of the
$160,000, the Normans requested a meeting in order to secure funds they desperately needed
after a fire at their water park in Moab. The meeting was held in defendant Arnold's office on
May 1, 1996. Therein, among other things, it was disclosed to the Normans for the first time
that:

a.

Arnold had acquired Lanto's interest;

b.

Arnold had given the $160,000 to Larson and no one could account for it;

c.

Arnold was aware that $50,000 had been sent to "financial people" in Arizona

who Arnold now believed were crooks;
d.

Arnold knew who these people were and would try to get the money back.

(See, Plaintiffs' timeline and supporting documents.)
The Normans thereafter considered Arnold both their partner and counsel for the joint
venture, and Arnold both before and after that time conducted himself as such.
1.

Arnold's Purchase of an Interest in the Joint Venture is an Independent
Basis to Hold Him Liable for Breach of the Joint Venture Agreement

There is an additional and independent basis for requiring defendant Arnold to answer
this claim.

In the Purchase Agreement wherein Arnold "purchased" Lanto's interest he

specifically agreed to assume Lanto's liability arising from the very claims the plaintiffs are
making.

Plaintiffs contend that Lanto knew there was substantial probability that the joint

venture would go sour at plaintiffs' expense and so covered himself in the buy-out agreement
with Arnold. The Purchase Agreement specifically states:
2.
In consideration of (Lanto) selling his interest, (Arnold) agrees to hold (Lanto) harmless
from any and all claims arising out of the development of the above mentioned projects,
including but not limited to tort claims and claims on any notes for monies previously borrowed
totaling $160,000.
Defendant admits that Lanto has joint and several liability under the Promissory Note.
The Arnold-Lanto Purchase Agreement (Def. Exhibit 7) is a separate contractual agreement to
which the plaintiffs are unquestionably third party beneficiaries. The agreement contemplated
this very claim. Consequently, to the extent that plaintiffs prove breach of the Joint Venture
Agreement or liability under the Promissory Note, Arnold's claim for summary judgment on this
cause of action not only fails, his liability is conclusively established.
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B.

Plaintiffs' Claims Against Arnold For Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Also Presents Questions of Fact For the Jury,

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on this claim is also easily resolved. While
admitting the he was counsel for the joint venture, which included Robert and Diane Norman,
who were required to bear the entire risk of loss for the venture, Arnold appears to contend that
he owed the Normans no fiduciary duty. To state the position is to emphasize its lack of merit.
Arnold attempts to escape through a narrow and illogical loophole, starting with two misstatements. First, "The fiduciary duty the Normans claim Arnold breached is the duty of
undivided loyalty." (Def. Memo at 13) This is simply incorrect. The plaintiffs' claim very
simply is that Arnold owed them a fiduciary duty as members of the joint venture and as
individuals, particularly since he was aware that the Normans were the parties most at risk in the
venture. Second, "The Normans claim that Arnold owed them a personal fiduciary duty because
he was their personal lawyer" (Id) As defendant takes pains to point out, and as plaintiffs
readily admit, they have never made such a claim. Rather, plaintiffs claim is that, as members of
the joint venture, Arnold owed them a fiduciary duty as counsel for the joint venture. In this
case, Arnold's numerous substantial professional breeches directly impacted the personal
interests of the plaintiffs which is the basis for their claim.
Moreover, the Court should keep in mind plaintiffs' theory of the case which is that they
were set up to take the fall by Arnold, Larson and the rest if the venture failed. It will be
plaintiffs' contention, supported by ample evidence that the Normans were intentionally kept in
the dark about the conduct of Mark Arnold and the other parties; that Arnold knew the Normans
were getting no information from Page or Barney; and that Arnold had become a member of the
joint venture, but nevertheless had his little side deals going on with Larson.
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From his deposition, it is clear that defendant Arnold could not state with any precision
who he thought he represented, but did testify under oath that he represented the Normans. In
testimony regarding his preparation of documents when he purchased Lanto's interest, Arnold
stated:
What capacity were ou acting in when you wrote up these documents?
Q
A.
I think it would be difficult to say what capacity.
Q.
Well, you're going to have to try.
A.
Helper.
Q.
Not an attorney?
A.
I was an attorney who was helping
Q.
Were you acting as an attorney when you wrote up these documents for someone?
A.
Not necessarily.
Q.
That won't do. (W)ere you or weren't you.
A.
I think I am an attorney and I understand how to write certain documents. I wrote
that up. Whether I was acting as an attorney when I wrote that up, I can't say. / think in my
mind I was acting as an attorney,
Q.
For whom?
A.
For Greg Page, Duane Barney and the Normans.
Q.
And that's all?
A.
Yes.
Arnold depo. at 14-15, emphasis added. Arnold later specifically stated that he represented the
Normans personally on the Holiday in project.
Q.
I want to take as much time as it takes to clarify your role in all of these
transactions, okay? Are you or have you ever been personal attorney for (sic.) Norman Larson?
A.
I would guess only to the extent of where I tried to assist with the Holiday Inn
project that's the subject of this lawsuit.
Q.
Mr. Larson, in his deposition, I believe you were present, mentioned some other
cases that you represented him on. Do you recall?
A.
Mr. Larson?
Q.
Yes.
A.
I keep getting Bob Norman and Bob Larson mixed up. Would you repeat the
previous question for me . . .
Id. at 24.
Clearly, Arnold believed the question pertained to Robert Norman, and testified that he
had represented him individually. He later said he did not represent the Normans individually.
Id, e.g. at 29.
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Though he now claims to have represented the joint venture, during the relevant time
period, Arnold was not even aware if a separate legal entity existed.
Do you think you represented the "group" on certain matters, yes or no.
Q
A.
Yes.
Q.
What was the group?
A.
It was Greg Page, Duane Barney, Bob and Diane Norman.
Q.
Not Norman Larson?
A.
No. He wasn't part of the group.
Q.
Did the group have a separate legal entity?
A.
When I first talked to them, I don't know. I have since learned that they have
some kind of an organization which the called the 4-D thing. (The Normans were not members
of 4-D) I was unaware of it.
Q.
Was it a separate legal entity?
A.
/ don't know.
Q.
Did you ever bill 4-D Development?
A.
Not that I can recall.
Q.
So is it fair to say that your testimony is that you didn 7 represent them
individually, but you represented them all individually as a group?
A.
That's what I 'm trying to say. Yes.
Id. at 29-30.
Q.
You've said that you represented the group and that at some point you found out
about 4-D Development. When did you find out about 4-D Development?
A.
I don't know when I found out about it.
Q.
Before or after the Trust Deed and Note?
A.
I can't say.
Q.
Did you ever consider that you represented the Moab Land Development Joint
Venture?
A.
I felt like on certain things I was representing the group, which includes some of
the signers on the agreement I believe. That's all I can say.
Id. at 32.
Q.
Did you take any part in the discussion about the dissolution of the 4-D
partnership that is set forth in (NL 71, dated 10/27/95)
A.
None. I always had it in the back of my mind that maybe the net effect of Mr.
Lanto doing wftat he did may destroy that partnership, but I didn't know hardly anything about
it. I had no input at all.
Q.
Did you at any time after October 27, 1995, perform legal services for what you
called the group?
A.
I believe so.
Q.
So that group was not 4-D Development?
A.
I don't know what the group was. / viewed them as individuals.
Q.
That sort of contradicts your testimony . . . You said you didn't represent
individuals.
A.
The group as individuals.
Id. at 38-39.

91

Arnold testified that he understood the Normans had personal interests in the venture
separate from the group, and that he was specifically looking after the Normans' personal
interests.
Q.
After having paid himself back for those franchise fees, why would there be any
question at all about (Larson) turning . . . (the franchise) over to the group.
A.
I think at that point in time Larson and Page weren't on the best of terms, and I
didn't know what was going to happen.
Q.
I know. But so what?
A.
It means a lot. Simply because Norm Larson was a franchisee of record with the
Holiday Inn, had to be, he had to be the one. And if I was going to save Bob Norman's property
and get some way to build the motel, I needed to have some ability to get the franchise in
someone else's hands so we could do it.
Q.
I'm having trouble making any sense of that . . . weren't you relying on Norman
Larson to be the guy to get the money to build the thing?
A.
Well, at this point in time, those guys - they had been like a tomato rotting from
the inside out. They were adversarial at this point in time.
Q.
What point in time is this?
A.
I can only generally tell you it was probably about the time that Diane Norman
came to my office and the meeting from which she's got a record of.
Q.
That was May 1, 1996.
A.
Yeah. I'm not sure. But it seems to me at that point in time things were starting
to heat up. Because Norm was not at that meeting.
Q.
But Norm reimbursed himself for the franchise (with) the first check out of the
account in June of 1995. By May 1st of 1996, when Diane came up desperately seeking some
money, the account had all been spent. Every cent of it had been spent.
A.
Yeah. Hence the need to find somebody that could build the hotel and save the
Normans 'property.
Q.
Why hadn't that been done before?
A.
/ don V know. All I can say is that's what I personally tried to do. Id at 104-05,
There is also documentary evidence that Arnold considered the Normans his clients.
Arnold wrote a letter to Holiday Inn on July 18, 1996, attempting to preserve the franchise, in
which he refers to "my clients" Duane Barney, Greg Page and Bob Norman. (See, attached)
Q.
In this letter you do expressly state that Duane Barney, Greg Page and Bob
Norman are your clients, do you not?
A.
I do.
Q.
When do you think Bob Norman stopped being your client?
A.
/ don 7 know. I knew for purposes of this letter, I was writing it on his behalf as
well as everyone else.
Id at 169.
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Arnold then attempts to claim that his personal representation of the Normans was
limited to this letter. That argument however, flies in the face of the fact that the entire
transaction, Arnold's involvement from day-one, and every aspect of this case is intimately
involved with that same franchise.
From defendant's own testimony, a jury would be entitled to believe that defendant
represented the Normans individually as members of the amorphous "group." At the very least,
a question of fact is raised. It is certain that, in performing his legal services, Arnold recognized
that the Normans had very substantial personal interests at stake.
1.

Defendants1 Legal Authority

The Utah legal authority relied on by the defendant in support of his Motion for
Summary Judgment is not persuasive. Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake
Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 299 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), does establish that joint ventures
are considered separate legal entities, like partnerships. However, no where does that case state
or imply that representation of a joint venture precludes an attorney from having a separate or
associatedfiduciaryrelationship with its individual members. Defendant's other case, Kilpatrick
v. Wiley, Rein & Fie/ding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct. App. 1996), is cited only for the proposition
that the plaintiffs must prove an attorney-client relationship to prevail on a legal malpractice
claim, a point the plaintiffs here do not dispute.
There is a legitimate question of fact, first of all, as to whether Arnold ever represented
the "Moab Land Development Joint Venture." Indeed, it would appear from his testimony that,
during 1995, he did not even know it existed. If Arnold was aware of the Joint Venture, and, as
its counsel, of the Joint Venture Agreement, he certainly didn't act like it. For example, the
acquisition of the Young loan, providing the proceeds to Larson, giving Larson a potential equity

interest in the project, all of the expenditures from the loan fees, and Arnold's purchase of
Lanto's interest would all have been prohibited under the joint venture agreement. (Def. Exhibit
2) If Arnold was aware of the joint venture and was acting as its counsel, then his acquiescence
and participation in all these violations of the agreement without informing the Normans, would,
in itself, justify their professional liability claim against him. Arnold should not be allowed to
avoid responsibility for his professional misconduct by hiding behind an entity that existed, if at
all, only on paper, and which Arnold completely ignored in any event.
Arnold may have believed he represented 4-D Development, but the Normans were not
members or partners of 4-D. More likely, Arnold had identified no specific separate legal entity
as his client, apart from the fact that they were a group of individuals involved in a common
project. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt from his testimony that Arnold knew that the Normans
were members of the "group" and that they had substantial personal interests involved in the
venture. It is most likely that Arnold represented the Normans "individually, as members of the
group" as he testified several times. (See, Arnold deposition testimony on this point, supra.)
This is perfectly consistent with the Normans' understanding that Arnold represented "the
group." The only thing that is certain is that the Normans definitely were looking to and relying
on Arnold to protect their personal interests.
As mentioned above, no precedent has been cited that an attorney's representation of a
joint venture precludes a direct fiduciary duty to some or all of its members. Common sense
would dictate otherwise, since a member's interests and contributions to a joint venture are
usually personal. In Stocks v. USF&G, 395 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Utah Ct. App. 2000), the Court
recognized that individual shareholders may bring an action for harm to a corporation if their
personal interests are involved.
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(T)his court has recognized a narrow exception to the general rule regarding a
shareholder's capacity to bring an individual suit. A shareholder may bring an individual cause
of action if the harm to the corporation also damaged the shareholder as an individual rather than
a shareholder. Id. at 16.
In this case, plaintiffs contend that Arnold's conduct as counsel for the group caused
them to lose $212,000 on their personal property which they had pledged as collateral for a loan.
The other "joint venturers" had contributed nothing to the project. As Arnold testified, "When
things started getting really tight for (Barney & Page), to me they just took the position that they
just scattered and left it. Left it in Bob Norman's lap." Arnold depo. at 15A In fact, the
Normans were the only parties with anything at stake in the venture, and Arnold's conduct as
counsel, whether for the Normans directly, the amorphous "group", 4-D Development, or
otherwise was directly contrary and adverse to their personal interests.
Moreover, it is the Normans' contention that the group knowingly and intentionally used
them solely to assume the risk to obtain money for their often separate goals, i.e., the Park City
project. It is absolutely clear that the "group", with Arnold and Larson leading, were united only
in their lack of concern for the interests of Bob and Diane Norman. The group was, for all
practical purposes, adverse to the Normans.
Plaintiffs contend that his conduct through October, 1995 alone is sufficient for their
fiduciary duty claim against Arnold.

The plaintiffs will testify that any of the following

disclosures would have caused them not to enter the joint venture, or immediately terminate their
involvement:
1.

That 4-D had separate projects going on in Park City.

2.
That 4-D had secretly entered into a Service Agreement with Norman Larson to
provide financing on several projects including Moab, and that if he was successful, would
receive substantial equity (up to 25%) in the project.
3.

That Larson was Arnold's client.
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4.
That Arnold would pay himself, Larson and his clients the Youngs $20,000 off
the top of the loan proceeds.
5.
That Arnold would then hand over the rest of the money to Larson with sole
check signing authority.
6.
That money from the Young loan secured by the Normans property would be
used for other projects in which the Normans had no knowledge or interest.
7.
That Arnold and Larson would secretly form their own separate business, Venture
Properties II, L.C., and use money from the Young loan secured by the Normans' property.
8.
Arizona.
9.

That Arnold and Larson would wire $50,000 to unknown financial people in

That Duane Barney was a convicted felon for fraud.

10.
That Arnold and Larson would buy out Pete Lanto's interest using Young loan
funds, thereby leaving the "joint venture" without a building contractor.
11.
That Duane Barney would be sent back to prison on a parole violation, thereby
leaving the "joint venture" without its administrator.
One of the more egregious examples of Arnold's breach of fiduciary duty and
professional negligence comes from his testimony regarding the indemnification he wrote
regarding his purchase of the Lanto interest.
Q.
According to the plain language of this document and your signature on it, you
agree to hold Mr. Lanto harmless from any claims arising from the borrowing of the $160,000
secured by the Norman property.
A.
I'm not going to read any more into the document than what it says.
Q.
Well,. . . you wrote it, so what were you were trying to accomplish in paragraph
number 2?
A.
I was trying . . . to let Mr. Lanto know - what I was doing, was obligating the
remaining partners to hold him harmless.
Q.
(W)ho were you obligating to do that?
A.
The people that had sent me to do this.
Q.
Tell me.
A.
I assumed, I knew for sure that it was Greg Page and Duane Barney and I
assumed that they were also partners with Bob and Diane Norman.
Q.
You were presuming to obligate Robert Norman to indemnify Pete Lanto on a
document, which you never showed him and which doesn V mention him?
A.
That $s correct
Arnold depo. at 19-20, emphasis added.
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C.

Plaintiffs' Punitive Damage Claim is Viable

There will be evidence to support plaintiffs' claim that defendants' conduct as partially
set forth herein was willful, malicious and/or with reckless disregard for the plaintiffs' economic
and personal interests. The issue of punitive damages will therefore be a question for the jury to
determine based upon appropriate instruction from the Court.

V.
PLAINTIFFS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO HAVE THEIR
PLEADINGS DEEMED AMENDED TO CONFORM WITH THE EVIDENCE.
Defendant's citation to Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah Ct.
App. 1996), was quite instructive on the law regarding legal malpractice claims and its
application to this case. The court pointed out that legal malpractice is a generic term for at least
three distinct causes of action - breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty and negligence, and
that, though malpractice actions based on negligence and breach of fiduciary are difficult to
differentiate, "the central purpose of the law of legal malpractice is to guard against and to
remedy exploitation of the power lawyers possess over their clients' lives and property." (Id. at
1289-90).
In this case, plaintiffs termed their cause of action as one for breach of fiduciary duty, and
while it may not be a model for legal malpractice pleadings, it definitely covers the central
purpose of the law of legal malpractice as above stated. It was the plaintiffs' belief that a claim
for breach of fiduciary duty subsumed negligent conduct on the part of the defendant attorney.
The plaintiffs believe that Arnold's conduct was intentional, dishonest and adverse to their
interests thus breaching his fiduciary duty to "exercise impeccable honesty, fair dealing and
fidelity." Id

If defendant really was "just an attorney who was helping" then his professional services
were almost incomprehensibly negligent.

Plaintiffs pleadings and evidence fit both distinct

causes of legal malpractice - breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.
Therefore, plaintiffs request that the Court allow the pleadings to conform to the evidence
and permit the plaintiffs to go forward with claims of breach of fiduciary duty and negligence.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied. Having secretly bought in
to the joint venture, and having, together with defendant Larson, taken over its operation, Arnold
cynically requests that this Court excuse him from liability because the plaintiffs did not consent
to his becoming a partner. Whether a part of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture per se9
or not, Arnold was a major player in the group effort which directly resulted in the plaintiffs'
losses.
Though the plaintiffs never personally retained Arnold as their counsel, they viewed him
as counsel for the group in which they were members. Arnold admits that he acted as counsel
for the group, who he viewed as individuals.

Arnold recognized that the plaintiffs had

substantial personal interests at stake in the venture which he claims, as counsel, to have been
trying to protect. The issue of whether Arnold breached fiduciary duties owed to the Normans is
for the jury, which should also be allowed to consider an additional legal malpractice claim
based on neglience.
The issues are not close. Plaintiffs assert that defendant's Motion, filed the last possible
day after several continuances was primarily designed to cause the plaintiffs additional hardship
through undue legal expense and delay. Plaintiffs should be awarded their costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in submitting this response.
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Dated thisffi^ day of \Jt/A>L

, 2000.

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs

Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that on the b^ day of vtf/\-t

2000, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Response to Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid to:
James C. Haskins
Attorney for Norman Larson
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Matthew Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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April 27,

1995

Greg Page
SENIOR FINANCE COMPANY
4770 South 900 East
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
Dear Greg:
On Monday, April 24, 1995, I met with Trust Guarantee Corp. in
Phoenix, Arizona and reviewed your funding request for the
two (2) Holiday Inn Express projects.
Prior to my going, you agreed to submit $500.00 to the cost
expenses of the trip.
Please issue a check to Western Empire Advisors, Inc. in this
amount and we will proceed with your funding request since we
have strong interest from both JWL Trust and Trust Guarantee
Corp. to fund the request.
Sincerely,

Norman M. Larson

NL5753

w,estern
Empire

J\chis ors
SERVICE AGREEMENT
THIS AGREEMENT and CONTRACT is made and intered into
on this 27th day of April, 1995 at Salt Lake City, Utah, by
and between Western Empire Advisors, a Utah Corporation,
(hereafter "WEA"), and 4-D Development Co. L.L.C. a proposed
limited liability corporation, (thereafter "BORROWER11)
AGREEMENT
This contract and agreement is entered into between
WEA and BORROWER for the following purposes:
1. BORROWER hereby stated that it is currently an
active corporation that is registered and in good standing
in the State of Utah as described below and is developing
owning and managing income producing properties as described
below:
MOAB HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS
Located along Utah Highway 191
North of Moab, Grand County, Utah
PARLEY'S HOLIDAY INN EXPRESS
Located along Interstate Highway 80
Between Kimball Junction and Jeremy Ranch Exit
Near Park City, Utah
BORROWER has retained WEA to arrange financing for
said company under the following terms and conditions:
AMOUNT: $7.0 Million
TERM:

20 years with a 10 year due date.

RATE:

10% interest with the first payment
being due one year in arrears and the
balance of the payments being due
monthly in arrears.

LIABILITY: Non Recourse
EQUITY:

40% in the Borrowing Entity until
the principal of the loan is
reduced by 50%{ then the equity
drops to 10% with a buy out
agreement.

NLl

COLLATERAL:. A one (1) year Standby Letter of
Credit with the face amount being
equal to fifty percent (50%) of
the funding commitment.
FEE:

Five and one/half (5.5) points to the
lender due at closing.

WEA FEE: An equity position equal to the
partners in 4-D Development,
and a fee of two percent (2%)
of the committed amount.
Or any such terms and conditions that are mutually agreeable
to BORROWER, the Lending Sources, and Western Empire
Advisors, Inc.
2. BORROWER hereby appoints WEA to represent them in
this transaction and authorizes WEA to submit to their
lender(s) and/or financial sources financial data and
information supplied by the BORROWER for the purpose of the
lender(s) and/or financial sources making the loan and/or
investment direct to the BORROWER. WEA will act as AGENT for
the BORROWER for the period of 120 days from the execution
of this agreement and will continue until cancelled in
writing by BORROWER. WEA will put forth its best efforts to
obtain approval and a letter of commitment as requested by
BORROWER. WEA will rely upon the information requested to be
full, complete( and accurate information. Any
misrepresentations in the information supplied by BORROWER
will void the contract and subject the BORROWER to the
payment of all fees as described in section 3.
3. In consideration for the efforts of WEA on behalf
of the BORROWER in procuring said loan and/or investment
commitment, BORROWER hereby agrees provide to WEA an equity
position equal to the partners of 4-D Development. A fee of
two percent (2%) of the funding commitment is also requested
by WEA and is due at closing.
The BORROWER reserves the right to accept or reject
any letter of commitment or'financing arrangement at the
sole discretion of the BORROWER. BORROWER understands that
the equity position assigned to WEA is separate from the
lenders and/or investors loan fees, investment fees,
commitment fees, and/or any broker fees signed and agreed by
BORROWER. If WEA enters into this agreement and facilitates
BORROWER to obtain funding that is accepted by BORROWER( and
BORROWER, for whatever reason, does not accept the funding,
or does not provide the information as reasonably requested
by the financial source issuing the funding, or BORROWER
does not satisfy the terms and conditions as agreed upon in
the funding documents, BORROWER shall be subject to the
assignment of said equity position to WEA. If, however, WEA
does not provide funds that are acceptable to the Borrower,
then the above indicated fee structure and equity position

to WEA is null and void.
4. BORROWER recognizes that in order to prepare a
loan request package, certain arrangement must be made.
BORROWER agrees to deliver to WEA, with this agreement duly
executed, a Good Faith Deposit of $5000. This deposit is
refundable, less expenses, in the event WEA is unable to
provide the Borrower with a Letter of Interest, and/or a
Conditional Commitment within a timely manner.
5. BORROWER expressly agrees and acknowledges that
WEA is an information resource only. Any fees or
compensation which are paid to WEA for services rendered are
done so with the understanding that WEA is using it's best
efforts to obtain a letter of Commitment and funding for the
BORROWER.
6. It is expressly acknowledged and stated between
the parties that WEA is not a bank, lender, or an agent of
any of the foregoing and that the BORROWER has been informed
and fully understands that the letter of commitment which is
being applied for is being applied for by WEA through a
financial institution.
7. WEA does not guarantee that any of the actual
representations made by any of the lending and/or investment
sources are accurate or that disbursement will be made in
accordance with the funding source commitment.
8. BORROWER agrees that if any further financing is
secured by BORROWER, (whether on the same or other property
and/or project) from sources procured by WEA during the
period of 60 months after the execution hereof, WEA shall be
entitled to a fee of two percent (2%) of all additional
financing so obtained, which will be due in full upon the
funding or commitment for funding of such additional
financing.
9. In the event a Commitment is issued and accepted,
WEA is authorized to make an announcement in newspapers and
trade journals without reference to the dollar amount of the
loan and/or investment.
10. This AGREEMENT if effective from the date shown
below and shall continue for a period of 120 days from this
date forward. Cancellation of the agreement may only be
done in writing and not more than 30 days in advance of the
cancellation.
11. BORROWER WARRANTS THAT NO REPRESENTATIONS, PROMISES
OR COMMITMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE TO BORROWERS BY WESTERN EMPIRE
ADVISORS INC., ITS AGENTS OR EMPLOYEES, THAT ARE NOT
EXPRESSLY SET FORTH WITHIN THIS AGREEMENT.
12. This AGREEMENT supercedes all previous agreement,
written or oral, between the parties hereto, and may be

modified only by an agreement in writing executed or signed
by the person, or party that is chargeable under such
modification- IN THE EVENT OF LITIGATION UNDER THIS
AGREEMENT, THE PARTIES AGREE THAT THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION
FOR, AND THE ONLY PROPER VENUE OF, ANY ACTION OR SUIT
PERTAINING TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THIS AGREEMENT SHALL BE
BEFORE THE COURTS OF SALT LAKE COUNTY IN THE STATE OF UTAH.
13. If the terms of outlined above reflect terms of the
agreement, please sign there indicated.
14. The one (1) year Standby Letter of Credit used to
collateralize the funding reguest is the responsibility of
the Borrower. However, WEA is has established several
resources that would consider providing the document. WEA
will reguest an additional one percent (1%) of the face
amount of the letter of credit that is provided through
WEA's efforts.
Dated:
APPROVED
BORROWER:
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Bruce Holman ^
John Zimbra
TRUST GUARANTEE CORP.
11811 North Tatum
P-120
Phoenix, Arizona 85028
RE:

Moab Holiday Express Motel

Dear Bruce:
Enclosed is a brief summary and proforraa's for the above
indicated project. The request is for approximately $4,0
million. We need a commitment very quickly so we can go ahead
an pay for the franchise fee of S40K.
Mark Arnold, the attorney for the project, will be calling you
to confirm what needs to be done for the funding at the
following terms and conditions:
Amount: $4.0 million
Term:
20 years
Rate:
9*5% interest
Fee's: 3 points
The Borrower is prepared to place the amount of $100,000.00 in
a Trust Account approved by both Borrower and Lender until
funds can be confirmed.
Please Advise Me Accordingly:
Norman M. Larstth
Srely,

7105 So. Highland Drive Suite 202 • Sail Lake City, Utah 84121 • (801) 942-8578

Trust Guarantee
Corporation

June 8, 1995
Mr. Norm Larson
Western Empire Advisors, Inc.
7105 So. Highland Dr Suite 202
Salt Lake Chy, UT 84121
Re: Holiday Inn Express, Moab and Park City
Dear Norm:
Trust Guarantee Corporation, through its lending sources, will apply for loans totaling a
maximum of Eight Million Dollars ($8,000,000.00) for the above projects.
Thefinalterms and conditions will be given with the Letter of Offer. However, we
believe it will be as previously outlined: Twenty year terax, ten year call, nine and one half
percent interest fixed, three points and an equity position of 12 - 15%.
The loan will be based on cost and may require the land to be invested as equity.
Construction control will be administered by Trust Guarantee Corporation
It is my understanding that your clients are prepared to place One Hundred Thousand
Dollars ($100,000.00) in your trust account to activate the Letters of Offer
The complete package for both projects can be underwritten by Paul at our office.
Yours truly,

Bruce G. Holman
CFO

NL55

w,estern

Empire
J\(hns ors
June 1 6 ,

1995

Trust Guarantee Corporation
Mr. Bruce Holman
11811 N. Tatum Blvd., Suite P-120
Phoenix, AZ 85028
RE: CONFIRMATION OF FUNDS IN TRUST ACCOUNT
Dear Mr. Holman
Please be advised that Western Empire Advisors, Inc. has on
deposit in their Trust Account One Hundred Thousand Dollars
($100,000.00) for the benefit of Trust Guarantee, or its
nominee.
The $100,000.00 will be released to Trust Guarantee
Corporation, or its nominee, upon acceptance of the Letter
of Offer and proof of loan funds by Trust Guarantee
Corporation and the Borrower.
If tne Letter of Offer is not acceptable, then monies cannot
be released and will be returned to the original provider.
Yours Truly,
Norman M. Larson

NL54

LOCATION: Route 191
Moab.UT
LOCATION No.: #6261
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VENTURE PROPERTIES II, LC

lMOAufCorp.CoM, Coda

The undersigned persons, each being more than eighteen (18) years of age, hereby establish a limited
liability company pursuant to the Utah Limited Liability Company Act and adopt the following
Articles of Organization:
NAME: The name of the limited liability company is VENTURE PROPERTIES II, LC.

(J G £

DURATION: The duration of the company will be thirty (30) years.
PURPOSE: The limited liability company is organized for the purpose of carrying on any and all
legal and lawful businesses in accordance with the Utah Limited Liability Company Act.
REGISTERED OFFICE: The address of the registered office of the limited liability company is 57
West 200 South, ste 404, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

en

PRINCIPAL PLACE OF BUSINESS: The address of the principal place of business of the limited
liability company is 57 West 200 South, ste 404, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

—)
£2

REGISTERED AGENT FOR SERVICE OF PROCESS: The name and address of the registered
agent for service of process, for the limited liability company, is Mr. Mark E. Arnold 57 West 200
south, ste 404, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101. In the event that the registered agent resigns, or his/her
authority is revoked, or the agent cannot through the exercise of reasonable diligence be found or
served, the Director of the Utah State Division of Corporations and Commercial Code is appointed
as the agent for service of process of the limited liability company.

H
CD

MEMBERS: The names and address of the members of the limited liability company are:
Mr. Mark E. Arnold
57 West 200 South
suite 404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Mr. Norman Larson
7105 S. Highland Drive
suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

ORGANIZERS: The names and address of the organizers of the limited liability company are:
Mr. Mark E. Arnold
57 W. 200 S. suite 404
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Mr. Norman Larson
7105 S. Highland Dr. suite 202
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121

53^

MANAGEIVIENT: The business of the limited liability company shall be conducted, by Mr. Norman
Larson, member and organizer as listed above.

June ^

, 1995
£g£2»

Mr"Norman Larson, Organizer

J u n e / 7 , 1995
# - .

MARK E. ARNOLD, Registered Agent

Mr. Mark ET Arnold, Organizer
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HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C,
AMERICAN PLAZA 11, SUITE 4<H
57 \MSST 200 SOLTTH
F A K D A L L J. HOLMGREN

TELEPHONE

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 64101

MARKE, ARNOLD

(SOI) 328^333

SCOTT L WIGGINS

FACSIMILE
(801) 328^1151

July 25, 1995

JOSEPH LEE NEMELKA

Mr. David Schori
P.O. B;x 1921
Park City, Utah 84060
Re;

Rasmussen Property Closing

Dear David:
As mentioned in your fax, we will not be able to close on July 27thrhowever in the next
48 hours, we will have a closing date scheduled which should take place in early to mid-August.
This letter is to request an extension of our earnest money agreement. If you choose not to
extend, please return the $10,000.00 earnest money to us.
Please contact me if you have any further questions.
Respectfully,

Mark E. Arnold
Attorney at Law
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HOLMGREN, ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L-C.
AMERICAN PLAZA II, SUITE 404
RANDALL J. HOLMGREN
tfARK E. ARNOLD
SCOTT L WIGGINS
OSEPH LEE NEMELKA

SALT

57 WEST 200 SOUTH
^ ^ C I T Y f mAH
84101

TELEFHONE
(801) 328-4333
FACSIMILE
(801) 328-1151

October^ 1995
Via Fax: (602)996-6257
Mr. Bruce Holman
Trust Guaranty Corporation
11811 North Tatum Boulevard, Suite P-120
Phoenix, Arizona 85028
Re:

Holiday Inn Earnest Money

Dear Bruce:
We have wired earnest money to you in the amount of $50,000. Listed below are the
conditions under which the earnest money is presented to you:
1)

Money is to be placetfin a trust account.

2)

If the money is moved from the trust account, it must only be used to purchase
treasury bills.

3)

The earnest money is fully refundable to Western Empire Advisors if we do not close
on the Holiday Inn Moab property or the Park City property by Odober 22, 1995.

If these conditions are not acceptable to you, please contact me immediately.
Respectfully,

Mark E. Arnold
Attorney at Law
MEA/cwb

w,esiern

Empire
J\duisors
Friday, October 20, 1995
Bruce Holman

TRUST GUARANTEE CORPORATION.
11811 N. Tatum
Suite P-120
Phoenix, Arizona 85028
RE: Holiday Express Commitments
Dear Bruce:
Enclosed are the signed copies of the commitments to fund the three (3) Holiday Express motels
located in Moab, Park City, and Richfield, Utah. Here is the tentative dates we would like to
close on.
Moab Holiday Express Closing Date November 15th
Plans are being completed, construction costs are being
finalized, so we should be ready to proceed by then.
Park City Holiday Express: Closing Date November 15th for the fand only ($1.6
million). The balance of the funding doesn't need to be
available until February of 1996. We will have the plans and
construction costs completed at that time.
Richfield Holiday Express: Closing Date for the Holiday Express Motel doesn't
need to be until December 15th. However, we won't need to
draw down much of the construction funds until February 1996.
We have issued $50,000 in commitment fee's for thefirst$5.0 million which will cover the
construction of the Moab Holiday Express and the purchase of the Park City land. The balance
of the commitment fee's of $50,000 will be transferred upon confirmation of the first funds being
received through the European transaction in behatf of Trust Guarantee.
Mr. Arnold, the attorney, has been very reluctant about releasing all commitment fee's since the
commitment fee has been paid for the November closing and because of the delays that have
been incurred thus far in the process of Trust Guarantee acquiring their funds.
Sincerely,

Norman M. Larson
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H O L M G R E N , ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L.C.
American Plaza n, Suite 404
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake Chy, Utah 84101
FAX TRANSMISSION

TO
FAX#

Norm Larson
(801) 942-0785

FROM
FAX#

Mark E. Arnold
(801)328-1151

DATE

October 27, 1995

# OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS PAGE
Holiday Inn/Pete Lanto
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October 27, 1995

Pete Lanto
2274 South 1300 East #G8-317
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
Duane Barney
c/o Holiday Inn Express
632 Kirby Lane
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660
Dear Members:
This letter is to inform you of discontinuing my association with 4D Partnership and
therefore dissolving 4D Partnership due to differences in achieving the goals of the partnership.
Based upon Pete Lanto's sale of interest in the Holiday Inn Hotels, Moab and Park City,
4D Partnership is hereby and immediately dissolved.
Sincerely,

ATT

PURCHASE AGREEMENT

Whereas Pete Lanto, herein referred to as Seller, wishes to sell any and all interest he or any of his
business entities holds in two Holiday Inn ventures, and
Whereas Mark E. Arnold and Western Empire Advisors, herein after referred to as Purchaser,
wishes to purchase the above interests,
It is now therefore agreed as follows;
1. For good and valuable consideration the sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged
Purchaser shall purchase and Seller shall sell all interest whatsoever Seller may own in two
Holiday Inn ventures located in Moab Utah and Park City Utah for the total amount of EIGHT
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($8,500.).
2. In consideration of Seller selling his interest, Purchaser agrees to hold Seller harmless,
and all claims arising out of the development of the above mentioned projects, including but noi
limited to tort claims and claims on any notes for moneys previously borrowed totajing $160,p00.

BUYER

t&jtl/^S

v->^/y

POWER OF ATTORNEY

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That I, DUANE BARNEY, of Utah County, State of Utah, do hereby make, constitute and appoint
GREGORY A. PAGE, my true and lawful attorney, for me, and in my name, and on my behalf, to:

1.

Ask, demand, recover and receive, all and any sum or sums of money, debts,
dues, merchandise or effects, due, payable, coming or belonging, or which
may at any time be due, payable, or belonging to me, from any person or
persons whatsoever;

2.

Sell all, or any part o£ said goods, merchandise and effects, which may come
to his/her possession or knowledge, on such credit, and for such prices as
he/she may deem meet;

3.

Purchase any goods, merchandise, specie, currency, shares of stock or other
commodities, on my account for such prices and to such amount as he/she
may deem meet, and the same to sell again for my benefit and on my account,
for any prices whatsoever, to ship or transport the same, or any part thereof,
on my behalf and account, to any post or posts, place or places, whatsoever,
in any vessel or vessels or other means of transportation, and with and to any
person or persons whatsoever, and there barter, exchange, and dispose of the
same;

4.

Insure and cause insurance to be made, of any such goods, merchandise,
specie or other commodities, or of any part thereof at such premiums, and for
such risks as he/she may deem meet;

5.

Accept any bill or bills of exchange or orders, make and execute any note or
notes of hand, bond or bonds, or other instruments or contracts, in my name,
and on my account, to and for any amount which he/she may deem meet or
expedient;

6.

Sell, barter, exchange or dispose of any real estate of which I am now seised
or possessed in fee simple, or for any less estate, to any person or persons, for
any price, or in any manner whatsoever, and for these purposes to execute and
acknowledge any deed or deeds, lease or leases, or other assurance or

assurances, with general covenants of warranty against all persons, or any
other covenants whatsoever, as he/she may deem expedient;
7.

Purchase any real estate on my account, in fee simple or otherwise, at any
price or any exchange whatsoever, and for these purposes to receive, confirm,
make and execute any contracts, deeds, conveyances, or other instruments
whatsoever,

8.

Settle and adjust all partnership accounts and demands, and all other accounts
or demands now subsisting, or which may hereafter subsist between me and
any person or persons whatsoever, and submit the same to and decide them
by arbitration;

9.

Compound for any debts, dues, or demands owing, or which may hereafter be
owing to me, and to take less than the whole, or otherwise to agree for the
same, in such manner, and on such terms as he/she, in his/her discretion, may
deem proper;

10.

Pay and discharge all debts and demands due and payable, or which may
hereafter become due and payable by me unto any person or persons
whatsoever;

11.

Enter into any lands or other real estate to which I am or may be entitled, and
recover the possession thereof, and damages for any injury done thereto, and
to distrain for rent due thereon;

12.

Commence and prosecute untofinaljudgment and execution, any suit or suits,
action or actions real, personal or mixed, which he/she shall deem proper for
the recovery, possession, or enjoyment of any matter or thing which is or
which may hereafter be due, payable, owing, belonging, accruing or
appertaining to me, for or by reason of the premises, or any part thereof, and,
in any such suits or actions, for me in person, or by such attorney or attorneys,
or counsel, he/she may deem necessary or proper to retain or employ to
appear and plead, before any courts or tribunals having jurisdiction thereof,
and all stipulations, undertakings, recognizances and other requisites in any
suits or actions, and any question arising on the same, by arbitration or other
compromise, and of all receipts and recoveries in the premises, due
acquittances and discharges to execute and deliver, and generally to do and
perform all matters and things, transact all business, make, execute and
acknowledge all contracts, orders, deeds, mortgages, satisfaction of
mortgages, leases and assignments of the same, and all other writing,
assurances and instruments of every kind, which may be requisite or proper
to effectuate all or any of the premises, or any other matter or thing
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appertaining or belonging to me, with the same powers, and to all intents and
purposes, with the same validity as I could, if personally present.

STATE OF UTAH

)
.ss

County of UTAH

)

Personally appeared before me DUANE BARNEY and signed the
this 3L day of QCj&h^y
, 1995.

Notary Public

NOTARY PUBLIC
MARK E. ARNOLD
57 West 200 South #404
Salt Uke City, UT 84101
My Commission Expires
January 10th, 1999
STATE OF UTAH

3

Wesiern
lLmvire

J\.duis ors
Friday, November 03, 1995
Bruce Holman

TRUST GUARANTEE CORPORATION
11811 N Tatum
Suite P-120
Phoenix, Arizona 85028
RE Moab Holiday Express
Dear Bruce
Enclosed are the basic plans and rendering for the Moab Holiday Express Mark Arnold, the
Attorney, and myself will come to Phoenix with a check when you can confirm a closing date for
this project and the purchase of the land in Park City We are very anxious to proceed since we
own an equity position in both projects and I have the Holiday Express Franchise

Norman M Larson
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INCOME & EXPENSE RECONCILIATION
FOR
MOAB HOLIDAY EXPRESS PROJECT:
$160,000

6/12
6/19
6/21
6/30
9/14
9/15
10/31
10/23
2/12
2/13
2/13
3/12

Loan fees
WEA Franchise fee
Ann Young
Park City
Kindra Const.
Trust
Pete Lantos
Jerry Young
Greg Page
1st City Cap
TCA Constr.
Ann Young

$16,000
$40,000
$ 3,200
$10,000
$ 1,000
$50,015
$ 8,500
$14,400
$ 5,000
$ 3,000
$ 2,638.45
$ 9,192.80

Total

$162,946.25
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Ff?Q1 : oVg-C CO.

PHONE NO. : 801 4664224

Apr. 10 1996 07:32PM PI

C $r finance & capital co. • po box 17622 • salt lake city, utah 84117 • ph. 801-466-2600 Max 801-466-4224

April 10, 1996

Mr. Norm Larson
Western Empiie Advisors
7109 So. Highland Drive, suite 201
Salt Lake City. Utah 84121

RE.

Moab and Jerem> Ranch, Utah Hotel Projects

Dear Norm,
When we brought the above mentioned projects to you a year ago, to provide financing,
you told us you could secure the financing needed to complete the projects. In addition,
you said you would provide any additional capital needed to secure the financing in
exchange for a share of the ownership As of this date you have been unable to piovide
the financing, and the land in Moab, Utah is now encumbered with a $178,000 loan.
After conferring with the other partners, we have decided to terminate our agreement with
you to find financing for these projects immediately. In regards to your shaie of the
partnership, you can either take over the debt on the land and release it of all
encumbrances, thus complying with our agreement that you would provide all additional
capital. Or you can decide to give up your share of the developments, and pa> back the
fees you were paid on the loan and the fees paid out to your sources. You have 48 hours
until 4.00 PM Friday April 12, 1996 to officiall) notify us in writing as to your decision
along with the outstanding funds.
Regardless of the decision you make about our partnership, we expect to receive by the
same time and date mentioned above the remaining balance of the funds entrusted to your
care with interest and copies of all checks drawn on the funds along with copies of the
bank statements showing the appropriate interest earned on these funds.

BN0061

^

ROM : SFS.C CO.

PHONE NO.

: 801 4664224

C\pr.

10 1996 07:33PM F2

We look forward to you compliance with our directives and to your decision on the
handling of the repayment of die loan. All funds must be received by April 19, 1996.
All responses and correspondence should be directed to me at the address shown on first
page.
Sincerely,

cc:

Bob Norman
Duane Barney
Mark Arnold

BN0062
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NOTES FROM SALT LAKE CITY TRIP
May i and 2, 1996
TRIP TAKEN TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICTS WITH LARSON, ARNOLD,
PAGE, BARNEY AND HOLIDAY INN MR. LONGENECKER.
MAY 1, 1996 10:00 - 12:45
Met with Micheal Hughes at 9:45 at the Lobby of Marks
building and went for coffee to discuss our case.
Met at Mark Arnolds office at 10:00 with all of the
principals except for Norman Larson and the Youngs.
Question on where the $160,000 went that was signed for by
all of the original people. Greg Page stated that Norm
Larson would not release that information.
It seems that the Land in Bountiful that is owned
Arnold is somehow tied to the Moab property owned
Normans and held by the Youngs. Mark Arnold said
trying to free up the Norman Land. It is held by
transfer clause but I do not know what that is.

by Mark
by the
he is
a 10195

Pete Lanto who was the holder of the Jeremy Ranch property
was bought out by Mark Arnold for 8,500 dollars, according
to Norm Larson it was paid for by the 160,000 indebtedness
that was accrued by the partnership of Normans, Rasmussen,
Barney, Lantos signature. We still do not have a
dissolution of the partnership of Lanto or the institution
of Mark Arnold and Norman Larson.
At the meeting it was stated that the money $50,000 was
being held by Guarantee Trust in Phoenix Arizona, later in
the day in meeting with Norman Larson it was stated that it
was 1st City Capitol that holds the money, but the amount is
not listed as that amount. (See attached)
Norman Larson had already paid the $40,000 when we were
asked to sign the paper borrowing $40,000, we learned that
the paper stated $160,000 this was and has been a conflict
and may never be resolved.
Norman Larson holds the franchise, and he also holds the
secured moneys that was secured from the Youngs.
It was stated that Greg and Barney had looked at a building
site to the south of Moab, before they got with the Normans.
Apparently according to Mark Arnold, Pete Lantos is about to
go bankrupt and the 8,500 was to bail him out. It was not
discussed that it was paid for with the 160,000 loan money,
Mark Arnold said he paid it. (See Attached)
It was discussed by David Longenecker that specific things
had to happen:
1. That the County must say that the septic system can
be expanded and used.
2. And a specific document that both water and septic
could be used for the Motel with an affidavit from the
county (Health Inspector?).

' ' ®

Divinn-jn

3. Also it was stated by David Longenecker that on 1 0 1-95 the Franchise was given and on 2-1-96 was the end
of the extension4. It must also be shown to Holiday Inn a copy of the
following:
a. The moratorium issue
b. The Norman Larson Issue
c. A request to Holiday Inn with a paper
showing secured financing
d. Site Control
e. End of the quarter, and who will pay for
further extension. ($6,000).
f. Letter stating plans
for review of Holiday
Inn
Board.
g. And additional information to be given to Doug
Artusio in Atlanta, Georgia for now new
requirements as the extension was lapsed on March
7 t h . 1996
The afternoon of May 1st. 3:00-4:30 Robert, Chara and
D i a n e met with Norman Larson. He gave us details as to the
m o n e y , on stationary of his company Western Empire Advisors,
and it was dated April 3, 1996. (See Attached)
He said he
w a s working on financing and possibly moving the Holiday Inn
motel site to south of Moab, one site being Dar C truck
plaza, and the other being Susie Tayors Branding Iron.
He said he would get back to us and seemed most helpful
as to where the money was and promised us that the loan to
the Y o u n g s would be paid off no matter weather he built on
our land or moved to another piece and thus freeing up our
land for s a l e .
MAY 2 , 1996 10:00 AM - 3:00 PM
Micheal Hughes was most helpful, we took up most of his day,
he tried to find us some hard money and was able to after he
helped to get a bridge loan from SBA, and M r . Brad Byby.
He
explained how a bridge loan worked and solved one of our
main pressing problems of the time of no liquid cash.
Without this being done, it would have been most difficult
to secure enough financing to pay the monthly payment.
Micheal Hughes w a s our consultant during both d a y s and is
now our council as to how to proceed with the continuing
land holdings that we have and how to liquidate them.
Faxed
Typed

this 7th day of May to Micheal Hughes 355-5070
to the best of my r e c o l l e c tJ4L"
U I"
1 .

A. Diane Norman

P. % 7

BN0071

hHuufc riu. : t'ui J t t ^ ^ a

J*jn.

1? l ? ? b 04.'57Fn PI

June 18, 1996

Norm Larson
c/o Western Empire Advisors
7105 South Highland Drive #202
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
f» . .

»r__JL

T 7 . T . ' J . . . T.._.

T?

n__.r_-.rf

Dear Norm:
As per your request, we held a strategy/resolution meeting regarding the Moab Holiday Inn.
We have concluded that both legally and equitably the resolution of the financing and franchise
purchase should be as follows:
Scenario 1—In the event you obtain thefinancingas previously required, you will be given an
equal interest in the project with Duane Barney, Bob Norman, Greg Page, and Mark Arnold, less any
agreed equity to be given to an investor.
Scenario 2—Should you not obtainfinancingand either Greg Page, Duane Barney, or Mark
Arnold obtains financing for the project, you will receive no equity interest in the project and you
must agree to transfer your interest in thefranchiseto a development company to be formed at the
time financing is obtained.
Scenario 3—Should no financing be obtained-and the francliise lost, the group shall look to
you for repayment of the $50,000 plus interest paid to Guaranteed Trust and/or National Acceptance
Corporation, In addition, you will remain responsible for your share of the remaining $128,000.

Dunnoc

r

ROM : SF&C CO.

PHOME NO. : 801 4864224

Jun. 13 1396 04:5GPM P2

Norm Larson
June 18, 1996
Page 2

We sincerely regret that this project has proceeded in this fashion.
Sincerely,

MaikE. Arnold

Dnanrt Rnrn^.v

Greg Page

Bob Norman
MEAAnc

fij
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/

My Cflmmcujfl £»pri» Jin 12,2CCQ
STATE OF UTAH

Dated thl*3 IS7^ ***<* fiu^UbT
.WIJC

.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF

'ZX^JK-

On the £ 1 ^ day of

U(A

f\\>-viy^

,19^,

personally appeared before me
.the signer...

me that ...he

execiifed,the same.

0/ the foregoing Instrument, who duly acknowledged to

Notary;
My Commission Expires- I//WjtrX'
fOOMH3 1-ASSIGNMENT Of'THUST DEED-X.llr Co MW m - K
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August 21, 1996

lderatl0n
uSdersiin^H ^ v C ° n i
' A n n Y o u n c J a n d Norman Young, the
int^f^? f^K
f w b y a s s i < ? n s ' grants and transfers all beneficial
«Jv^f
withinh e this
note,
together with all rights accrued or to
deed
dff?^!i 2
*.
° f t r u s t ' securing same, so far as the trust
deed relates to the note, to: James w. Wrinkler.

A

Ann Young ,y

Norman YoUng

Date

I

Date

&
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ARNOLD & WIGGINS,

L.C

ATTORNhYS \ N D COl'NSLLORS AT LAVt

MARK E ARNOLD
bCOTT L UIGGINb
DIANA L (, \RRETT

AMERICAN PLAZM1 SUITh 404
S7 \XhST200 SOUTH
SALT LAkb C m UTAH 84101

ItlhPHONt
(HOI) 32H4333
TACSlMlLh
(801)32H 1151

Kent Johnson
230 West 300 South
Moab, UT 84532

Dear Kent,
Please be advised that this firm has been retained by Pacific Development to assist them in
the master planning and developing of approximately 17 acres in Moab and contiguous to a two
acre parcel owned by your family Because of the location of your property it would be beneficial
to develop it together with the above referenced 17 acres However we have been unable to make
contact with you to discuss the possible sale or trade
Because you have been difficult to contact, we are left to assume that you are not interested
in discussing the same with us If this is in fact the case, please understand that it forces us to
develop around you and because you will have no without access it will make it virtually
impossible for you to develop your piece
We are in the process of master planning the 17 acres, with excavation beginning as early as
February 1997 Once the master planning is completed, Pacific Development will not amend its
development to accommodate your parcel
Presently, Pacific Development is in a position to purchase your property at fair market
value or assist you in trading perhaps under a 1031 exchange, for properties presently owned by my
client in Grand, Utah or Davis Counties
Please contact us as soon as possible and let us know what your intentions are

cc Randy Day r
Jim Winkler /
Otto Belvedere/

Sincerely,

£:
MarkE Arnold
ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L C

ARNOLD & WIGGINS, L C
A T T O R N E Y S A N D C O U N B E L O R B AT LAW
A M E R I C A N P L A 2 A II S U I T E 4 0 4

1^1=032

57 WEST 200 50UTH
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8 U01

' 9 M«u««I
15*41511

Kent Johnson
230 West 300 South
Moab, UT 84532

BN0095

SOUTH EASTERN UTAH TITLE COMPANY
150 East 1st North
P.O. Box 700
Moab, Utah
435-259-7635
B. Type of Loan

4[]VA

8. Mortgage Ins. Case Number

7, Loan Number

6. File Number
50,480-G

1.1 } FHA 2.[ J FmHA 3.[ ] Conv. Vains
S.f ] Conv. Ins.

C. Notc:This form is furnished to give you a statement of actual settlement costs. Amounts paid to and by the settlement agent are shown.
Items marked "(p.o.c.)" were paid outside the closing; ihcy are shown here for informational purposes and are not included in the totals.
D. Name and Address of Buyer
JAMES W. WINKLER
2700 NORTH US HIGHWAY 40
HEBER, UTAH 84032

E. Name and Address of Seller
ROBERT R. NORMAN
A. DIANE NORMAN
P.O. BOX 1300
MOAB, UTAH 84532

| G. Property Location
T25S, R21E, SECTION 26, A PORTION

F. Name and Address of Lender

Settlement Date:
5/22/98

H. Settlement Agent:
South Eastern Utah Title Company
Place cf Settlement: 150 East 1st North
Moab, Utah

J. Summary of Buyer's Transaction
100. Gross Amount Due From Buyer
1
101. Contract sales price
102. Personal Property
I 103. Settlement charges (line 1400)
104.
105.

K Summary of Seller's Transaction
400. Gross Amount Due To Seller
420,000.00
121 Contract sales price
402. Personal Property
87
403.
404.
405.

420.000.00

j Adjustments for Items paid by seller In advance

Adjustments for Items paid by seller In advance

106.
1 107. County taxes 5/23/98-to 12/31/98
1 108.
109.
110.
111.
1 112.

406.
407. County taxes
408.
409.
410.
411.
412.

j 120. Gross Amount Due From Buyer
200.

648.40

420,735.40

AxnouDU Pmld BY Or In D«haJf oT Buyer

1 201. Deposit or earnest money
! 202. Principal amount of new loan
I 203. Existing loan taken subject to
_2Q4_CREDIT FOR PAYOFF FROM NORMAN
! 205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
Adjustments for items unpaid bv seller
210.
211. County taxes
to
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

420.000.00 |

420. Gross Amount Due to Seller
500.

212000.00

to

Reduction In Amount Due to SeUer

501. Excess deposit
502. Settlement Charges to Seller (line 1400)
503. Existing loan taken subject to
504. Payoff of first mortgage loan-winker
505. Payoff of second mortgage loan
506.Payoff Linda Bohannon on adjacent property
507.
508.
509.
Adjustments of Items unpaid by seller
510.
511. County taxes 1/1/98 to 5/22/98
512. Delinqunet 1996 taxes
513.
1997 taxes
1
514.
515.
516.
517.
1
518.
519.

220. Total Paid By/For Buyer

212,000.00

520. Total Reduction Amount Due to Seller

300. Cash At Settlement From/To Buyer
301. Gross Amtdue from buyer (line 120)
302. Gross Amt pd bv/for buver (line 220)

420,735.40
212.000.00

600. Cash At Settlement From/To Seller
601. Gross Amt due to seller (line 420)
602. Less reduction in amt due seller

303. Cash [X] From [ ] To Buyer

208,735.40

603. Cash [X] To [ ] From Seller

(tfoUy ravwwvt fee H U M S M I C C M M SutencM « d to 0* bti. o4 my knowiedce « 4 belief. t t U i n c w )

iteMM •( »U rcctlpu tad dttbuium

380
212000.00
38.229.25

412.88
1,125.99

949.52J

253,097.64 |
""420,000.00
253,097.64
166,902.36

* fcy M M 1A IB)< U M M C U M .

I Amber etrufy

1 k » v t > ^ t v t t i » copy of th< HUD-J S<u)«a««i S U M M M .

BN0099
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Page 2
^ Settlement Charges
700 Total Sales/Broker's Commission Based on price S

(S) %*

Division of Commission (line 700) as follows
701 S

to

702 $

to

Paid From

Paid From

Borrowers

Sellers
Funds at
Settlement

funds at
Settlement
i

703 Commission paid at Settlement

704
800
801
802
803
804
805
806

Items Payable In Connection With Loan
Loan Origination Fee
% to
Loan Discount
%
Appraisal Fee to
Credit Report to
Lender's Inspection Fee to
Mortgage Insurance Application Fee to

807
808
809
810
811
| 900. Items Required by Lender To Be Paid In Advance
901 Interest from
to
(5}S
/day
902 Mortgage Insurance Premium to
903 Hazard Insurance Premium to

'

904
905
|| 1000 Reserves Deposited With Lender
1001 Hazard insurance

months (S),%

per month

1002 Mortgage insurance

months (a)$

per month

II 1003
1004 County property taxes
II 1005
1006
1007

months (2),$

per month

1008 Aggregate Accounting Adjustment
U H00. Title Charges
1101 Settlement or closing fee to South Eastern Utah Title Company
|| 1102

75 00

75 00

1103
1104
1105
1106 Document Preparation to South Eastern Utah Title Co
j| 1107

25 00

1108 Title Insurance to South Eastern Utah Title Company
i 1109 Lenders coverage $

200 00

II 1110 Owner's coverage $10,000 00 MINIMUM PER INSTRUCTIONS FROM BUYER
I 1111
1 1112
1113
|| 1200 Government Recording and Transfer Charges
|| 1201 Recording Fees Deed S12 00.Rclcases$80 00

12 00

80 00

J 12.02
1.1.203
1 1204
1 1205
j 1300. Additional Settlement Charges
1

1301 Survey to
1302 Pest inspection to
1303
1304
1305
1400, Total Settlement Charge*

•

m*H\JI^\Stnianmt$uummitad^ikehmofmykaowitd%etndUite(
• M M AM 10 UMt MM 01 Oiy kl
« copy of U« HUD-IS

a u t tntt tad tcatnu u

W,w 1

U of til r«ccipu tad di$bvrt€mtaii mud* •* my tcctxuu tmymtunhu

380.00 1
trtmstcuoa ffttnixrcertify

V. MHKLM
Seller £b\K&
"he HUD-1 Settlement Statement which I
e disbursed in accordance with this slate
by

WSSm^^&WU*^

is d true and accurate account of this transaction I have caused or will cause the funds to
Settffement Agent

YEARNING; U is a crime to knowingly make false statement* m th~ T i~ . - J «*
find and imprisonment F~^ ^— \* < *-

"fa
HOLMGREN. ARNOLD S WIGGINS, L C .
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Holiday Inns Worldwide
Three Ravinia Drive, Suite 2500
Atlanta, GA 30346
Re:

Extension of Franchise Agreement, Demand

Dear Ms. Stillman:
Please be advised that this firm has been retained by Mr. Duane Barney, Mr. Greg Page, and
Mr. Bob Norman for the purpose of enforcing an oral agreement made between themselves and
Holiday Inns Worldwide for the extension of afranchiseagreement for the construction and operation
of a Holiday Inn Express Hotel in Moab, Utah.
It has been indicated by my clients that for reasons which are not relevant at this time, they
were expressly promised that theirfranchiseagreement would be extended for an additional 60 to 90
days from July 22, 1996 upon their removal of Mr. Norman Larson from the franchise. Apparently,
this was due to Holiday Inns' dissatisfaction with Mr. Larson, not only in Moab, but other locations
as well.
Pursuant to direct instruction from Holiday Inns Worldwide, Mr. Larson was removed,
leaving all rights associated with the franchise left to my clients. (Please see attached letter to Mr.
Jim Darby dated July 2, 1996). After having performed as directed by Holiday Inns Worldwide, my
clients were then notified that the franchise no longer existed and that Mr. Larson's removal was
contrary to the franchise agreement. From that point in time, it appears that all has gone downhill
with both Sales and Franchise Administration departments blaming each other for the apparent
"communication."
Holiday Inns' subsequent position constitutes bad faith under the present agreement as well
as an enforceable oral agreement for the extension of their contract under Utah law.1 As has been
indicated by my clients, preliminary architectural plans have been completed and a site has been

1

It has also come to the Moab partnership's attention that others have been contacted by
Holiday Inns Worldwide for the sale of the Moab franchise, but to date this has not been verified.
Needless to say, if this were the case, it would constitute an additional act of bad faith and frilly
explain Holiday Inns' conduct to date.
r
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purchased for the Hotel, leaving only the actual funding of the construction loan which is scheduled
to occur on or before August 30, 1996. To date, the Moab partnership has expended over two
hundred thousand dollars on the project and they are not willing to walk away from these costs in the
event Holiday Inns Worldwide should refuse to extend the franchise as agreed. I have been
specifically instructed to file suit should Holiday Inns Worldwide refuse to honor their agreement.
We have had a lengthy and beneficial relationship with Holiday Inns as evidenced by Express Hotel
and to now become adversarial over a three month extension is unreasonable. However, should
Holiday Inns Worldwide attempt to terminate the franchise, we would be left with no other option
except litigation.2
At the same time, my clients realize that Holiday Inns Worldwide has a vested interest in
seeing that a Hotel be built in Moab. To this end, ail parties involved in the partnership are willing
to execute the appropriate agreements to, in effect, walk away from the project and hold Holiday Inns
Worldwide harmless for the losses incurred once the 90-day extension has expired.
I would expect your response to this matter on or before July 28, 1996. Please judge
yourselves accordingly.
Sincerely,

Mark E. Arnold
Attorney at Law

(

MEA/mc
Enclosure
cc:
Duane Barney
Greg Page
Bob Norman
Michael Hughes

2

Please keep in mind that a major reason for the delay has been the Moab City
Moratorium placed on utility hook-ups.
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SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

Gateway Tower West
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT ARNOLD'S MOTION
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

vs.

Civil No.: 9807-116
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") respectfully files this reply memorandum in
support of his motion for partial summary judgment on the first, third, and fourth causes of
action in plaintiffs Robert and Diane Norman's (the "Normans") amended complaint.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In his motion for partial summary judgment, Arnold is not asking this court to rule that he
has no liability to the Normans. Nor is he asking the court to prevent the Normans from
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proceeding to trial or from presenting their case to a jury. In fact, it is precisely because this case
will proceed to trial that Arnold has filed this motion. If the alleged facts are presented to the
jury under the alleged legal theories, the jury will be forced to hammer square pegs into round
holes. Arnold's objective in filing this motion is to put this case into an analytical framework
that will allow the jury to make a fair and principled decision. From the shotgun approach in the
Normans' opposition memorandum, it is obvious that their objective is precisely the opposite.
Whatever causes of action the Normans might have against Arnold, they simply do not
have a claim for breach of the joint venture agreement or for breach of fiduciary duty. They do
not have a claim for breach of the Agreement, first, because it is undisputed that .Arnold was not
a party to it. Second, the Normans have unequivocally admitted that they never consented to
Arnold becoming a joint venture partner. Under the Agreement and Utah law, Arnold simply
could not become a partner without their consent, and thus could not have been grafted into the
joint venture agreement.
There may be a disputed issue of fact about whether Arnold and Western Empire
Advisors assumed liability under the promissory note and deed of trust when they ostensibly
purchased Peter Lanto's joint venture interest. However, the Normans are pursuing that claim in
their second cause of action for default of promissory note and trust deed, and that second claim
is not the subject of Arnold's motion. The possibility of liability under Lanto's purchase,
however, cannot make Arnold liable for breach of an entirely separate contract to which he was
never a party.
The Normans also do not have a claim for breach of fiduciary duty because, again, they
unequivocally admit that Arnold was "never" their lawyer and, therefore, he never acquired a
2
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fiduciary duty that could be breached. Contradicting the Normans' deposition testimony, their
lawyer now asserts - without citation to the record or authority of any kind - that it is "certain"
that "the Normans definitely were looking to and relying on Arnold to protect their personal
interests." Opp'n. Mem. at 24. As shown in more detail below, there is absolutely no evidence not even a single affidavit from the Normans - that suggests Arnold undertook to perform any
legal services on behalf of the Normans' personally.
Finally, the Normans have not addressed Arnold's argument seeking summary judgment
on their claim for punitive damages. In the absence of any opposition, the Court should grant
summary judgment for Arnold on that claim. The Court also should grant summary judgment on
the claim because it is predicated on the Normans' fiduciary duty claim, which fails because
Arnold did not owe the Normans a fiduciary duty as a matter of law.
In short, granting this motion will not deprive the Normans of their day in court, and it
will not prevent them from recovering damages if they can prove such damages are justified.
The only effect of granting this motion will be to force the Normans' to do what is required of
every claimant in every lawsuit: plead and prove specific facts that satisfy the necessary
elements of applicable legal claims. The Normans have not done so with respect to three of the
four causes of action in their complaint. Those causes of action - for breach of the joint venture
agreement, breach of a non-existent fiduciary duty, and for punitive damages - should be
dismissed.
II.

REPLY TO THE NORMANS' STATEMENT OF FACTS

The Normans have provided the court with numerous documents and have alleged
numerous facts that may be relevant to the lawsuit, but are not material for purposes of this

motion for partial summary judgment. In doing so, the Normans have attempted to bury the
court in minutiae that is immaterial to the present motion in the hope that the court will conclude
that there must be a disputed issue of fact in there somewhere. So the court will not be misled by
this strategy, it is important to note that the only facts material to this motion concern (1) whether
Arnold was a party to the joint venture agreement; (2) whether the Normans consented to admit
Arnold as a joint venture partner; and (3) whether Arnold provided legal representation to the
Normans in their individual capacity as opposed to their capacity as members of the joint
venture. By the same token, the only documents that pertain to these material issues are those
attached to Arnold's moving papers.
In this light, Arnold replies to the Normans' Response to Undisputed Material Facts as
follows1:
2.
The Normans contend that Defendant's undisputed material facts 14-19 do "not tell the
whole story." Opp'n Mem. at 5. The "whole story," however, is simply not material to the
discrete legal issues raised in this motion.
3.
All factual allegations about the promissory note and trust deed do not pertain to the
issues in this motion, and therefore are not material.
4.
None of the alleged facts surrounding the Young loan and the expenditure of Young loan
proceeds are material to the issues before the court in this motion.
5.

The acquisition of the Holiday Inn Franchise is not material to this motion.
In addition to their Response to Undisputed Material Facts, the Normans also provided

Plaintiffs' Additional Undisputed Facts. Opp'n Mem. at 7-13. This section, consists only of
selective excerpts from various deposition transcripts. However, none of the excerpts cited

1

Arnold's numbering corresponds to the numbering used in the Normans' opposition.
4
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pertain to the discrete issues raised in Arnold's motion. Instead pertain only to alleged acts of
wrongdoing, which will be duly considered at trial.
III.

ARGUMENT

"[Sjummary judgment is proper when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Town of Alta v. Ben Hame Corp., 836
P.2d 797, 1992 Utah App. LEXIS 122, * 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In resisting a motion for
summary judgment, "bare contentions, unsupported by any specifications of facts in support
thereof, raise no material questions of fact." Brigham Truck & Implement Co. v. FridaL 746
P.2d 1171, 1173 (1987). Id Moreover, "in opposing a motion for summary judgment, the
plaintiff still has the ultimate burden of proving all the elements of his or her cause of action."
Hipwell v. IHC Hospitals. 944 F.2d 327, 339 (Utah 1997). As will be shown below, although
the Normans' opposition accuses Arnold of wide variety of wrongs, these allegations consist
largely of the conclusory and assertions of their counsel, not citations to the record. Few, if any,
of the wrongs asserted are "material to the applicable rule[s] of law" of breach of contract,
breach of fiduciary duty, and punitive damages, and none "support [ ] the essential elements" of
these claims.." Norton. 669 P.2d at 859; HipwelL 944 F.2d at 339.
A. Arnold Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Normans' Breach of Contract
Claim Because Arnold Was Not a Party to the Contract.
In the first cause of action, the Normans allege that Arnold breached the joint venture
agreement. However, in their opposition memorandum, the Normans concede the applicable
law: a person cannot breach a contract to which he never became a party and never assented to
be bound by its terms. Vasels v. LoGuidice. 740 P.2d 1375, 1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1987)

5

(observing that mutual assent of parties to a contract is "essential" to create binding contract);
Bunnell v. Bills. 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) ("[a] binding contract can only exist where there
has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its terms.") The
Normans further concede, as they must, that Arnold was never a party to the joint venture
agreement. Based on these concessions alone, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on the
first cause of action because it is undisputed that he never became a party to the agreement he is
accused of breaching.
Unable to identify any facts or law to satisfy the first and most fundamental element of a
breach of contract claim, the Normans ask the court to overlook that fatal defect for three
reasons.
First, the Normans assert the complete non-sequitur that Arnold's alleged unclean hands
somehow compensate for the fact that he was never a party to the joint venture agreement.
Specifically, they allege that:
Defendant's claim that he is entitled to Summary Judgment
because the Normans never consented to his entry in the joint
venture is untenable. Plaintiffs will produce evidence from which
a jury would be entitled to believe that Arnold was double-dealing
and self-dealing, both as counsel for and as a member of the joint
venture from its inception.
Opp'n. Mem. at 16. Even assuming all of the alleged bad acts are true, however, the law simply
does not provide an unclean hands exception to the rule that a person cannot breach a contract to
which he is not a party. That, of course, is why the Normans have not cited any authority for this
theory. The alleged bad acts may be actionable under some other legal theory, but they do not
make Arnold a party to the joint venture agreement.

6
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Second, the Normans claim that Arnold somehow became a party to the joint venture
agreement because he and Western Empire Advisors entered into a "Purchase Agreement" with
Peter Lanto, one of the joint venture partners. Under that purchase agreement, Arnold and
Western Empire Advisors purported to purchase Lanto's interest in the joint venture. The
Normans contend that the purported purchase made Arnold a joint venture partner and, hence, a
party to the joint venture agreement.
This argument fails, first, because entering into the purchase agreement with Lanto did
not make Arnold a party to the entirely separate joint venture agreement. Nor did the purchase
Agreement make Arnold a joint venture partner. The law in Utah is absolutely clear that
"subject to any agreement between them . . . [n]o person can become a member of a partnership
without the consent of all partners." Utah Code Ann. §48-1-15(7) (supp. 1999). The Utah
Supreme Court, in Folsom v. Fernstrom. 134 P. 1021, 1024 (Utah 1913), further observed that
"[o]f course [defendant] could not become a member of the partnership without the consent of
both [the plaintiff] and [the co-defendant], the original members of the firm." Moreover, "[a]
partner may sell his interest in the partnership to a third party . . . but the sale does not, alone,
make the third party a partner in the firm against the will and consent of the other partners." 59A
Am.Jur.2d § 397.
Consent to partnership admission is not only the law of Utah, it is also required by the
joint venture agreement. The agreement unambiguously provides that "[additional Joint
Venturers may be added to the Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of the then
existing Joint Venturers" Def s. Undisputed Material Facts 1f 11. There are good reasons for
this. In the absence of this requirement of unanimous consent, an infinite number of claimants 7

strangers to the partnership agreement - would be allowed to materialize if and when any
partnership became a success, and to sue on their "entitlement" to partnership profits or assets.
For this reason, if the joint venture had been a success, the Normans almost certainly would be
arguing that Arnold is not a partner.
Third, the Normans now claim they "subsequently learn[ed] that Arnold had acquired
Lanto's interest and thereafter allowed him to continue to act as a partner." Opp'n. Mem. at 17.
To the extent this assertion is intended to suggest that the Normans retroactively consented to
admit Arnold as a partner, it is both unsupported and directly contradicted. This is a legal and
factual conclusion that appears without citation to the record or to evidence of any kind, disputed
or undisputed. It is not even supported by a self-serving affidavit from the Normans. Of course,
the Normans would not and could not give such an affidavit because this newly advanced
conclusion directly contradicts the Normans' sworn deposition testimony, taken only in March of
this year. The Normans' depositions - as opposed to their lawyer's assertions - definitively
establish that they at no time consented to Arnold's admission to the joint venture as a partner:
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold becoming
a partner?
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Never.
Def s. Undisputed Mat. Fact f 13. Moreover, Mr. Norman has testified under oath on two
different occasions that "[n]obody asked [him] about" Arnold becoming a member of the joint
venture, and that he never consented to Arnold's admission. Def's Undisputed Material Facts ^
12.

8
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The first cause of action, therefore, should be dismissed, because Arnold never became a
party to the joint venture agreement or a partner in the joint venture.
B. Arnold Is Entitled to Summary Judgment on the Normans' Breach of Fiduciary
Duty Claim Because Arnold Did Not Owe Them a Fiduciary Duty.
In their third cause of action, the Normans allege that Arnold owed and breached a
fiduciary duty because he was their personal lawyer. Contradicting this claim his supporting
memorandum and affidavit, Arnold provided undisputed facts and dispositive authority
demonstrating that he was not the Normans' personal lawyer and therefore did not owe them a
fiduciary duty as a matter of law. In opposition, the Normans now reluctantly admit that it "may
be technically true . . . that [Arnold] was not the Normans' personal attorney." Opp'n Mem. at 2.
The Normans further concede the law; that is, that an attorney does not owe a fiduciary duty
absent an attorney-client relationship, and that an attorney representing a partnership does not
owe a fiduciary duty to the individual partners.2 Notwithstanding the undisputed facts and law,
the Normans argue that the third cause of action should not be dismissed because (1) Arnold
allegedly committed acts of wrongdoing, (2) the Normans' interests were personally affected;
and (3) Arnold was unclear about whether or not he represented the Normans personally. Each
of these arguments is unavailing.

2

See Kibatrick v. Wiley. Rein & Fielding. 909 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("an attorneyclient relationship" is an essential element of a legal malpractice claim based on a breach of fiduciary
duty); Ronald E. Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24.8 (4th ed. 1996) ("a lawyer who
represents a partnership does not thereby become counsel for or owe a duty to the partners"); Salt Lake
Knee & Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Snorts Medicine, 909 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (joint venture is a "distinct and separate" legal entity from the individual joint venture
partners).
9

First, the Normans "contend that [Arnold's] conduct through October, 1995 alone is
sufficient for their fiduciary duty claim against Arnold." Opp'n Mem. at 25 (emphasis added).
Elaborating on this theory, the Normans assert, that
. . . the Court should keep in mind plaintiffs' theory of the case
which is that they were set up to take the fall by Arnold, Larson
and the rest if the venture failed. It will be plaintiffs' contention,
supported by ample evidence that the Normans were intentionally
kept in the dark about the conduct of Mark Arnold and the other
parties; that Arnold knew the Normans were getting no
information from Page or Barney; and that Arnold had become a
member of the joint venture, but nevertheless had his little side
deals going on with Larson.
Opp'n Mem. at 19. Thus, the Normans are making the entirely circular argument that Arnold
acquired a fiduciary duty by breaching a fiduciary duty. They contend that Arnold, by keeping
them "in the dark" and having "his little side deals with Larson," violated a fiduciary duty. Yet
they do not explain, nor can they, how Arnold acquired a duty of disclosure, a duty of loyalty, or
any other fiduciary duty.
Second, the Normans argue that "the basis for their claim" is that Arnold owed them a
fiduciary duty as members of the joint venture whose personal interests were "directly impacted'
in the course of the representation. Opp'n Mem. at 19. In support of this contention, the
Normans cite only one case, Stocks v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 2000 Utah App. LEXIS
46 (Ct. App. Utah 2000). This case, in fact, proves the exact opposite of what the Normans
contend.
In Stocks, similar to the Normans' allegations here, individual shareholders of a
corporation sued third-party insurers for alleged breaches of duties owed to the corporate entity.
Because the individual shareholders claimed a personal harm, like the Normans, they claimed
10
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that the corporation's insurers owed duties directly to them. As the Normans contend, the Utah
Court of Appeals indeed recognized one "narrow exception" to the general rule that individual
shareholders do not have standing to sue third parties for the breach of duties owed to a
corporation. Stocks, 2000 Utah App. LEXIS 46, **6. The Normans quote the Stocks court as
stating that "[a] shareholder may bring an individual cause of action if the harm to the
corporation also damaged the shareholder as an individual rather than as a shareholder." Id.
However, the Normans failed to quote the very next sentence of the Stocks opinion, which
expressly sets forth the circumstances in which this "narrow exception" applies: "[t]his
exception applies to cases in which the wrong itself is a 'violation of a duty arising from a
contract or otherwise, and owed directly to the shareholder.'" Id (emphasis added).
Thus, the appellate court found that the plaintiff shareholders did not have standing to sue
the corporation's insurer and upheld summary judgment against them on this basis. The court
found that the exception (on which the Normans rely) did not apply to the plaintiff shareholders
despite the fact that they (1) were the corporation's "sole shareholders, directors, officers, and
agents"; (2) were the personal guarantors of the corporation's debts; (3) had financed the
corporation's defense in its suit against the insurer "out of their own pockets"; and (4) had
suffered mental and emotional distress as a result of the insurer's conduct. Stocks. 2000 Utah
App. LEXIS at **7-8. Perhaps most significantly, in the face of these facts, the court still
refused to apply the exception because the insurer's duties "were owed to the corporation, " not
the plaintiffs, even though the plaintiffs "were named insureds and thus [had] a contractual
relationship with [the insurer]." Id.

11
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In short, Stocks affirms rather than alters the general rule that "a lawyer who represents a
partnership does not thereby become counsel for or owe a duty to the partners." Ronald E.
Mallen & Jeffrey M. Smith, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 24.8 (4th ed. 1996); Bieter Co. v.
Blomquist 132 F.R.D. 220, 224 (D. Minn. 1990) (law firm's representation of joint venture did
not constitute representation of individual joint venturers); see also Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.13;
Mareuiles v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985) ("an attorney representing a
corporation or similar entity owes allegiance to the entity rather than to its shareholders.")
Therefore, this second argument by the Normans - that Arnold owed them a duty because they
were personally affected - also is circular. Even if the Normans suffered personal harm, they
cannot sue Arnold for breach of fiduciary duty unless Arnold owed them a personal duty in the
first place.
Third, the Normans claim that "defendant Arnold could not state with any precision who
he thought he represented . . . . " Opp'n Mem. at 20. Therefore, the Normans contend, there is a
disputed issue of fact about whether Arnold represented the Normans personally. Beyond this,
the Normans now claim that "[t]he only thing that is certain is that the Normans definitely were
looking to and relying on Arnold to protect their personal interests." Opp'n Mem. at 24. These
claims are both unsupported and directly contradicted by the Normans' sworn testimony.
Because his deposition transcript arguably was unclear, Arnold filed an affidavit in
connection with this summary judgment motion in which he stated unequivocally that "[njeither
my law firm nor I have ever provided legal services of any kind to Robert or Diane Norman
individually." Arnold Aff. 1J 3. Arnold further testified that "[njeither my law firm nor I have
ever received payment for legal services of any kind from Robert or Diane Norman
12
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individually." Id *\] 4. Thus, there is no question of fact about whom Arnold thought he
represented.
Moreover, even if Arnold had thought he represented the Normans personally, the
Normans themselves deny it. The Normans both have repeatedly and unequivocally testified
under oath that although Arnold acted as "the lawyer for the group," he "never" represented them
individually:
Q: [By Mr. Lalli] . . . . You've told me that you believe that
Arnold was the lawyer for the group; right?
A: [By Mrs. Norman] Uh-huh.

Q: [Arnold] represented the group, and do you know if he
represented Page, Barney, or Lanto individually?
A: No, I don't.
Q: And he did not represent you individually?
A: Never.

Q: [By Mr. Lalli] In the event that your interests became different
from say Page or Barney, did you believe that Arnold would then
represent your interests rather than Page or Barney's?
A: [By Mr. Norman] No, I was just - as the group is the only
thing.

Q: Did you think about whether Mr. Arnold would look out for
your interests rather than Page or Barney's in the event your
interests became different from Page's and Barney's?
A: I don't think it would be singled out - that I would be singled
13

out as being shown any favor, it was strictly for the group, that's it.
Def.'s Undisputed Material Facts 1fl[ 14 and 15.
Thus, the Normans have testified that (1) Arnold was "never" their lawyer; (2) they did
not rely on Arnold even for communications about the joint venture; and (3) when they wanted
representation "personally" in the joint venture, they retained counsel of their own. Def.'s
Undisputed Material Facts lfi| 14-20. Unlike the Marguiles case where "[a]ll three of the
[plaintiff partners] attested" that it "was their impression and belief that "Jones, Waldo was
acting for their individual interests as well as the interest of the partnership," the Normans cannot
even assert in good faith that they believed Arnold represented their personal interests. Having
so emphatically acknowledged that Arnold was never their personal attorney, the Normans
cannot now contradict themselves and, unlike the Marguiles case no attorney-client relationship
can be implied.
Summary judgment on the third cause of action should be granted because Arnold did not
owe the Normans a fiduciary duty.
C. The Normans' Claim for Punitive Damages Should be Dismissed Because They
Are Not Available Here As a Matter of Law.
The Normans' opposition to Arnold's motion for partial summary judgment does not
address Arnold's argument that punitive damages are not available at all. As a result, the
Normans' fourth cause of action for punitive should be dismissed for failure to raise an
opposition.

14
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IV.

CONCLUSION

The Normans have Arnold and other to share in the loss resulting from the failed joint
venture. They have cited to numerous documents and alleged facts to support their contention
that Arnold and others are partially or completely responsible for that alleged loss. In this
motion, Arnold is not seeking to prevent the Normans from presenting their allegations to a jury.
Arnold is merely seeking the court's assistance in placing the factual allegations within the
correct legal framework. Accordingly, Arnold has moved for partial summary judgment on the
Normans' first, third, and fourth causes of action because they simply are the wrong causes of
action for this case.
DATED this

day of June, 2000.
SNELL &

WILMERLLP.

Matthew L. Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on this // ° ^day of June, 2000,1 caused a true and conect copy of the
foregoing to be faxed and mailed, postage prepaid, to:

Steve Russell, Esq.
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab,UT 84532
Attorney for Plaintiffs
James C. Haskins, Esq.
Haskins & Associates, P.C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Norman M. Larson
By mail only:
Mark R. Gaylord, Esq.
Craig H. Howe, Esq.
Ballard Spahr Andrews & IngersoU, LLP
201 South Main Street, #1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Norman M. Larson
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT - MOAB COURT
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT SR NORMAN Et al,
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Case No: 980700116 CN

MARK E ARNOLD Et al,
Defendant,

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

LYLE R. ANDERSON
August 2, 2000

pamelaab

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): ROBERT SR NORMAN
DIANE NORMAN
Plaintiffs Attorney(s) : STEVE RUSSELL
Defendant's Attorney(s): MATTHEW LALLI
Video
Tape Number:
00-46
Tape Count: 11:35

HEARING
TAPE: 00-46
COUNT: 11:35
There has been a motion for a partial summary judgment. Mr. Lalli
presents his arguments to the court. Mr. Russell presents his
argument. He would like the court to award attorneys fees and
costs. The court grants the summary judgment as
to causes 3 and 4. There are no punitive damages for breach of
contract only a tort claim.
Mr. Russell addresses the court. Mr. Lalli address the court.
The court orders Mr. Lalli is submit an order.
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SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004
Telephone: (801) 257-1900
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1 5 2000

-JLERK OF THE COUH i

Attorneys for Defendant Mark Annold

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR. and DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,

Case No. 980700116 CN

Plaintiffs,

ORDER

vs.

Honorable Lyle R. Anderson

MARK E. ARNOLD and NORMAN M.
LARSON,
Defendants.

On August 2, 2000, the motion of defendant Mark E. Arnold for partial summary
judgment came on for hearing in this court. Matthew L. Lalli appeared for Arnold and Steve
Russell appeared for plaintiffs. Based upon the supporting memoranda, exhibits, affidavits, the
record hearing, and the argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

The motion for partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' first cause of

action for Breach of Joint Venture Agreement is denied because there are disputed issues of fact
concerning whether plaintiffs consented, through their conduct, to admit Arnold as a partner to
the joint venture. The court will fashion a jury instruction that a finding of such consent is a
31645.00I8\Laflim\SLC\ 136468

prerequisite to establishing Arnold's liability, if any, on this first cause of action.
2.

The motion for partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' third cause of

action for Breach of Fiduciary Duty vs. Defendant Arnold is granted because Arnold's
representation of the joint venture did not give rise to a fiduciary duty to the individual plaintiffs
as a matter of law. This cause of action is dismissed with prejudice.
3.

The motion for partial summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' fourth cause

of action for Punitive Damages is granted because plaintiffs' remaining claims are based upon
breach of contract theories for which a punitive damage claim is unavailable. This cause of
action is dismissed with prejudice.
DATED this / ^ K d a y of August, 2000.
BY THE COURT:

Lmp^K. Anderson
seventh District Court Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM

Attorney for Plaintiffs
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 980700116 by the method and on the data
specified.
METHOD

NAME

Mail

JAMES C. HASKINS
ATTORNEY
357 South 200 East
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs' Objection to Ruling on
Defendant Arnold's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment
Civil No. 9807416

Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson.
Judge Anderson
Defendants.
On August 2, 2000, a hearing was held on defendant Arnold's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment. Defendant requested the dismissal of Counts I, III & IV of plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint. (I - Breach of Joint Venture Agreement; III - Breach of Fiduciary Duty
and IV - Punitive Damages.) The Court denied the Motion and to Count I and granted the
Motion to Dismiss Counts III & IV.
For the purpose of making and preserving the record in this matter, plaintiffs hereby
object to the ruling dismissing Counts III & IV on the following grounds:
1.

The Court ruled that defendant Arnold did not owe the plaintiffs a personal

fiduciary duty since his role as an attorney was with the joint venture and not the individual
plaintiffs. The ruling that Arnold owed the plaintiffs no fiduciary duty as a matter of law is error
under Margulies v. Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985).

Since the holding in Margulies is that an attorney for an entity such as a partnership or
joint venture may, under appropriate circumstances, owe a fiduciary duty to the individual
members of the entity, the issue of whether the facts of this case gave rise to a fiduciary duty on
the part of defendant Arnold to the Normans should have been for the jury.
2.

Questions if fact precluding summary judgment exist as to whether defendant

Arnold owed the plaintiffs a fiduciary duty outside that imposed by an attorney/client
relationship; i.e. a fiduciary duty arising from his role as a joint venturer or partner of the
plaintiffs.
3.

The Court dismissed plaintiffs claim for punitive damages on the ground that

Counts I (Breach of Joint Venture Agreement), and II (Liability Under a Promissory Note) were
contract claims for which punitive damages are unavailable. Plaintiffs assert that those claims
are not solely contractual in nature, but also sound in tort, i.e. plaintiffs claim fraudulent conduct,
intentional misrepresentation, and intentional interference with existing and potential economic
relations, any of which would support a claim for punitive damages.
4.

Defendant Arnold's breach of his fiduciary duties as a joint venturer with or

partner of the plaintiffs would support a claim for punitive damages.
Dated this / J ^ d a y o f Qioj^s

1

,2000-

Steve Kussell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs

Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that on the /3/May of OMSUASA-

2000, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Objection to Order was mailed, postage prepaid to:
James C. Haskins
Attorney for Norman Larson
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Matthew Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine to
Reinstitute Claim for Punitive
Damages
Civil No. 9807-H^

Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson.
Judge Anderson
Defendants.
On August 2, 2000, the Court granted defendant Arnold's Motion for Partial Summary

group of individuals engaged in a joint venture to develop a Holiday Inn on property owned by
the plaintiffs. I he Co

further ruled that, since a claim for punitive damages must be based

upon a tort and cannot be based on upon breach of contract, plaintiffs' claim for punitive
damages also failed as a matter of law. However, the Court invited counsel to provide authority
to the contran *•- indicated a willingness to change the in: i lling based i ipon appropriate authority.
As stated at the hearing, plaintiffs' initial Complaint dated September 18, 1998, included
a clain i foi pi inith fe damages |
October, 1999. (The original and amended Complaints are exactly the same except for the
addition of thefiduciaryduty claim. References therefore will be to the Original Complaint.)

The Court apparently believes that plaintiffs original claims were based solely on breach
of contract. Such an interpretation misapprehends plaintiffs' claims. In fact, there is no specific
contract upon which plaintiffs' claims are based. The statement of facts set forth in the
Complaint alleges fraudulent conduct in the effort to get the Normans to pledge their property for
a loan (f 15-22); intentional misrepresentation including the failure to make necessary
disclosures; intentional diversion of loan proceeds for purposes other than the joint venture fl[2427, 29); and through these, intentional interference with the plaintiffs' present and prospective
economic interests. As was also stated at the hearing, the plaintiffs have learned a great deal
more about defendants' conduct through discovery. For example;
1.

That defendant Arnold secretly became a member of the joint venture through a

payoff to Pete Lanto, not of his own funds, but those of the joint venture;
2.

That defendants Arnold and Larson formed another entity, Venture Properties II,

L.C., and diverted funds from the joint venture to a competing project.
Plaintiffs' First cause of Action is for Breach of the Joint Venture Agreement. A
document entitled the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement was executed, but
never adhered to. Nevertheless, the venture continued. The real "joint venture agreement" was
simply for the parties involved to use their best efforts to develop a Holiday Inn on the Normans'
property.

Defendants' conduct is not specifically characterized as a breach of contract, and

among the numerous acts and omissions that violated the joint venture agreement, several are
tortious. In fact, although the Court ruled that defendant Arnold did not owe the plaintiffs a
fiduciary duty as an attorney, it did rule that there is a legitimate issue as to whether he was a
partner. If he was, numerous issues of fact exist as to whether he breached his fiduciary duty as
a partner, which is in itself, a tort. The same goes for defendant Larson.
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A "tort" is defined simply as, "a breach of duty, other than a breach of contract, for which
the offender will be subject to legal responsibility." Webster' Deluxe Edition (1989).
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that in some cases an act constituting a
breach of contract may also result in breaches of duty that are independent of the contract mid
give rise to causes of action in tort. Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P. 2d 795, 800 n.3
(Utah 1985).

'

vest Construction i ' I 'aimer, 886 P.2d 92 (Utah App. 1991), 1 1 ic G n n t

affirmed that tort liability is not always precluded just because there is a contract between the
plaintn

-

defendant

Ii i some cases, an act or omission resulting in breach of contract may

also constitute breach of a duty that is not subsumed by the contract and may thereby give rise to
a cause of action sounding in tort

In that case, the Court dismissed tort causes of action, but

only after finding that the alleged tortious conduct was "entirely controlled" by a very specific
written contract.
I he lav T of pai tnei ship ai id joii it \ enti ii e express!) ai id ii nplicitly i ecognizes that tl ic
partners acts as agent for each other. This enhances their fiduciary relationship. Hal Taylor
Associates v. Union America Ins., 65 71> 2d 743. 748 (Utah 1.982), though not in the context of a
joint venture states that, wholly apart from contractual obligations undertaken by the parties, the
law imposes upon all agents a fiduciary obligation to their principals with respect to matters
falling within the scope of their agency.
A large portion of the misconduct attributable to defendant Arnold was his failure,
intenifional in otherwise In intonii (In Norni.ms of mloim.ilion uitual lo Ilk |ninl nmlute.
U.C.A. §48-1-17 provides that, "(J°int venturers) shall render on demand true and full
information of all tilings affecting the joint venture . . ."

The breach of this duty is a tort that

could, under appropriate circumstances, form the basis for plaintiffs' punitive damage claim.

While the terms of any implied contract between the Normans and defendants are
amorphous at best, it is evident that Arnold's secret and dishonest entry into the joint venture
would fall outside the terms of any such contract. The same can be said about the Arnold Larson formation of Venture Properties II, L.C., and the use of joint venture funds for purposes
other than the Moab Holiday Inn.
The Court requested legal authority on the issue. In DCR, Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663
P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), plaintiff suffered losses in a robbery after defendant had installed an alarm
system and entered into a service and maintenance contract. The evidence established that the
alarm system had been circumvented in a manner known to the defendant that could have been
remedied by a simple and inexpensive alteration to the system. However, defendant failed to
inform plaintiff of the potential problem and remedy. The Court recognized that a party who
breaches his duty of care toward another may be found liable in tort, even when the relationship
giving rise to such a duty originates in a contract between the parties {Id. at 434-35), and went
on to hold that,
[T]he defendant's duty to warn the plaintiff of the vulnerability of the alarm system did
not come from any provision contained within the four corners of the contract. Instead, the duty
as it exists in this case is derived from defendant's general duty of due care which accompanies
its ongoing relationship with plaintiff for service and maintenance of the alarm system. Thus,
the plaintiff allegation of failure to warn provides the basis for a cause of action in tort which is
entirely separate from any contract based claim which plaintiff might present. Id. at 436.
In Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, supra, the plaintiff insured brought an action
against his insurer for the failure to settle a claim uninsured motorist benefits. This being a
"first-party" claim (insured vs. insurer), the Court ruled that the duties running between the
parties, including that of good faith and fair dealing were contractual as opposed to tortious.
Consequently, in Beck, as here, the plaintiffs' punitive damage claim was dismissed.
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However, in explaining the law, the Court made numerous observations directly
applicable to this case which would support a ruling that the 1 km. nai is' claims som id ii 1 tort, ai id
therefore may be a basis for additional damages including punitive damages.

vs. insurer) and a third-party claim (third party vs. insured).
In the third party situation, the insurer must act in good faith and be as zealous in
protecting the interests of the insured as it would be in regard to its own. In the first party
situation, the insured and the insurer are, in effect and practically speaking, adversaries.
Id at 799
In this case the plaintiffs claim that their relationship with the defendants is far more
analogous to a third-party fiduciary situation than a first-party contractual situation. There was
no specific contract between the plaintiffs and defendants. The parties were supposedly engaged
in a joint venture for their mutual benefit and therefore had fiduciary duties to each othei

I he

members of a joint venture are required to protect the interests of the joint venture and
consequently each otl ler. , rather tl i,ai i beii lg aci\ rei sai ial.
An insurer's (joint venturer) failure to act in good faith exposes its insured (partners) to a
judgment and personal liability...
In essence, the contract (joint venture) itself creates a fiduciary relationship because of the trust
and reliance placed in the insurer (defendants) by its insured (partners). Id at 799.
In this case, the defendants had assumed complete control and authority over the funds
secured b> plaintiffs' propeit

I therefore complete authority arid control regarding plaintiffs'

personal stake in the joint venture.
In addition, when dealing with third parties, the insurer (defendant) acts as an agent for the
insured (partners) with respect to the disputed claim (joint venture). Wholly apart from the
contractual obligations undertaken by the parties, the law imposes a fiduciary obligation to their
principals with respect to matters falling within the scope of their agency.
(Id. at 799-800; The parenthetical additions are those of the plaintiffs.)

Conclusion
It is plaintiffs5 contention quite simply that the unique circumstances of this case give rise
to duties on the part of defendants Arnold and Larson greater than those that arise from an armslength contractual situation where both sides are expected to be primarily concerned with their
own interests. Though the Court has ruled that Arnold did not owe the plaintiffs a personal
fiduciary duty as a result of his role as attorney for the joint venture, that role, combined with an
interest as a partner of the plaintiffs is sufficient to give rise to fiduciary duties outside the
attorney/client context.
Plaintiffs claim for punitive damages should be reinstated.
Dated this lf*h day of /-Ivan J

, 2000.

SteveKussell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that on the / [>J- day of Liu/i^^

2000, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Motion in Limine to Reinstate Punitive Damages Claim was mailed, postage
prepaid, to:
James C. Haskins
Attorney for Norman Larson
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Matthew Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City JJtak^/m01
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Matthew L. Lalli (#6105)
SNELL & W l L M E R LLP.

Gateway Tower West
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

DEFENDANT MARK E. AlOULD J>
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION IN LIMINE TO REINSTITUTE
CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M.
LARSON,
Defendants.

Civil No.: 9807-116
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") respectfully submits this opposition to plaintiffs'
Robert and Diane Norman (the "Normans") motion in limine to reinstitute plaintiffs' claim for
punitive damages.
I.

INTRODUCTION
This Court dismissed the Normans' third claim for breach of fiduciary duty against

Arnold at the August 2, 2000 hearing on Arnold's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. The

Court ruled that Arnold did not owe the Normans a fiduciary duty because the Normans
unequivocally testified that they were not Arnold's clients, and because Arnold's fiduciary duties
ran to the joint venture as a matter of law. Because each of the Normans' two remaining claims
sounds in contract, not in tort, the Court also dismissed the Normans' dependent claim for
punitive damages as a matter of law.
As counsel for the Normans' correctly notes, however, in so ruling, the Court invited the
Normans to come forward with any competent authority holding that punitive damages are
nevertheless recoverable for breaches of contract. Because the general rule is that punitive
damages are not available for breaches of contract, "even if intentional and unjustified," unless
"there is some independent tort indicating malice, fraud or wanton disregard for the rights of
others," the Normans have not and cannot accomplish this task. Hal Taylor Assocs. v.
Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750 (Utah 1982).
Unable to provide evidence or legal authority that would justify punitive damages based
on their contract claims, the Normans instead argue that their complaint, amended once in late
1998, somehow contains five entirely new causes of action - claims ranging from common law
fraud to intentional interference with economic advantage - each conveniently sounding in tort.
Such claims are not part of the Normans' complaint. They have not made a motion to amend,
and such a motion could not be granted at this late stage without causing substantial prejudice to
Arnold. New tort claims simply cannot be added by way of a motion in limine to reinstitute
punitive damages literally on the day of trial This motion must be dismissed.
II.

ARGUMENT
Under the guise of a Motion In Limine to Reinstitute Their Punitive Damages Claim, the

Normans' are asking the court to grant an untimely motion to amend their complaint. In their
motion, the Normans argue that, although their complaint contains only two claims for "Breach
2
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of Joint Venture Agreement" and "Default of Trust Deed Note," they in fact have sued Arnold
and Larson for (1) "fraudulent conduct"; (2) "intentional misrepresentation"; (3) "intentional
diversion of \oan proceeds"; and (4) "intentional interference with the plaintiffs' present and
prospective economic interests." Punitive Damages Motion at 2. Not satisfied with four new
claims, the Normans further assert for the first time that Arnold and Larson also breached their
fiduciary duties as alleged partners in the joint venture. Id
Even more incredibly, despite the fact that the Normans' suit is based solely on the
March 15, 1995 Joint Venture Agreement and the June 27, 1995 Promissory Note Secured by
Deed of Trust, the Normans now claim that the written Joint Venture Agreement is beside the
point, and the contract at issue is a nebulous, unwritten agreement to develop the Holiday Inn in
adherence to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Such claims present entirely
new bases for recovery for the Normans, claims which Arnold and Larson have been completely
precluded from explonng in discovery, from addressing in dispositive motions, and for which no
jury instruction or a single defense witness has been prepared.
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) prohibits precisely this kind of conduct. Under the
Rule, a plaintiff who seeks to amend his complaint after the defend atit has answered may do so
only by leave of court or on written consent of the adverse party. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 15(a).
Although Rule 15 "tends to favor the granting of leave to amend," Westlev v. Farmer's Ins.
Exclu 663 P.2d 93, 94 (Utah 1983), the Utah courts have not hesitated to deiiv such motions
under facts far less prejudicial than those presented here.
In Girard v. Appleby, 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983), overruled on other grounds,
Meadowbrook v. Flower. 959 P.2d 115. 119 (I Itah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the
district courfs denial of leave to amend where the motion to amend was made the first day of
trial, it proposed "new and different causes of action," and defendants wc -

3

;M- r - ejudice "if

required to meet the new causes of action." More recently, in Swift Stop, Inc. v. Wight, 845
P.2d 250, 253-54 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals found no abuse of discretion
in denying the plaintiffs motion to amend where the plaintiff waited eighteen months after filing
its complaint to seek leave to amend, plaintiff "should have known" of the proposed claims at the
time it filed its first complaint, and the defendant had "already completed his discovery and
submitted his motion for summary judgment" at the time the plaintiff moved to amend.
Similarly, in Tripp v. Vaughn. 746 P.2d 794, 798 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), the appellate
court upheld the denial of a motion to amend where the movant delayed bringing the motion
until two weeks before trial, the reasons for bringing the untimely motion were "inadequate," and
the movant failed to demonstrate that the refusal to allow the pleadings resulted in any prejudice.
Thus, Utah Courts routinely deny motions to amend when made at the time of trial
Here, however, the Normans have not even moved to amend. They merely have made a motion
in limine -ostensibly an evidentiary motion - that seeks to completely transform the nature of the
case they pled and Arnold has defended. Directly contradicting the claims alleged in their
complaint, the Normans now purport to assert causes of action sounding in tort, entitling them to
recover punitive damages. Arnold has had no notice of these claims, no opportunity for
discovery into their merits, and no opportunity to challenge them in dispositive motions. This
type of pleading gamesmanship violates the rules of procedure and should not be tolerated by
this court.
If the court takes this motion at face value - a motion to reinstitute punitive damages - it
still must fail. The Normans nowhere identify any authority indicating that punitive damages are
available for breaches of contract alone. Instead, the Normans primarily rely on DCR, Inc. v.
Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983), for the entirely unremarkable proposition that
contractual relationships can give rise to causes of action sounding in tort. Arnold concedes this

4
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point, as far as it goes. However, the argument that a relationship based on a contract can also
give rise to claims for tort recovery between the parties to the contract in no way changes the fact
that the Normans' complaint contains no tort claim - against Arnold or anyone else. Nor does it
change the fact that the law in Utah does not allow the recovery of punitive damages for
breaches of contract - even where such breaches are malicious, intentional, or unjustified. Hal
Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 750 (Utah 1982). The Normans have
provided no factual or legal basis for allowing punitive damages based on the two contract
claims that remain in issue.
Moreover, the Normans also rely on Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795
(Utah 1985). In Beck, the Utah Supreme Court specifically held only that "the good faith duty to
bargain or settle under an insurance contract is only one aspect of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing implied in all contracts and that a violation of that duty gives rise to a claim for breach of
contract." 701 P.2d at 798. In so holding, the supreme court expressly declined the view of a
majority of the states permitting an insured to institute a tort action against its insurer who fails
to bargain in good faith, thus allowing insureds in other jurisdictions to recover "extensive
consequential and punitive damages." id. at 798-99. The Normans discuss at some length dicta
in Beck contrasting first-party and third-party insurance claims, and attempt to analogize a thirdparty insurance claim with partaking in a joint venture. Ultimately, they correctly, if
bewilderingly, conclude that joint venture partners owe each other fiduciary duties.
Again, this is a point Arnold concedes. But the Normans have never sued Arnold for
breach of fiduciary duty arising from a partner relations!up, They sued him for breach of
fiduciary duty arising from an alleged attorney-client relationship, and that claim proved
defective on summary judgment. For the reasons described above, the Normans cannot amend
their complaint through a motion in limine to add a new fiduciary duty claim. Moreover, as

5

explained in Arnold's motion in limine, even if Arnold did become a partner and acquire a
fiduciary duty to the Normans in that way, such a duty did not arise until May 1996. By that
time, all of the acts the Normans contend Arnold did in violation of a fiduciary duty already had
occurred. Acts or omissions that Arnold may have committed before he allegedly became a
partner simply cannot be the basis for a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Obviously, Arnold could
not have breached a fiduciary duty before one arose.
III.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Normans' Motion to Reinstitute Claim for Punitive

Damages should be denied.

s

DATED this <^>> day of August, 2000.
SNELL &

WILMERLLP.

X^/^CcyJu-

Mattfiew L. Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on this

day of August, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing to be Federal Expressed to:

Steve Russell, Esq.
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab,UT 84532
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and mailed, postage prepaid, to:
James C. Haskins, Esq.
Haskins & Associates, P.C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Norman M. Larson
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Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C.
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (435) 259-7321
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

J
!
j
j
I

Reply re: Motion in Limine
To Reinstate Punitive Damage
Claim

v.
Civil No. 9807-116
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson.

I
j

Judge Anderson

Defendants.

Attorney defendant Arnold claims it would be unfair to have to face the legal
consequences of his conduct because he did not get sufficient warning of the exact nature of
plaintiffs' claims. One would hope the persuasive impact of this argument would be lessened by
the fact that plaintiffs have been hampered in their pleadings by Mr. Arnold's lies, intentional
misrepresentations, failure to provide documents and other dishonest conduct.
Nonetheless, he has had plenty of notice of plaintiffs' claims. Virtually the full extent of
his 180 page deposition that led to the breach of fiduciary duty claim (prior to Mr. Lalli's
involvement) centers on tortious conduct, i.e. fraud, conversion, intentional misrepresentation.
To state that Arnold had no expectation of such claims is nonsense. Moreover, plaintiffs have
claimed that Arnold is liable as a partner since the original Complaint was filed. Thus the claim
that his breach of fiduciary duty as a partner is itself sufficient to support a claim of punitive

damages. Arnold, an attorney, drafted the indemnification agreement at the time he bought into
the partnership. He specifically indemnified Lanto from '"tort claims and claims on any notes for
moneys previously borrowed totaling $160,000." Arnold and Lanto knew what he was up to
even if the plaintiffs at the time, did not.
Well, but - says Arnold, all of my really bad conduct took place before I secretly became
a partner. To that, plaintiffs respond that Arnold and Larson brought all their baggage with them
when they "officially" joined the venture. They certainly knew what they had done before.
Quite probably, Arnold and Larson were the only partners with complete knowledge of the status
of the joint venture and its prospects.
Less than a week after the acquisition of Lanto's interest in the venture, defendant Larson
sent a letter to the prospective financing source precisely spelling out the situation.
(Arnold and Larson) are very anxious to proceed since we own an equity position in both
projects and (Larson) has the Holiday Express Franchise. See, attached.
Since Arnold and Larson were fully prepared to reap any and all possible benefit as
partners in the joint venture, despite their previous conduct, they should be held accountable to
the plaintiffs as partners for that same conduct.
Defendant feigns surprise that plaintiffs would raise this issue at the last moment in a
Motion in Limine. However, in plaintiffs' response to Arnold's Motion For Summary Judgment
and in argument before the Court the plaintiffs stressed the importance of the Court allowing
plaintiffs' pleadings to conform to the evidence.

The issue is settled by Rule 15(b), U.R.Ctv.P., which provides,
When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties,
they shall be treated in all respects as if they have been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the evidence and
to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after Judgment; but
failure so to amend does not affect the result of the trial on these issues. If evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the action will be
subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the court that the admission of such
evidence would prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits.
Plaintiffs contend that the issues of Arnold's tortious conduct and fiduciary liability are
adequately raised in the pleadings. Even if they are not, defendant is fully aware of plaintiffs
position as a result of discovery and plaintiffs' response to his Motion for Summary Judgment.
Arnold was personally aware of the nature of plaintiffs' claims prior to Mr. Lalli's involvement,
and respective counsel have been discussing these claims since Mr. Lalli's initial appearance.
Regardless, the presentation of the merits of plaintiffs' case will definitely be subserved by the
presentation of this evidence. Defendant's only legitimate concern of prejudice is that the jury, if
the claim is presented with a complete picture of the facts, will be more likely to rule against
him.
Plaintiffs should be allowed to proceed on any and all claims supported by the evidence.
A defendant should never be allowed to avoid a legitimate claim, even if inadequately plead,
when it was his own intentional misrepresentations and failure to make necessary disclosures
that precluded the plaintiffs' full knowledge of the facts.
Dated this J VM day of

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs

Mailing Certificate
ith

This is to certify that on the^ ' day of CtuyOA

2000, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Request to Schedule Oral Argument was mailed, postage prepaid to:
James C. Haskins
Attorney for Norman Larson
, r n \ t
L
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 ty[l l-J>?'b>^l
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Matthew Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
c\n , - 7 < 7 _ ))( (T>
r
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200 * l
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Wesfern
JLnxtnre
J\iuis ors
Friday, November 03, 1995
Bruce Holman

TRUST GUARANTEE CORPORATION.
11811 N. Tatum
Suite P-120
Phoenix, Arizona 85028
RE: Moab Holiday Express
Dear Bruce:
Enclosed are the basic plans and rendering for the Moab Holiday Express. Mark Arnold, the
Attorney, and myself will come to Phoenix with a check when you can confirm a closing date for
this project and the purchase of the land in Park City. We are very anxious to proceed since we
own an equity position in both projects and I have the Holiday Express Franchise.

Sincerely,

Norman M. Larson
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT - MOAB COURT
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT SR NORMAN Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
JURY TRIAL

vs.

Case No: 980700116 CN

MARK E ARNOLD Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

LYLE R. ANDERSON
August 28, 2000

claudiap

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): ROBERT SR NORMAN
DIANE NORMAN
Defendant(s): MARK E ARNOLD
NORMAN M LARSON
Plaintiffs Attorney(s) : STEVE RUSSELL
Defendant's Attorney(s): JAMES C. HASKINS
MATTHEW LALLI
AMY SORENSEN
Video
00-50
Tape Count: 9:09
Tape Number:

TRIAL
TAPE: 00-50
COUNT: 9:09
Jurors are called, given voir dire, and 8 jurors are seated and
given the oath.
TIME: 10:02 AM Jurors are excused until 10:45.
TIME: 10:03 AM Mr. Dayzie approaches the bench he advises he had
a felony charge in 1985 in Arizona for burglary. He is excused
from the courtroom but advised to return at 10:45 A.M.
TIME: 10:04 AM Mr. Russell has no objection to his remaining
empaneled. Mr. Haskins requests to look at Mr. Dayzie's
questionaire. Mr. Haskins requests a 5 minute recess. Court allows
same.
TIME: 10:43 AM Court declares a mistrial. Mr. Lalli moves to go
forward with the Motions in Limine in the file and Court so orders.
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Case No: 980700116
Date:
Aug 28, 2000
TIME: 10:44 AM Jurors are brought back into the courtroom.
TIME: 10:45 AM Jurors are excused and advised they are excused
for the remainder of this term.
TIME: 10:49 AM Mr. Lalli argues his Motion in Limine.
TIME: 11:14 AM Mr. Haskins gives argument
TIME: 11:19 AM Mr. Russell gives argument.
TIME: 11:28 AM Objection by Mr. Haskins.
Argument by Mr. Russell. Court takes a recess.
TIME: 1:11 PM Court back in session with all parties present.
Mr. Russell continues with argument.
TIME: 1:39 PM Mr. Arnold addresses the court.
Mr. Lalli gives clarification for the court.
TIME: 2:08 PM Argument by Mr. Haskins
TIME: 2:13 PM Mr. Lalli gives argument
TIME: 2:15 PM Court grants Defendant Arnold 7 s Motion in Limine,
TIME: 2:17 PM Mr. Russell requests clarification.
Mr. Russell moves to amend the complaint.
Mr. Russell requests Rule 54B. Court requests Mr. Russell file
motion for same.
TIME: 2:22 PM Mr. Russell requests another clarification.
TIME: 2:23 PM Mr. Russell is to file a Motion to Amend.
TIME: 2:24 PM Mr. Russell argues his Motion in Limine
TIME: 2:26 PM Mr. Lalli gives argument.
TIME: 2:48 PM Trial is set for January 16 through 19, 2001.

JURY TRIAL is scheduled.
Date: 01/16/2001
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: DIST. COURT
GRAND COUNTY COURTHOUSE
125 EAST CENTER
MOAB, UT 84532
Before Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 01/17/2001
Time: 09:00 a.m.
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Case No: 980700116
Date:
Aug 28, 2000
Location: DIST. COURT
GRAND COUNTY COURTHOUSE
125 EAST CENTER
MOAB, UT 84532
Before Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 01/18/2001
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: DIST. COURT
GRAND COUNTY COURTHOUSE
125 EAST CENTER
MOAB, UT 84532
Before Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON
JURY TRIAL.
Date: 01/19/2001
Time: 09:00 a.m.
Location: DIST. COURT
GRAND COUNTY COURTHOUSE
125 EAST CENTER
MOAB, UT 84532
Before Judge: LYLE R. ANDERSON
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Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C.
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (435) 259-7321
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs' Motion to File 2'
Amended Complaint
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. 9807-116
Mark E, Arnold & Norman M, Larson.
Judge Anderson
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rules 15, 19 & 21 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, move the Court
for an Order allowing the filing of a Second Amended Complaint in this action. The purpose of
the amendment is to adjust plaintiffs' existing claims in conformance with pretrial rulings of the
Court, To name the Moab Land Development Joint Venture as a party plaintiff, to add additional
parties as defendants and to assert additional claims on behalf of the joint venture.
This motion is supported by an accompanying memorandum of legal authority.

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs

Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that on the/__ day of ^y£p yf/^J^ 'POOP, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Plaintiffs' Motion to File 2n Amended Complaint was mailed, postage prepaid
to:
James C Haskins
Attorney for Norman Larson
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Matthew Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410

Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C.
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone (435)259-7321
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,

j
Memorandum in Support of Motion
to File 2nd Amended Complaint

Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. 9807-116
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson,
Judge Anderson
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rules 15, 19 & 21 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, have requested
the Court for an Order allowing the filing of a Second Amended Complaint in this action.
The purposes for the amendment which will be explained below are as follows:
1.

To add the Moab Land Development Joint Venture as a party plaintiff;

2.

To assert claims of professional negligence and liability as agent against Mark

Arnold (as counsel) and Norman Larson and/or Western Empire Advisors (as financial expert).
3.

To add Eric Rasmussen as a defendant.

4.

To add Pete Lanto as a defendant.

5.

To assert claims against Lanto and Rasmussen arising under the Moab Land

Development Joint Venture. ("MLDJV")

This matter was set to be tried to a jury on August 28. 2000

A procedural problem in

jury selection resulted in a mistrial, and trial was rescheduled to commence January 16, 2001.
Following the mistrial the Court made a number of evidentiary ruling that materially alter and
limit the plaintiffs' case as presently plead.
Rule 15(a), URCiv.P. provides in relevant part that, "A party may amend his pleading
by leave of Court; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."
Rule 19(a), provides in relevant part, "A person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the Court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action shall
be joined as a party in the action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among
those already parties.^
Rule 21 provides that, "Misjoinder of parties is not a ground fcr dismissal of an action.
Parties may be dropped or added by order of the Court on motion of any party or of its own
initiative at any stage in the action and on such terms as are just."
1.

Addition of the MLDJV as a Party Plaintiff.
Plaintiffs claims in this case arise from the failure of a joint venture that was intended to

develop a Holiday Inn in Moab, Utah on land owned by the plaintiffs. The joint venture was
identified in plaintiffs' original complaint.

Plaintiffs did not name the MLDJV as a party

plaintiff due to:
a.

Its changing and ambiguous nature over the course of its existence;

b.

Plaintiffs' belief that the other members of the joint venture had acted contrary to

the interests of the joint venture and the plaintiffs' individual interests;
c.

The members of the joint venture abandoned both the joint venture and their

obligations therein; and

d.

Since the plaintiffs had solely assumed the joint venture obligation that is the

subject of this case, any recovery on the part of the joint venture would rightfully belong to the
plaintiffs.
Nevertheless the defendants have insisted that the case arises, if at all, from the MLDJV,
and the Court has appeared to adopt that position. Moreover, the Court has ruled that the duties
and obligations of defendants Arnold and Larson run, if at all, to the joint venture and not to the
plaintiffs individually. Adding the MLDJV as a plaintiff is therefore necessary for a fair and
complete adjudication of the claims plaintiff has heretofore unsuccessfully attempted to assert.
2.
Addition of Claims of Professional Negligence and Liability as Agents Against
Defendants Arnold and Larson on Behalf of the MLDJV.
At the hearing on August 28, 2000, defendants Arnold and Larson pronounced that they
were professionals hired by the joint venture to accomplish its ends. The Court has ruled that the
defendants' duties and obligations, if any, ran to the joint venture. Plaintiffs, as members of the
joint venture, assert that defendants Arnold and Larson conducted their duties negligently, and
with intentional disregard for the interests of the joint venture resulting in financial loss and the
failure of the joint venture. Allowing the addition of these claims is necessary for a fair and
complete adjudication of all causes of action arisingfromthe joint venture.
2a.

Addition of Western Empire Advisors as a Defendant
Western Empire Advisors (WEA) is Norman Larson's Company. Though the distinction

between Larson and WEA in the facts and circumstances of this case is in no way apparent (for
example, Larson acquired the Moab Holiday Inn Franchise individually, and became an obligor
on the Young loan individually), defendants insist that WEA is a separate entity and is the entity
that actually is responsible for much of the conduct set forth in plaintiffs' claims. Further,
defendants correctly point out that it was WEA that jointly acquired Pete Lanto's interest in the

joint venture with Mark Arnold. Adding WEA as a defendant is necessary in order to make sure
that, as between defendant Larson and WEA, the correct party is held responsible for any
liability eventually determined.
3.

Addition of Eric Rasmussen as a Party Defendant
Eric Rasmussen signed the MLDJV. See, attached. Pursuant to Paragraph 4.1 and

Schedule A of the Agreement, Rasmussen is responsible for 25% of the losses of the joint
venture. Defendants have wondered aloud why Rasmussen was not named as a party and
insisted he should have been. Allowing the addition of Eric Rasmussen as a defendant is
necessary so that all parties liable under the MLDJV pay their fair share of the losses.
4.

Addition of Pete Lanto as a Party Defendant
Pete Lanto was named as a defendant in plaintiffs' original complaint. Plaitiffs' claims

against him were not actively pursued based on plaintiffs' information and belief that Lanto's
interest in the joint venture had been acquired by Mark Arnold. Still later, the plaintiffs learned
that Lanto's interest had been acquired by Arnold and WEA, and that the purchasers had also
agreed to indemnify Lanto for liability under the Young note, any tort claims, and any other
claims arising from his involvement in two Holiday Inn ventures.
However, the Court has ruled that the Arnold - WEA acquisition did not make them
members of the joint venture since the plaintiffs, without knowledge of the transaction, did not
affirmatively consent. Defendants insist Arnold and WEA should not be liable under the
unambiguous indemnification agreement unless Lanto is first adjudicated as liable under the
Young note or otherwise. Plaintiffs are uncertain of whether the Court ruled or what that ruling
on this issue may have been. Plaintiffs contend that the contortion of suing Lanto should be
unnecessary however, since no further evidence is needed to establish Lanto's liability under the

note or MLDJV Agreement, and the Court has ruled that plaintiffs are entitled to contribution
having effectively paid the note in full with interest. See, accompanying separate Motion on this
issue.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs seek only to proceed in accord with the law and proper procedure.
If it is necessary to add Pete Lanto as a defendant in order to effectuate the document prepared
and signed by Arnold and Lanto, plaintiffs will do so.
5.

To Assert Claims on Behalf of the MLDJV Against Lanto and Rasmussen.

(See, above.)
The foregoing amendments, as has been repeatedly pointed out by the defendants, are all
necessary in order to properly adjudicate the claims in this case. Additionally, from the
plaintiffs' perspective, the amendments are necessary in the interests of fairness and justice.
None of the claims are "new." Plaintiffs have been trying to get them adjudicated from the
beginning. They were merely insufficiently or improperly plead. Plaintiffs anticipate no further
discovery or new documents, although one never knows in this case. Should new, relevant
documents surface, they will be provided to all concerned parties without need of request.
Rasmussen and Lanto will have to be found and served. Though the need for discovery on their
part is unlikely, the plaintiffs will agree to expedited discovery if necessary. If the January, 2001
trial date has to be continued, so be it. Defendants are hardly in a position to complain about a
continuance at this stage having already requested and received several.
The Proposed 2nd Amended Complaint isfiledherewith.
Dated this (_^_ day of

^^Hpth^^W^,.

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs

Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that on the jj^_ day of l f ^ / ^ C

, 2000, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Plaintiffs' Motion to File 2nd Amended Complaint was mailed, postage prepaid
to:
James C. Haskins
Attorney for Norman Larson
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Matthew Lalli
Attorney fcr Mark Arnold
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C.
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab,Utah 84532
Telephone: (435) 259-7321
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W THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sn, & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
v.

Plaintiffs9 Reply Re: Motion to
Amend Complaint and Motion
Regarding Lanto Interest
Civil No. 9807-116

Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson.
Judge Anderson
Defendants.
Plaintiffs hereby reply to defendant Arnold's memo in opposition to plaintiffs' motion to
amend complaint and motion regarding the interest of Pete Lanto in the MLDJV.
Plaintiffs' Motions are not at all complicated. They are, in fact, an attempt to incorporate
plaintiffs' understanding of the Court's rulings to date.
Regarding the Lanto Interest
This Motion is simply designed to allow the parties to litigate what should be obvious.
Defendants Arnold and WEA purchased Lanto's interest in the joint venture. Those defendants
also specifically and unambiguously indemnified Lanto against "tort claims and claims on any
notes for moneys previously borrowed totaling $160,000." (Lanto was apparently aware of the
fact that there were several different notes in the files of Arnold and Larson.)
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The fact that the Normans eventually had to assume full liability under that Note is what
this case is about. No number of Byzantine and contradictory defenses can change the fact that
Arnold and Larson (WEA) spent and lost the money and agreed to assume Lanto's
unquestionable contractual liability therefor.
Granting the Motion will allow the plaintiffs to get the liability of the responsible parties
before the jury, assuming they are allowed to present any evidence. If the plaintiffs have to go to
the wasteful time and expense to sue Peter Lanto in order to enforce the unambiguous and
integrated provisions of the Lanto Purchase Agreement, they will do so, as evidenced by the
companion Motion to Amend the Complaint for that purpose.
Defendant's assertion that the Normans are not "intended beneficiaries" of the
indemnification agreement is nonsense. All one needs to do is consider the actual relevant facts
regarding the Purchase Agreement. The "moneys previously borrowed" was secured by property
owned by the Normans. No one else in the joint venture had contributed anything. When the
Purchase Agreement was secretly executed, everyone involved knew that if losses were incurred
it would be the Normans who would bear the brunt of them. Indeed, the other partners couldn't
cover their posteriors fast enough. 4-D Development (Page, Barney and Lanto), the entity that
had hired Larson/WEA and Arnold to provide professional services, was dissolved on the same
day the Purchase Agreement was executed. As should be clear, the "intended beneficiaries" of
any indemnification agreement includes anyone who might foreseeably assert a claim against the
person being indemnified. The Normans are securely within that category of persons.
That Lanto was also indemnified for tort claims in the Purchase Agreement drafted by
attorney defendant Arnold is illustrative that the defendants knew their conduct was tortious.
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Regarding the Proposed Amended Complaint
As stated above, the proposed amended complaint reflects the arguments (to date) of
defense counsel and this Court's rulings. Among other things, defendants have continually
insisted that Lanto and Rasmussen should be defendants, though never having availed
themselves of the opportunity to join those parties themselves; that WEA is an additional real
party in interest; that plaintiffs' claim is one for contribution rather than breach of the joint
venture agreement and default of the trust deed note, and so forth. Arnold's assertion that the
amended complaint "would significantly transform the nature of the case and would require a
substantial amount of new discovery" (def memo at 3) is more nonsense. The proposed
amended complaint contains no new facts or allegations and is significantly simpler than the
present complaint, other than the allegation that the Normans were not to be liable under the
Young note. In that regard, on February 17, 1999, defendant Larson testified: "/ think it was
part of the agreement that Mr. Norman wouldn 7 be liable for any loans . . ." (Larson depo. at
131) The Normans have a document (not yet excluded) confirming this Agreement between the
joint venturers.
Defendants have not yet asserted any legal theories that would prevent the plaintiffs from
presenting this evidence to a jury.
Defendant Arnold asserts that plaintiffs' Motion to Amend should be denied: (1) because
it is untimely; (2) because there is insufficient justification for its alleged untimeliness; (3)
because Arnold will be prejudiced; and (4) because the claims asserted are doomed to fail.
Plaintiffs will consider each in turn.
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Timeliness
Plaintiffs original Complaint was filed in September, 1998.

Plaintiffs conducted

discovery and took the depositions of Arnold and Larson. In that process, plaintiffs found out for
the first time the facts surrounding the failed venture through documents never before seen and
forced disclosures of the defendants. Defendants essentially did nothing. Arnold in fact, was
rescued from default by the Court. Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint in November, 1999,
to add a claim for professional liability against Arnold. Arnold requested and obtained a trial
continuance to obtain counsel and conduct discovery. After 5 months, Arnold's liability insurer
hired counsel who, after requesting and obtaining another trial continuance, conducted discovery
and filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The professional liability claim was dismissed.
Through the process, defendant Larson has continued to do nothing other than threatening to file
for bankruptcy protection.
The case was scheduled for trial on August 28, 2000. A Mistrial was declared due to a
juror disqualification. Significantly, the defendants refused several options that would have
allowed the trial to go forward that day before a jury. The trial was rescheduled four months
hence, beginning in January, 2001. Following the Mistrial the Court heard and ruled on several
Motions in Limine, the result of which significantly altered the nature and scope of plaintiffs'
case.
For these reasons, even though it occurred on the day scheduled for trial, plaintiffs view
the last round of Motion Proceedings as far more analogous to a Pretrial Hearing where the
issues to be tried are narrowed, or in this case changed completely. Indeed, on the subject of
timeliness, the Motions in Limine should have been heard sufficiently in advance of trial to allow
the parties to react and prepare accordingly. As it is, the case is still four monthsfromtrial. That
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span provides more than ample time for the defendants to do whatever they think they need to
do. Plaintiffs do not plan on any additional discovery since there still is nothing different about
the case, with the exception that much of the important evidence may be unavailable.
The Court has discretion on the decision of whether to grant a Motion to Amend.
Precedent from other cases is helpful,

see, e^g., Lewis v. Moultree, 627 P.2d 94 (Utah

1981)(allowing amended answer after the pre-trial order because, as here, the pretrial order
significantly affected the defense and there was still ample time before trial); but the critical
aspect of any discretionary decision are the particular facts of the'case at hand. In this case,
plaintiffs' proposed amendment is to assert the claims defendants have argued should have been
asserted all along.
If the issue is close, the Rules of Procedure, "leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires" favor granting the amendment.
Justification
Plaintiffs have stated repeatedly since the filing of defendant Arnold's Motion for
Summary Judgment, that the unusual circumstances of this case require that the Court be
sensitive to the plaintiffs' need to amend their pleadings as necessary and/or allow the pleadings
to be deemed amended to conform to the evidence.
Plaintiffs' case is simply to seek recovery of their losses from a failed business venture
from those who are actually responsible for the losses. The present defendants, whose conduct
was secretive, dishonest and intentionally contrary to the plaintiffs' interests, have thus far been
successful in eliminating plaintiffs' claims and evidence. Plaintiffs' only goal is to get the
evidence, the whole story as it were, before an impartial jury and let them decide who should be
responsible for the losses.

The plaintiffs have been very straight-forward in explaining why they have proceeded as
they have to date, to wit Limited knowledge of the actual facts due to defendants' deception
and intentional non-disclosures, coupled with amendments necessary to adapt to the Court's
rulings With regard to parties: The joint venture was not named as a plaintiff because it seemed
and still seems illogical given its virtual non-existence in reality. However, if the only avenue to
legitimate claims against the defendants is through the joint venture, there is no good reason to
deny the plaintiffs' that opportunity Western Empire Advisors was not named as a defendant,
because it and Larson are indistinguishable There is not even a corporate veil to be pierced If
however, the Court has any notion to allow Larson to hide behind the entity, it should allow the
plaintiffs to bring WEA in It has always been there Lanto was not named because the clear
evidence shows that, not only was he bought out by Arnold and WEA, but his liability was also
expressly assumed by them.

What justification exists for allowing the defendants to escape

liability for this objective fact? Let them try to convince a jury that they should have no liability
under the purchase agreement.
There was a time when the plaintiffs felt it was simply unfair to go after Eric Rasmussen.
Well, fairness has to go both ways. He signed the MLDJV and is liable under its terms.
Defendant Arnold will surely agree that the parol evidence rule will prohibit the admission of
evidence that Rasmussen was not intended to be a member of the joint venture. Mr. Rasmussen
can then try to figure out a way to deal with his brother-in-law and other responsible parties.
Under §78-12-23, the statute of limitations for claims under a written contract is six years. The
MLDJV was executed in March, 1995.
The proposed amendments are necessary because the plaintiffs' case has been boxed-in
and limited. These limitations did not occur until August 28,2000.

6

Prejudice to Defendant Arnold
Let's talk about prejudice. The Court has heard the litany of Arnold's alleged misdeeds
enough that they need not be repeated. Suffice to say however, that if defendant Arnold had
bothered to inform the plaintiffs of his conduct as counsel for the joint venture, and, if one looks
at the evidence, an equity partner of the joint venture, we would not be here today. The
plaintiffs' proposed amendment states the case in the form that defendant Arnold would have it though having done so, Arnold finds it objectionable. It is disappointing, though not at all
surprising, that Arnold's procedural maneuvering has as its sole aim the avoidance of deserved
liability.
Plaintiffs' proposed amendments will not result in the introduction of any evidence the
defendant has not already been confronted with a dozen times. Plaintiffs do not plan to conduct
any additional discovery if their motion is granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs are willing to
allow the defendant all the time he wants, up to the 2002 Winter Olympics if need be, to prepare
himself
The only prejudice defendant faces is letting the plaintiffs have a chance to get a
recognizable version of the facts before an impartial jury. Unfortunately for him, that is the
primary and overriding goal of the civil justice system.
Co-defendant Larson has made no objection to plaintiffs' Motions, nor does he claim
prejudice.
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Futility
Defendant Arnold's final claim is that plaintiffs' Motion to Amend should be denied
because the new causes of action fail as a matter of law. This is curious. One would suppose
defense counsel confronted with a Motion to Amend substituting impossible claims would seize
the opportunity to allow his opponents to hang themselves.
Actually though, Arnold only makes the point with regard to plaintiffs' allegation that the
other Members of the joint venture agreed to indemnify them under the Note, stating that such
evidence would be inadmissible under the parol evidence rule. Defendant jumps the gun. The
question now is only whether plaintiffs should be permitted to file an 2nd Amended Complaint.
Thereafter, defendant can make his evidentiary objections and it will be up to the Court to
determine whether the MLDJVA is an integrated document, "a final and complete expression of
the parties' agreement" as a matter of law. If it is, then the Court can consider parol evidence
issues. Hall v. Process Instruments & Control, Inc., 866 R2d 604, 606-08 (Ut. App. 1994);
Webb v. R.O.A. General Inc., 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Ut. App. 1987). Plaintiffs will contend that
the indemnification agreement does not alter the terms of the MLDJVA, but rather that it is a
completely separate agreement between individuals with regard to the completely separate
obligation under the note. (Let us recall defendant Arnold's position on parol evidence when he
wants to explain his signature on the unambiguous, fiilly integrated Lanto Purchase Agreement.)
Why don't we just try the case? Even if the Court determines that the parol evidence
rule prohibits establishing a separate the agreement of the parties, it doesn't result in the failure
of plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law, it simply means that the ratios and percentages of liability
have to be refigured.
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The Professional Liability Claim
This argument is classic Both the Court and the defendants have been quite clear in the
opinion that defendants' professional duties run to the joint venture Do the defendants seriously
suggest that they are unaware of the conduct alleged to justify this claim? They might read the
Complaint, or more particularly the Amended Complaint The proper objection here is for a
more definite statement, not dismissal of the claim

If the Court determines a more definite

statement is necessary, plaintiffs' will gladly provide it

Defendant Arnold then states that

plaintiffs have identified only personal losses, and not losses of the joint venture Here again,
defendant forgets the box plaintiffs have been placed in by previous defense arguments, and/or
has failed to read the Second Amended Complaint which alleges plainly that, "The Young loan
was acquired for business purposes of the MLDJV, and was thereby a debt or liability of the joint
venture " (Proposed 2nd Amended Complaint at f31 )
The professional liability claim is brought on behalf of the joint venture as defendant has
insisted it must be The unnecessarily circular argument goes like this Defendants' professional
misconduct caused the joint venture to fail and lose at least $212,000, the Normans sue on behalf
of the joint venture for its recovery (other members are most welcome to join as plamtiffsf), if
the joint venture recovers, the members share m the recovery under the terms of the MLDJVA,
however, since the Normans covered the entire loss they would be entitled to contribution from
the other members If that is what the law requires, the Normans, on behalf of the joint venture,
will do it

Co-defendant Larson did not object either individually or on behalf of WEA with regard
to this claim

9

Defendant Larson's Failure to Respond
Is Additional Support For Granting Plaintiffs' Motions
Defendant Larson did not object or respond to plaintiffs' Motion to Amend the
Complaint or their suggestion for handling the Lanto interest. Since Arnold and Larson are
essentially in the same boat, said failure provides additional justification for the Court to grant
plaintiffs' Motions. At the very least, the failure to respond should result in the granting of
plaintiffs' request to add Westaern Empire Advisors as a defendant.
Conclusion
With regard to the Lanto, plaintiffs will defer to the Court's decision as to whether he
needs to be a party defendant. Given the evolved circumstances of the case, including the fact
that it is four months from trial and plaintiffs are willing to give defendant Arnold all the time he
wants, the Motion to Amend is neither untimely nor unjustified.

The alleged prejudice to

defendant Arnold is fanciful, and in any event, not nearly as great as the prejudice to the
plaintiffs if the Motion is denied.
Dated this jfyh

day of ji^hmb^K^

12000.

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
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Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that on the / 7 ^ day of hPf rr^h^"

, 2000, a true and correct

of the foregoing Reply Memorandum was mailed, postage prepaid, to:

James C Has kins
Attorney for Norman Larson
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Matthew Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah
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James C. Haskins (#1406)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-0234
Facsimile: (801)539-5210
Attorneys for Defendant Norman M. Larson

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., and DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

OBJECTION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO
FILE 2 N D AMENDED
COMPLAINT
Civil No. 9807-116

vs.
MARK E. ARNOLD, DUANE R. BARNEY,
PETER LANTO, ERIC A. RASMUSSEN,
GREGORY A. PAGE, and NORMAN
M. LARSON,
Defendants.

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

COMES NOW Defendant Norman M. Larson, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and objects to the Plaintiffs' Motion to File 2nd Amended Complaint.
While Utah R. Civ. Proc. 15(a) provides that leave to amend a pleading "shall be
freely given when justice so requires," in Utah it is well recognized that "the liberality of
the rule is not without limit, particularly when nothing new or of substance is contained
in the proposed amendment." Duplerv. Yates, 351 P.2d 624, 637 (Utah 1960). The

resolution of motions for leave to amend pleadings are left to the sound discretion of
the trial court. Christiansen v. Utah Transit Authority, 649 P.2d 42 (Utah 1982). In
general, the decision whether to grant leave to amend is governed by three factors: (1)
the timeliness of the motion; (2) the moving party's reason for the delay; and (3) the
resulting prejudice to the responding party. Hill v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Co., 829 P.2d 142, 149 (Utah App. 1992). However, the timeliness of the motion for
leave to amend is of primary significance. Thus, where the only excuse for an untimely
motion is the moving party's failure to conduct appropriate discovery, the motion for
leave to amend will be denied. Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah App.
1988). A motion of leave to amend was denied where the moving party conducted no
previous discovery, the opponent had completed his discovery based upon the original
pleadings, and the motion to amend was filed only one day before the opponent's
motion for summary judgment was to be filed. Span East Airlines, Inc. v. Digital
Equipment Corp., 486 F. Supp. 831, 835 (D. Mass. 1980), cited with approval in
Chadwick v. Nielsen, supra.
This is the second time the Plaintiffs have sought to amend the Complaint, which
was originally filed on September 23, 1998, almost two full years ago. The Plaintiffs5
motion was filed after the first trial in this case, which resulted in a mistrial on August
28, 2000. The Plaintiffs now seek to alter in a radical fashion the bases for their
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complaints against the Defendants, who have completed their discovery based upon
the original pleadings The Plaintiffs seek to add an additional party plaintiff, seek to
add two Defendants, who were originally included in the Complaint but subsequently
dismissed, and seek to assert professional negligence and liability claims against the
Defendant Larson based upon his alleged status as a financial expert All of these
claims are patently untimely
The Plaintiffs' only explanation for their delay in seeking to amend the Complaint
is that "[fjollowing the mistrial the Court made a number of evidentiary ruling [sic] that
materially alter and limit the plaintiffs' case as presently plead " (Plaintiffs' Supporting
Memorandum, p 2 ) This explanation is wholly insufficient to allow the amendments
the Plaintiffs now propose First, the Plaintiffs should not be permitted to amend their
Complaint merely upon the basis that they were negligent in failing to anticipate the
Court's evidentiary rulings, particularly where it is not alleged in the moving papers that
those rulings were in error Where there has been a substantial delay in seeking an
otherwise appropriate amendment and the moving party has failed to offer any reasons
for the delay, Utah courts have not hesitated, in the exercise of the Court's discretion,
to deny motions for leave to amend Mountain America Credit Union v McClellan, 854
P 2d 590 (Utah App 1993).
On the merits, the Plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend is not well taken They
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acknowledge as they must, that they failed to join the Moab Land Development Joint
Venture as a party herein despite their knowledge of its existence at the time they filed
both their original Complaint and their First Amended Complaint The Plaintiffs refer to
the "changing and ambiguous nature" of the Joint Venture, but fail to allege the
existence of a single fact unknown to the Plaintiff at the time the original Complaint was
filed They assert that other members of the Joint Venture "acted contrary to" their
interests and "abandoned" the Joint Venture but, again, they fail to assert any facts
which were not known to them at the time the original Complaint was filed An
amendment to a pleading is prejudicial to opposing parties where it occurs in an
untimely fashion and after discovery has been completed See Bushnell Real Estate v
Nielson, 672 P 2d 746, 751 (Utah 1983)
The Plaintiffs also assert that they should be permitted to raise a claim of
negligence against Defendants Arnold and Larson based upon the Court's ruling that
the Defendant's duties and obligations, if any, ran to the Joint Venture and not to the
individual Plaintiffs The Plaintiffs admit, however, that "[n]one of the claims are new"
Plaintiffs' Supporting Memorandum, p 5 It is thus apparent that those claims could
have been raised by them two years ago, when the original Complaint was filed The
Plaintiffs should not be permitted to capitalize on their own failures to raise these
obvious issues when this action was filed or, at the latest, at the time the Plaintiffs filed
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their First Amended Complaint, particularly where the Plaintiffs have not come forward
with any explanation whatsoever for the untimeliness of their attempt to amend the
pleadings.
But the most significant difficulty with the Plaintiffs' Motion is that, as the Court
has already determined, there can be no duty owed to the Plaintiffs by any Defendant
who had no agreement with the Plaintiffs to become partners in the joint venture
project. Before there can be any liability, there must be consent by the Plaintiffs and
the Defendant to become a partner or joint venturer in the project. Virtually all of the
evidence in this case is to the effect that none of the parties at any time understood
Defendant Larson to be a member of any joint venture with them with respect to the
Holiday Inn project. Consequently, even if the new factual allegations in the proposed
Amended Complaint are accepted, the Plaintiffs cannot prevail on any theory against
Defendant Larson because, as they have previously acknowledged, they never at at
any time consented to Larson becoming an additional member of the joint venture.
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Plaintiffs Motion to
File 2nd Amended Complaint should be denied by the Court.
DATED t h i s ^ day of September, 2000.

rnes C. Haskins
Page 5

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Objection to Plaintiffs' Motion to File 2nd
Amended Complaint was served on the^V 1 day of September, 2000, by mailing the
same in a U.S. Postal Service postage-paid envelope addressed as follows:
Steve Russell, Esq.
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC.
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, Utah 84532
Matthew L. Lalli, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER
15 South West Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

W iU^
\Thomas N. \honhpson
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Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C.
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab,Utah 84532
Telephone: (435) 259-7321
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,

I
Motion to Further Amend
Complaint

Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. 9807416
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson.
Judge Anderson
Defendants.

Upon further consideration, and based upon the current status of the case and defendant
Arnold's response to plaintiffs' Motion to file a 2nd Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs, pursuant to
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, move the Court to consider an alternative 2nd Amended
Complaint in this action.

In order to be efficient, the alternative Complaints should be

considered at the same time.
This motion is supported by an accompanying memorandum of legal authority.
Dated this

day of ^ipk<y)n^/C

, 2000.

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs

Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that on the^fr day of <fyOnjfrh*iL , 1999, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Motion to Further Amend Complaint were mailed, postage prepaid to:
James C Haskins
Attorney for Norman Larson
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Matthew Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah

v/- 1

Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C.
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (435) 259-7321
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,

I
Memorandum in Support of Motion
to Further Amend Complaint

Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. 9807-116
Mark E, Arnold & Norman M. Larson.
Judge Anderson
Defendants.
Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, submit the following memorandum in support of their
Motion to further amend the complaint. The purpose of the further amendment is to allow the
plaintiffs to plead alternative theories of liability: 1) under the joint venture agreement, and 2)
individual liability. Support for plaintiffs' request to file a Second Amended Complaint, and the
amendments to the joint venture theories of liability are set forth in plaintiffs' previous memo.
Argument
Plaintiffs have attempted to impress on the Court the unusual and difficult circumstances
presented by this case. For example, the Moab Land Development Joint Venture that never
really was followed; the ulterior motives and competing projects of the "other group" Lanto,
Page, Arnold and Larson (WEA); the undisclosed and conflicting roles of Arnold and Larson. It

is plaintiffs belief that thev were used by the other group solely as person who had land to
secure a loan to give the other group money for their own purposes
Plaintiffs' original Complaint was set forth in the context of the MLDJV since it was one
of the few documents that plaintiffs had Defendant Arnold has done a good job of seizing on
that context to artificially restrict plaintiffs' case

See, Arnold's Memo in Opposition to

Plaintiffs' Motion to File a 2nd Amended Complaint, particularly section 11(A) regarding the
existing Complaint

Plaintiffs' case, as formulated by the defendants, and as limited by

evidentiary rulings is virtually impossible to prove
Arnold, for example, has found great comfort in the provision of the MLDJV requiring
unanimous consent for new partners, and argues that, as an integrated contract, the Court may
not look outside its four corners regarding any aspect of the joint venture This interpretation is
the equivalent of a grant of immunity for conduct that resulted in the failure of the joint venture
and plaintiffs' eventual losses Plaintiffs have tried to explain and demonstrate that the MLDJV
was nothing more than a vehicle to get them to pledge their property

It was, in fact, never

observed by any of the other individuals involved Consider
1.

There is not one other document which so much as mentions the MLDJV as an

entity Where an entity is named, it is 4-D Development (Page, Barney & Lanto), in which the
Normans were not involved, and which was dissolved on October 27, 1995
2.

Pursuant to ^[1 5 and 1 6 of the MLDJV, it would have dissolved, by its own

terms, not later than March 15, 1996 The involvement if defendants Arnold and Larson (WEA)
continued long after that
3.

The "LLC to be created" mentioned in those same sections, was never created

4.

Duane Barney was named Administrative Agent fl[2.1). As administrative agent

he was "to manage the assets and invest the funds of the joint venture." We know that those
function were carried out by Arnold and Larson (WEA).
5.

According to f5.1, funds of the joint venture "will be used only for investments

approved by an affirmative and unanimous vote of the joint venturers." We know, however, that
funds were diverted by Arnold and Larson (WEA) to a project in Park City of which the
Normans had no knowledge. We also know that Arnold and Larson (WEA) sent $50,000 to
Arizona without the Normans knowledge or consent.
6.

Paragraph 8.1 calls for a joint venture bank account, with checks to be signed by

the administrative agent, Barney. No joint venture bank account ever existed. The only joint
venture funds were given to Larson (WEA) by Arnold. Larson thereafter had sole check signing
authority, and testified that he always had the expenditures approved solely by Arnold.
7.

It was 4-D Development that hired Larson (WEA), not the MLDJV, and yet

Larson (WEA) clearly took control of the financing for the MLDJV and acquired a potential
equity interest.
8.

It was Larson, individually, who owned the very Holiday Inn Franchise that the

MLDJV was organized to acquire, (f 1.2 and 1.5)
9.

Clearly, the nature and composition of the "group," whatever it was, changed

drastically on or about October 27, 1995 when Arnold and Larson (WEA) bought out Lanto, 4-D
Development was dissolved and administrative agent Barney went to prison.
At no time did the defendants conduct themselves pursuant to the provisions of the
MLDJVA, and that agreement should provide them no protection from plaintiffs' claims.

Rather than providing Arnold and Larson (WEA) with an escape from liability, it would
be more logical to hold that the events of October 27, 1995, particularly since Normans were
intentionally uninformed, resulted in a dissolution of the MLDJ V. Thereafter, it would appear
that there was either another unnamed and informal joint venture in operation, or the conduct of
the various parties was undertaken as individuals. Significantly, while Arnold and Larson
(WEA) had possession and complete control of the loan funds, the liability under the Young note
that the Normans assumed and paid, makes no mention of any joint venture. The Normans never
transferred their property into the joint venture. The Normans signed the Trust Deed as
individuals, as did the signers on the Trust Deed Note. It is the testimony of both Arnold and
Larson that the Youngs requested and obtained Larson's personal guarantee on the Note.
In the words of defendant Arnold when asked to explain his role as counsel in the project:
44

(I) represented them all individually as a group. " (depo. at 30) "/ don V know what that group

was. I represented them as individuals. " (depo. at 39).
Consequently, plaintiffs contend that they should be allowed to proceed under alternative
and/or cumulative theories.
1.

Liability under the terms of the MLDJ V.

2.

Individual liability, both in the conduct of the failed venture and under the Note.

This has been plaintiffs' point all along. It makes no difference whether the MLDJV ever
existed in reality or not. The loss of the money that the Normans had to assume responsibility
for was a direct and proximate result of the conduct of Arnold and Larson (WEA). The plaintiffs
should be allowed to get their claim before a jury.
Plaintiffs' proposed 2nd Amended Complaint, as further amended is attached.

Dated this Q?k

day of Kt/lk^O^

, 2000^,

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiff

Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that on the 35^ day of St^b"

!?**£-> , 2000, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Plaintiffs' Motion to Further Amend Complaint was mailed, postage prepaid to:
James C. Has kins
Attorney for Norman Larson
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Matthew Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Matthew L Lalli (,#6105)
SNELt & WILMERJUL.P.

Gateway Tower West
U W Snuth Temple, Suite 1200
St<lt Lake City: UT 84101
Telephone: (801)257-1900
fritcsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT .NOKMAN, SR., & DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,

MEMORANDUM TN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO * URTHER

PlaiiivilTs,

AMEND COMPLAINT
v<?

ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Civil No- 9S07-U6
Judge Lyle R. Anderscc

Defendants.

I

INTRODUCTION

In this memorandum, defendant Maik Arnold ("Arnold") is compelled to respond to the
Mornians1 second motion to amend their Complaint ia the month aaace the first day of trial,
winch unfortunately ended ra a mistnal. Arnold oppo&cd the first po3t-trial motion to amend nr.
September 14,2000. Before that motion could be heard, huwevcr, the Nctnume inexplicably
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tiled rhis second motion :o amend. Not only is this second moiion to amend procedurally
unprecedented and unjustified, it suffers from the same, incurable infirmities as the first.
As explained at length in Arnold's opposition to the first motion to amend., Utah law
makes clear that both of the Normans' motions simply come too late. The Normans do not
allege surprise or new evidence, nor do they justify their requests for leave to amend in any way
odicr than to candidly admit that they believe their case "as formulated by the defendants, and as
limited by the Court's evidentiary rulings/' to be Virtually impossible to prove." Plfs.5 Motion
to Further Amend Complaint (hereinafter "Second Morion to Amend") at 2. As set forth in
/ jnold'b original opposite. to the Norman*7 motion to amend, the Normans5 motions are
x,ntimely, unjustified, and extremely prejudicial tc Arnold, and Arnold reasserts and incorporates
by reference those arguments herein.
Second, and again as before, the Normans' additional proposed claims cannot be
incorporated into the complaint because they are futile. The Normans seek to add a new claim
J

.bi "Individual Liability for Lob&es Incurred by ihe Joint Venture/' whatever that is, and they

also attempt to cure defects in their pruposcd claim for Arnold's alleged professional liability"
o the joint venture. The 'Individual Liability for Losses Incurred by the Business Venture"
wlaim fails because no such claim exists under die laws of this or any other state. The Normans'
modifications to their proposed "professional liability" is simply an attempt to reintroduce the
fiduciary duty claim, which the court dismissed on summary jadgmen:, through the back door.
Regardless of the label the Normans try to attach, they simply can't iecovcr a pcr3onal loss for
breach of duties Arnold did not owe to them personally, but the joint venture.
Finally, the Normans have filed an additional motion to amend before the Court could
rule on their first motion. In so doing, the Normans have forced Arnold to respond 10 two
motions without justification- No rule of procedure allows them to do so. As a rc&ult, pursuant
to the Court's inherent powers to regulate the parties and litigation before it, Arnold requests that
2
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he be awarded his fees and costs incurred in responding to the Normans' unprecedented and
unauthorized "Motion to Further Amend Complaint.5'
II
A.

ARGUMENT

The Normans* Motion to Further Amend Should Be Denied as Untimely,
Unjustified, and Prejudicial, as Set Forth In Arnold's Original Opposition.

The Court should deny the Nonnans7 Motion to Further Amend because it is untimely,
u ljusrifieri, and prejudicial to .Arnold. As the Utah courts have repeatedly made clear, Utah Rule
o f Civil Procedure 15 does not permit amendment under these circumstances. These arguments
a:e fully set forth in Arnold's opposition to the Normans' first post-trial motion to amend and
provide adequate and independent grounds for denial. In the interest of efficiency, however,
/anold incorporates those arguments herein by reference, rather than setting them forth in their
entirety a second time.
B.

The Normals* Proposed Claim for "Individual Liability for Losses Incurred
bv the Business Venture* Is Fntile Because It Has No Basis in Utah Law,

In their second motion to amend, the Normans propose to add yet another new claim for
"Individual Liability for Losses Incurred By the Business Venture." Second Proposed Am.
Compl. at TJ 38-49. They allege that if the joint venture "ever existed in reality/' it was
eventually ''dissolved" as of the October 27,1995 Lanto Purchase Agreement IdL atfl43.
further, although the Normans admit that "efforts to secure the Holiday Inn Development
continued," they allege that a "new joint venture or partnership was [not] formally organized."
id atfflf45-46 Eventually, the Normans claim that these development efforts failed, the
Holiday Innfranchisewas lost and the Nonnans alone assumed full responsibility for repaying
the promissory note, hi at ^ 46-47, From this, and without further explanation, the Normans
conclude that they "are entirled to recover their lossesfromeach individual defendant in such
amounts aa ore to be proved at trial to have proximately resultedfromeach individual's

i

conduct." W. 2t<fU9.
In Utah, leave to amend "should be denied when the moving party seeks to assert a new
claim that is legally insufficient ox futile." Andalex Resources, Inc, v. Mvers, 871 P.2d 1041,
1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Here, even assuming the Normans' factual allegations as set forth
above axe true, their "individual liability" claim simply fails to set forth any claim recognizable
uader Utah law. The Normans r.laim that Arnold, Larson, Lanto, Rasmussen, and Western
Empire Advisors ore each individually liable for unidentified losses "in such amounts as are
proved at trial," but do not identify any contract oral or written,fromwhich such liability may
arise, nor du they identify any tort duty or standard that has been breached. Second Proposed
Am, CompL al % 49. The Normans do not even identify the alleged wrongful conduct that could
create such individual liability. The Normans cannot simply create new law or manufacture new
claims. They must plead and prove this case under established legal theory.
C

The Normans' Modifications to the Propped Claim Against Arnold and
Larson for Professional Liability On Behalf of the Joint Venture Cannot
Cure Its Defects.

The Normans next attempt to cure the defects in then claim against Arnold and Larson
for '"professional liability" to the joint venture. This is simply the latest attempt to try to hold
.Arnold and Larson liable for breach offiduciaryduty so the Normans can reinstitute their
rmnitive damages claim and hope for a runaway jury. The Normans initially tried to hold Arnold
liable as their personalfiduciary,but the court correctly held that Arnold was not their person
lawyer and therefore owed them no personal fiduciary duty. Second Proposed Am- CompL, fflf
56-89. Next, after the court granted Arnold's motions in limine, the Normansfiledtheir first
motion to amend alleging that Arnold and Larson were "professionally liable" to the joint
venture, but not to ths Normans personally. However, in opposition to thefirstmotion to amend,
the Normans failed to identify what legal services Arnold performed or negligently failed to

4
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perform, or ho^ he breached a fiduciary duty in doing so. In response, the Normans here
attempt to "amend" their proposed amendment adding some thirty-three paragraphs of alleged
^vroDga" committed by Arnold and Larson. 1^ Of course, the Court has excluded all of this
evidence at the hearing on the parties' motions in limine as irrelevant to the Normans' existing
claim*. Realleging theee fects after the date set for trial has come and gone, and even after the
iNOiroanb have already filed one motion to amend, is nothing more than an attempt to avoid the
consequences of the Court's ruling,
The only damage the Normans identify in connection with 7he claim is their own personal
loss in paying off Qic promissory note. Second Proposal Am. CornpL at 188. They do net and, since this is the Normals' second attempt at amending their complaint, cannot - claim that
Arnold did or failed to do any thing which damaged the joint venture. In fact the only loss the
Normans have ever identified in any vf their complaints hae been the loss resulting from the
repayment of the promissory note. The Nonnans' existing complaint already contains two
claims which seek recovery for this personal loss, and this Court has ruled that Arnold did not
owe the Normans themselves a fiduciary duty, The Normans' proposed claim for professional
liability "on behalf of the joint venture" is futile, and they should be denied leave to amend as a
result
D.

Arnold Is Entitled to AD Award of His Attorney Fees and Costs Incurred In
Opuusiap the Normans* Motion to Further Amend Complaint.

Finally, the Court should award Arnold his attorney fses and costs incurred as a result nf
having to oppose this unprecedented and unjustified second motion to amend. In Utah, the
district courts are given "statutory authority to control proceedings before [them]" and they
"possess certain inherent power to impose monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their conduct
thwart the court's scheduling and movement of cases," including attorney's fees. Barnard v.
WassermaiL 855 P,2d 243,249 (Utah 1993), citing Utah Code Ann. §§ ^8-7-5,78-7-17. In

s

Barnard, the Utah Supreme Court Jpheld the district court's order requiring an attorney who
foiled to appear at or notify his client of a contempt hearing to pay the attorney's less of the
opposing party. The supreme court found that such a sanction was justified beCLise the
aitomcy's actions "interfered with the administration of justice and resulted in wasted time and
c Toit by opposing counsel" IcL
The Normane moved to amend their complaint and submitted a proposed amended
CDmplaint adding new parties, claims, and allegations. Because amendments to the complaint at
this late date would cause Arnold substantial prejudice, Arnold was forced to spend a substantial
amount of time opposing xhc Normans' untimely motion. In response and before the first motion
to amend was neard, ihc Noimans filed a second motion tn amend and submitted a new proposed
amended complaint attempting to cure the infirmities identified in Arnold's opposition. The
second motion to amend can only he treated as superseding thefir^rt,and as a tacit
acknowledgment thai the first wa* insufHcicnt.
The Normans cite no authority - nor can they for such conduct Asa result after going
io substantial expense to fully respond to the Normans' first motion, the Norma** needlessly
"^ave forced Arnold to spend additional time and money to respond to yet another. Accordingly.
Arnold respectfully requests that the Court award him his attorney's fees and costs in responding
to the Normans' motion.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Noimans clearly believe that the Court's evidentiary rulings have somehow
"artificially restricted]" their case and that therefore, they are entitled to proceed under whatever
"alternative and/or cumulative theories," they may allege. Second Motion to Amend at 2,4. hi
fact, Arnold's opposition to the Normans' previous motion to amend and the Court's earlier
evidentiary rulings do nothing other than require the Noimans to prove the causes of action they
have selected, using only evidence that is relevant to establishing the elements of those claims.
6
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3xi cither motion, the Normans cite no authorir/ whatsoever which would allow the Conn to grant
them leave to file an amended complaint under these circumstances. This matter is ready to be
Uicd.

Tor the reasons set forth herein, and for the reasons set forth in Arnold's opposition to the
Normans3 Motion to Amend, the Cnun should deny the Normans' Motion to Amend and their
Motion lu Further Amend Complaint. In addition, pursuant to its inherent powers, the Court
sliould award Arnold hx3 attorney fees anri COSTS in opposing the Motion to Further Amend
Complaint.
DATED this J " Y "day of October, 2000.
SNELL & W I L M E R L X *

tf&ithew L. LaDi
Attorney for Mark Arnold

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
S)

I hereby certify on this ^ A ^ d a y of October. 2000,1 caused a true and correct cupy of
the foregoing to be faxed and mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Steve Russell, Esq.

Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC
72yBartlettCiiclc
Moab?UT 84532
Attorney for Plaintiffs
James C. Haskks, Esq.
Haskins & Associates, P,C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, LIT 84111
Attorney for Norman M, Larson

$CdL*>u^ i^tcz/n^

cAT>rxTCA\CT n i i 7 i n i

8

Tab 18
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SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

Gateway Tower West
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO FURTHER
AMEND COMPLAINT
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Civil No.: 9807-116
Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In this memorandum, defendant Mark Arnold ("Arnold") is compelled to respond to the
Normans' second motion to amend their Complaint in the month since the first day of trial,
which unfortunately ended in a mistrial. Arnold opposed the first post-trial motion to amend on
September 14, 2000. Before that motion could be heard, however, the Normans inexplicably

filed this second motion to amend. Not only is this second motion to amend procedurally
unprecedented and unjustified, it suffers from the same, incurable infirmities as the first.
As explained at length in Arnold's opposition to the first motion to amend, Utah law
makes clear that both of the Normans' motions simply come too late. The Normans do not
allege surprise or new evidence, nor do they justify their requests for leave to amend in any way
other than to candidly admit that they believe their case "as formulated by the defendants, and as
limited by the Court's evidentiary rulings," to be "virtually impossible to prove " Plfs.' Motion
to Further Amend Complaint (hereinafter "Second Motion to Amend") at 2. As set forth in
Arnold's original opposition to the Normans' motion to amend, the Normans' motions are
untimely, unjustified, and extremely prejudicial to Arnold, and Arnold reasserts and incorporates
by reference those arguments herein.
Second, and again as before, the Normans' additional proposed claims cannot be
incorporated into the complaint because they are futile. The Normans seek to add a new claim
for "Individual Liability for Losses Incurred by the Joint Venture," whatever that is, and they
also attempt to cure defects in their proposed claim for Arnold's alleged "professional liability"
to the joint venture. The "Individual Liability for Losses Incurred by the Business Venture"
claim fails because no such claim exists under the laws of this or any other state. The Normans'
modifications to their proposed "professional liability" is simply an attempt to reintroduce the
fiduciary duty claim, which the court dismissed on summary judgment, through the back door.
Regardless of the label the Normans try to attach, they simply can't recover a personal loss for
breach of duties Arnold did not owe to them personally, but the joint venture.
Finally, the Normans have filed an additional motion to amend before the Court could
rule on their first motion. In so doing, the Normans have forced Arnold to respond to two
motions without justification. No rule of procedure allows them to do so. As a result, pursuant
to the Court's inherent powers to regulate the parties and litigation before it, Arnold requests that
2
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he be awarded his fees and costs incurred in responding to the Normans' unprecedented and
unauthorized "Motion to Further Amend Complaint."
II.
A,

ARGUMENT

The Normans5 Motion to Further Amend Should Be Denied as Untimely,
Unjustified, and Pre judicial, as Set Forth In Arnold's Original Opposition.

The Court should deny the Normans' Motion to Further Amend because it is untimely,
unjustified, and prejudicial to Arnold. As the Utah courts have repeatedly made clear, Utah Rule
of Civil Procedure 15 does not permit amendment under these circumstances. These arguments
are fully set forth in Arnold's opposition to the Normans' first post-trial motion to amend and
provide adequate and independent grounds for denial. In the interest of efficiency, however,
Arnold incorporates those arguments herein by reference, rather than setting them forth in their
entirety a second time.
B.

The Normans' Proposed Claim for "Individual Liability for Losses Incurred
by the Business Venture" Is Futile Because It Has No Basis in Utah Law.

In their second motion to amend, the Normans propose to add yet another new claim for
"Individual Liability for Losses Incurred By the Business Venture." Second Proposed Am.
Compl. atfflf38-49. They allege that if the joint venture "ever existed in reality," it was
eventually "dissolved" as of the October 27,1995 Lanto Purchase Agreement. IdL at ^ 43.
Further, although the Normans admit that "efforts to secure the Holiday Inn Development
continued," they allege that a "new joint venture or partnership was [not] formally organized."
Id. atffl[45-46. Eventually, the Normans claim that these development efforts failed, the
Holiday Inn franchise was lost, and the Normans alone assumed foil responsibility for repaying
the promissory note. Id at ^ 46-47. From this, and without further explanation, the Normans
conclude that they "are entitled to recover their losses from each individual defendant in such
amounts as are to be proved at trial to have proximately resulted from each individual's

3

conduct." IdL at f 49.
In Utah, leave to amend "should be denied when the moving party seeks to assert a new
claim that is legally insufficient or futile." Andalex Resources. Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041,
1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Here, even assuming the Normans' factual allegations as set forth
above are true, their "individual liability" claim simply fails to set forth any claim recognizable
under Utah law. The Normans claim that Arnold, Larson, Lanto, Rasmussen, and Western
Empire Advisors are each individually liable for unidentified losses "in such amounts as are
proved at trial," but do not identify any contract, oral or written, from which such liability may
arise, nor do they identify any tort duty or standard that has been breached. Second Proposed
Am. Compl. at f 49. The Normans do not even identify the alleged wrongful conduct that could
create such individual liability. The Normans cannot simply create new law or manufacture new
claims. They must plead and prove this case under established legal theory.
C.

The Normans' Modifications to the Proposed Claim Against Arnold and
Larson for Professional Liability On Behalf of the Joint Venture Cannot
Cure Its Defects.

The Normans next attempt to cure the defects in their claim against Arnold and Larson
for "professional liability" to the joint venture. This is simply the latest attempt to try to hold
Arnold and Larson liable for breach of fiduciary duty so the Normans can reinstitute their
punitive damages claim and hope for a runaway jury. The Normans initially tried to hold Arnold
liable as their personal fiduciary, but the court correctly held that Arnold was not their person
lawyer and therefore owed them no personal fiduciary duty. Second Proposed Am. Compl., fflf
56-89. Next, after the court granted Arnold's motions in limine, the Normans filed their first
motion to amend alleging that Arnold and Larson were "professionally liable" to the joint
venture, but not to the Normans personally. However, in opposition to the first motion to amend,
the Normans failed to identify what legal services Arnold performed or negligently failed to

4
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perform, or how he breached a fiduciary duty in doing so. In response, the Normans here
attempt to "amend" their proposed amendment, adding some thirty-three paragraphs of alleged
"wrongs" committed by Arnold and Larson. Id Of course, the Court has excluded all of this
evidence at the hearing on the parties' motions in limine as irrelevant to the Normans' existing
claims. Realleging these facts after the date set for trial has come and gone, and even after the
Normans have already filed one motion to amend, is nothing more than an attempt to avoid the
consequences of the Court's ruling.
The only damage the Normans identify in connection with the claim is their own personal
loss in paying off the promissory note. Second Proposed Am. Compl. at f 88. They do not and, since this is the Normans' second attempt at amending their complaint, cannot - claim that
Arnold did or failed to do anything which damaged the joint venture. In fact, the only loss the
Normans have ever identified in any of their complaints has been the loss resultingfromthe
repayment of the promissory note. The Normans' existing complaint already contains two
claims which seek recovery for this personal loss, and this Court has ruled that Arnold did not
owe the Normans themselves a fiduciary duty. The Normans' proposed claim for professional
liability "on behalf of the joint venture" is futile, and they should be denied leave to amend as a
result.
D.

Arnold Is Entitled to An Award of His Attorney Fees and Costs Incurred In
Opposing the Normans' Motion to Further Amend Complaint

Finally, the Court should award Arnold his attorney fees and costs incurred as a result of
having to oppose this unprecedented and unjustified second motion to amend. In Utah, the
district courts are given "statutory authority to control proceedings before [them]" and they
"possess certain inherent power to impose monetary sanctions on attorneys who by their conduct
thwart the court's scheduling and movement of cases," including attorney's fees. Barnard v.
Wasserman. 855 P.2d 243, 249 (Utah 1993), citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-7-5, 78-7-17. In
5

Barnard, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the district court's order requiring an attorney who
failed to appear at or notify his client of a contempt hearing to pay the attorney's fees of the
opposing party. The supreme court found that such a sanction was justified because the
attorney's actions "interfered with the administration of justice and resulted in wasted time and
effort by opposing counsel." L±
The Normans moved to amend their complaint and submitted a proposed amended
complaint adding new parties, claims, and allegations. Because amendments to the complaint at
this late date would cause Arnold substantial prejudice, Arnold was forced to spend a substantial
amount of time opposing the Normans' untimely motion. In response and before the first motion
to amend was heard, the Normans filed a second motion to amend and submitted a new proposed
amended complaint attempting to cure the infirmities identified in Arnold's opposition. The
second motion to amend can only he treated as superseding the first, and as a tacit
acknowledgment that the first was insufficient.
The Normans cite no authority - nor can they - for such conduct. As a result, after going
to substantial expense to fully respond to the Normans' first motion, the Normans needlessly
have forced Arnold to spend additional time and money to respond to yet another. Accordingly,
Arnold respectfully requests that the Court award him his attorney's fees and costs in responding
to the Normans' motion.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Normans clearly believe that the Court's evidentiary rulings have somehow
"artificially restrict[ed]" their case and that therefore, they are entitled to proceed under whatever
"alternative and/or cumulative theories," they may allege. Second Motion to .Amend at 2, 4. In
fact, Arnold's opposition to the Normans' previous motion to amend and the Court's earlier
evidentiary rulings do nothing other than require the Normans to prove the causes of action they
have selected, using only evidence that is relevant to establishing the elements of those claims.
6
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In either motion, the Normans cite no authority whatsoever which would allow the Court to grant
them leave to file an amended complaint under these circumstances. This matter is ready to be
tried.
For the reasons set forth herein, and for the reasons set forth in Arnold's opposition to the
Normans' Motion to Amend, the Court should deny the Normans' Motion to Amend and their
Motion to Further Amend Complaint. In addition, pursuant to its inherent powers, the Court
should award Arnold his attorney fees and costs in opposing the Motion to Further Amend
Complaint.

DATED this 5

T

day of October, 2000.
SNELL &

WILMERLLP.

Matthew L. Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify on this , ^ - ^ d a y of October, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to be faxed and mailed, postage prepaid, to:
Steve Russell, Esq.
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab,UT 84532
Attorney for Plaintiffs
James C. Haskins, Esq.
Haskins & Associates, P.C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Norman M. Larson

feuZ/n,^
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT - MOAB COURT
GRAND COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT SR NORMAN Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENT

vs.

Case No: 980700116 CN

MARK E ARNOLD Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

LYLE R. ANDERSON
October 10, 2000

geriw

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): ROBERT SR NORMAN
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): STEVE RUSSELL
Defendant's Attorney(s): MATTHEW LALLI
JAMES C. HASKINS
Video
00-58
Tape Count: 11:19
Tape Number:

HEARING
TAPE: 00-58
COUNT: 11:19
Court addresses the case.
COUNT: 11:22
Mr. Russell addresses the court.
COUNT: 11:27
Mr. Lalli addresses the court.
COUNT: 12:04
Mr. Haskins gives his arugment.
COUNT: 12:11
Mr. Russell gives argument.
COUNT: 12:28
Judge takes attorney's from both sides to chambers.
COUNT: 12:51
Court resumes and court denies motion to amend complaint.
COUNT: 12:53
Mr. Russel makes request on motions. Court states that both
parties are entitled to look at the file.
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Tab 20

.•-•>r".-'n;OT COURT

Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C.
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab,Utah 84532
Telephone: (435) 259-7321
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs' Objection to
Proposed Orders
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 9807-116

Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson.
Judge Anderson
Defendants.
On October 10, 2000, the Court heard plaintiffs' Motion to file a 2nd Amended
Complaint, and incorporate further amendments that were made prior to the hearing date. At the
time it was pointed out that defendants had not filed Orders based upon rulings on various
Motions in Limine made by the Court on August 28, 2000.

In an off-record conference in

chambers on October 10, 2000, the Court and counsel acknowledged that the case is destined for
appeal, probably on several issues. Counsel for the plaintiffs pointed out the deficiencies in the
current record, and the need to have the basis for the Court's rulings adequately set forth in any
written Orders to be placed in the record.

Subsequently, defendant Arnold submitted proposed Orders on several issues from the
August 28, 2000 hearing and the October 10, 2000 hearing. The Proposed Orders merely state
whether the Court granted or denied each of the various motions. No attempt is made to set for
the factual basis or legal rationale for any of the rulings and are therefore insufficient, both in
terms of making an adequate record and for purposes of appellate review.
Dated this i ) ^

K

day of /f> Vn h< <€

, 2000.

sfi .

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs

Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that on the £t ^day of VCUJI^^X^

, 2000, a true and correct copy of

the foregoing Objection to Proposed Orders was mailed, postage prepaid to:
James C. Has kins
Attorney for Norman Larson
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr, Matthew Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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Matthew L. Lalli (6105)
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant Mark Arnold

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR. and DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER
Case No. 980700116 CN

MARK E. ARNOLD and NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Honorable Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

On October 10, 2000, the following motions of plaintiffs Robert and Diane Norman came
on for hearing in this Court:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion to File Second Amended Complaint;

2.

Plaintiffs' Motion Regarding Lanto Interest; and

3.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Further Amend Complaint;

Matthew L. Lalli appeared for defendant Mark Arnold and Steve Russell appeared for the
plaintiffs. Based upon the supporting memoranda, exhibits, affidavits, the record hearing, and
the argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing
SORJENSA\SLC\l 42996.1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion to File Second Amended Complaint is denied;

2.

Plaintiffs' Motion Regarding Lanto Interest is denied; and

3.

Plaintiffs' Motion to Further Amend Complaint is denied.

DATED thisfrftv day of Gteteber , 2000.
BY THE COURT:

GJT-E^,,

^ c

Or xiyr ^~

e R. Anderson n
! \
eventh District Coftrt JUdgeAPPROVED AS TO FORM

Steve Russell
Attorney for Plaintiffs

APPROVED AS TO FORM

fames C. Haskins
Attorney for Norman M. Larson

SORENSA\SLC\ 142996.1
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 980700116 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this

/

NAME
JAMES C. HASKINS
ATTORNEY
357 South 200 East
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
MATTHEW LALLI
ATTORNEY
15 W. S TEMPLE, STE 1200
GATEWAY TOWER WEST
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
STEVE RUSSELL
ATTORNEY
729 Bartlett circle
Moab UT 84532

day of // A^A^m^H^— , 20^70 .

"'A

<

JvU

/^7*^M^^

Deputy CourtIClerk •

;
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Matthew L. Lalli (6105)
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 -1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant Mark Arnold

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR. and DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER
Case No. 980700116 CN

MARK E. ARNOLD and NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Honorable Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

On August 28, 2000, Defendant Mark E. Arnold's Motion in Limine came on for hearing
in this Court. Matthew L. Lalli appeared for Mark Arnold and Steve Russell appeared for
plaintiffs. Based upon the supporting memoranda, exhibits, affidavits, the record hearing, and
the argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing

SORENSA\SLC\ 143005.1

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
Defendant Mark E. Arnold's Motion in Limine seeking the exclusion of evidence,
argument or comment concerning : 1) the terms of the Young loan; (2) the Park City
development and the formation of Venture Properties II; (3) the preparation of or representations
about the trust deed and note; (4) the expenditure of loan proceeds; and (5) Arnold's relationship
with Jim Winkler, is granted.
DATED this £<fL day of (A#ber , 2000.
BY THE COURT:

^rr:—._

R. Anderson I I
Seventh District Court Judge
•:> If

APPROVED AS TO FORM

\

Steve Russell
Attorney for Plaintiffs

APPROVED AS TO FORM

les C. Haskms
Attorney for Norman M. Larson

SORENSA\SLC\ 143005.1
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 980700116 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated this / ~ day of //

tv^^rv^f-o^,

NAME
JAMES C. HASKINS
ATTORNEY
357 South 200 East
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
MATTHEW LALLI
ATTORNEY
15 W. S TEMPLE, STE 1200
GATEWAY TOWER WEST
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
STEVE RUSSELL
ATTORNEY
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab UT 84532
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Matthew L.Lalli (6105)
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant Mark Arnold

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT NORMAN, SR. and DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

ORDER
Case No. 980700116 CN

MARK E. ARNOLD and NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Honorable Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

On August 28, 2000, the following motions came on for hearing in this Court:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine to Reinstitute Claim for Punitive Damages;

2.

Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine Re: Interest, Attorney's Fees and Costs;

3.

Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine to Require Production of Documents; and

4.

Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine Request to Use Hearsay Evidence;

Matthew L. Lalli appeared for defendant Mark Arnold and Steve Russell appeared for the
plaintiffs. Based upon the supporting memoranda, exhibits, affidavits, the record hearing, and
the argument of counsel, and for good cause appearing
SORENSA\SLC\l 43019

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:
1.

Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine to Reinstitute Claim for Punitive Damages is denied;

2.

Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine Re: Interest, Attorney's Fees and Costs is denied;

3.

Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine to Require Production of Documents is denied and

any evidence of or testimony about the bankruptcies of Greg Page and Duane Barney will not be
presented to the jury; and
4.

Plaintiffs' Motion In Limine Request to Use Hearsay Evidence is granted on the

ground that the evidence which the plaintiffs seek to admit therein, if not offered for its truth, is
non-hearsay.
DATED this V^

day of Qetober, 2000.
BY THE COURT

n

w
Lyre R. Anderson
*.*
Seventh District CourtUfudge
APPROVED AS TO FORM

Steve Russell
Attorney for Plaintiffs

APPROVED AS TO FORM

ames C. Haskins
Attorney for Norman M Larson
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 980700116 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Mail

Dated t h i s

V

day of

/*?/QV^MC^

7^

NAME
JAMES C. RASKINS
ATTORNEY
357 South 200 East
Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
MATTHEW LALLI
ATTORNEY
15 W. S TEMPLE, STE 1200
GATEWAY TOWER WEST
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101
STEVE RUSSELL
ATTORNEY
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab UT 84532
20 & ° .

Deputy Cowct Jfcl^rkr
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James C. Haskins (#1406)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-0234
Facsimile: (801)539-5210
Attorneys for Defendant Norman M. Larson

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., and DIANE

MOTION FOR SUMMARY

NORMAN, husband and wife,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 9807-116

MARK E. ARNOLD, DUANE R. BARNEY,
PETER LANTO, ERIC A. RASMUSSEN,
GREGORY A. PAGE, and NORMAN
M. LARSON,
Defendants.

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendant Norman M. Larson, by and through his undersigned counsel here,
and pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56, moves this Court for summary
judgment with respect to the remaining issues herein. The remaining issues are
whether Defendant Larson is in breach of a joint venture agreement, and whether the
Defendant Larson is liable on the alleged default of a promissory note. There is simply
no support for the material allegations of the First Amended Complaint with respect to

these issues; and thus there are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to
either of them.
A supporting memorandum is submitted herewith.
A^CKV

DATED this

>

day of ectobefr2000.

ames C. Haskins
Attorney for Defendant
Norman M. Larson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment
was served on the

"^"^

day of,Octt5ber, 2000, by mailing the same in U.S. Postal

Service postage paid envelopes addressed as follows.
Matthew L. Lalli, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Steve Russell, Esq.
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER P.C.
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, Utah 84532

i M4^
fhomas N. Thompson/
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James C. Haskins (#1406)
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 539-0234
Facsimile: (801)539-5210
Attorneys for Defendant Norman M. Larson
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., and DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT NORMAN
M. LARSON'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 9807-116

vs.
MARK E. ARNOLD, DUANE R. BARNEY,
PETER LANTO, ERIC A. RASMUSSEN,
GREGORY A. PAGE, and NORMAN
M. LARSON,
Defendants.

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The Plaintiffs were the owners of 8.33 acres of realty located adjacent to

North Highway 191 in Grand County, Utah. They operate a water park adjacent to this
property. (Complaint, ffij 5, 6,13.)
2.

In 1995, the Plaintiffs met with Duane Barney, who is not a defendant

herein, in Spanish Fork, Utah, to discuss a potential development project for a Holiday

Inn to be located in Moab, Utah. Mr. Barney was then running a Holiday Inn Express in
Spanish Fork. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo, p. 13-14, 21.)
3.

Mr. Barney advised Plaintiff Robert Norman that he had contacts, among

whom he named Greg Page, and said that he had put together a proposal to construct
another Holiday Inn in Spanish Fork, and that he could assist the Plaintiffs in doing the
same thing in Moab. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo, p. 14-15.)
4.

Greg Page is not a party herein.

5.

Subsequently, at a second meeting in Moab, Utah, Plaintiff Robert

Norman met with Duane Barney, Greg Page, and Peter Lanto, to discuss the
development proposal. Mr. Lanto was going to be the builder on the project. (Exhibit
G, Norman Depo, p. 16-18.)
6.

Peter Lanto is not a party herein.

7

Plaintiff Robert Norman made a series of cross-sections across the

property and provided those cross-sections to Mr. Lanto. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo, p.
18.)
8.

For reasons which Plaintiff Robert Norman did not comprehend, it was

Plaintiff Norman's understanding that Eric Rasmussen — Greg Page's brother in law —
would become a member of the venture in lieu of Greg Page. (Exhibit G, Norman
Depo, p. 18.)
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9

Eric Rasmussen is not a party herein

10

Greg Page proposed that the parties enter into an agreement for the

development of the Holiday Inn, prepared such an agreement, and submitted it to
Plaintiff Norman (Exhibit G, Norman Depo, p 19 )
11

Greg Page and Peter Lanto represented that they were affiliated with an

entity called 4-D Development (Exhibit G, Norman Depo p 22 )
12

4-D Development is not a party herein

13

The Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement ("the Joint

Venture Agreement") is dated March 15, 1995 The parties to the Joint Venture
Agreement were Plaintiff Robert R Norman, Sr, Plaintiff A Diane Norman, Duane R
Barney, Peter Lanto, and Eric A Rasmussen Pursuant to the Joint Venture
agreement, the Plaintiffs contributed the 8 33 acres of realty referred to m paragraph 1
above, to the joint venture (Exhibit A, Complaint, U 13 )
14

The Moab Land Development Joint Venture is not a party herein

15

The Joint Venture Agreement contains, inter alia, the following provisions
U.

Additional Joint Ventures

Additional Joint Venturers may be added to the Joint Venture at any time
upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint Venturers

3J_

Capital Contribution
Page 3

Each Joint Venturer shall made a contribution(s) to the Joint Ventrue in
cash, property or expertise. The percentage ownership for the Hotel
Development is shown in Schedule A, the percentage ownership for any
other projects utilizing the remaining land and artesian well is shown in
Schedule B. In the event additional capital is required to finance any
project development, the Administrative Agent has the right to sell a
portion of the development to secure the needed capital for such project
by an unanimous affirmative vote of the Joint Venturers.

4.1

Allocations

All profits and losses of the Joint Venture shall be allocated among the
Joint Venturers in accordance with their relative contributions as set forth
on Schedules 'A' and 'B' attached hereto.
8.6

Amendments

This Agreement may be amended in writing only. All amendments must
be approved by the Joint Ventures5 unanimous decision.
(Exhibit A.)
16.

The individuals who signed the Joint Venture Agreement represented all

of the members of the Joint Venture. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo., p. 27) Those
members did not include Defendant Norman M. Larson.
17.

Plaintiff Robert Norman never gave his consent to the addition of any joint

venturers other than the original joint venturers. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo. p. 28-29;
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18

At some point in the Spring of 1995, Plaintiff Robert Norman learned that

Defendant Larson would be involved in the financing of the project (Norman Deop pp
33 35)
19

As part of the financing for the transaction, the Plaintiffs executed a

deed of trust on the realty underlying the project in favor of Ann and Norman Young,
who loaned the venture $160,000 00 (Exhibit B )
20

A promissory note in the amount of $160,000 00, and secured by a deed

of trust on the realty underlying the project, was executed in favor of Ann and Norman
Young and signed by Plaintiff Robert R Norman, Plaintiff A Diane Norman, Duane R
Barney, Peter O Lanto, Gregory A Page, and Defendant Norman M Larson (Exhibit
C)
21

Plaintiff Robert R Norman did not read the deed of trust or the promissory

note referred to in paragraphs 19 and 20, above He was advised by Greg Page that
the purpose was to secure a franchise for the proposed Holiday Inn development,
which would cost $40,000 00 (Exhibit G, Norman Depo , pp 37-40 )
22

Plaintiff Robert Norman telephoned Ann Young, who told him that she

was interested in getting the motel project going and that she would work with them in
any way to achieve that goal Plaintiff Robert Norman concluded that Ms Young would
work with them in any way she could (Exhibit G, Norman Depo , pp 46-47 )
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23

In connection with the Plaintiffs' participation in the joint venture, Greg

Page was their principal contact (Exhibit G, Norman Depo , p 61-62, 75 )
24

On May 9, 1996, Defendant Larson, as President of Western Empire

Advisers, Inc ("WEA"), wrote to the Plaintiffs and proposed, inter alia, that his
company, WEA, "pay off the hen of $160,000 00 that presently exists on the land
designated for the motel," that WEA "provide the financing for the construction of the
motel and refinancing and improvements of [the Plaintiffs'] water park" and provide
other services related to the construction of the motel if WEA were permitted to "joint
venture the [Plaintiffs'] Waterpark and the development and construction of a 50 to 80
room motel to be located adjacent to the water park and on property presently owned
by Mr & Mrs Norman " The Plaintiffs did not respond to this proposal (Exhibit D,
Exhibit G, Norman Depo, pp 89-90 )
25

WEA is not a party herein

26

The Plaintiffs at no time had any agreements with Defendant Larson

(Exhibit G, Norman Depo, p 91 )
27

On or about June 27, 1995, Ann Young and Norman Young assigned to

James W Winkler their interest in the promissory note and trust deed referenced in
paragraphs 19 and 20, above (Exhibit E )
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28

On May 22, 1998, James W. Winkler purchased a substantial portion of

the property of the Plaintiffs referred to in paragraph 1, above. No appraisal of the
property was made at that time. (Exhibit G, Norman Depo., pp. 135-137; Exhibit F.)
29.

The total acreage purchased by James W. Winkler in the transaction

referred to in paragraph 28, above, was more than six but less than seven acres.
(Exhibit G, Norman Depo., p. 142-143.)
30.

Defendant Larson was asked by Duane Barney and Greg Page to seek

financing for the Holiday Inn Project. (Exhibit H, Larson Depo., p. 19.)
31.

Defendant Larson received a commitment from National Acceptance

Corporation to fund the project but it was never funded. The commitment was to
provide $8,000,000.00 with respect to the Holiday Inn Project, and another Holiday Inn
Express project in Park City (Jeremy Ranch). (Exhibit H, Larson Depo., p. 25.J1
32.

Defendants Larson and Arnold had traveled to Phoenix, Arizona, met with

representatives of National Acceptance Corporation and their attorneys, and paid
$50,000.00 to National Acceptance Corporation as a fee for the funding commitment.
(Exhibit H, Larson Depo., p. 27.)
33.

Defendant Larson was never a part of the Moab Land Development Joint

Venture. (Exhibit H, Larson Depo, p. 42, 59.)
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34.

Defendant Larson obtained the original franchise from Holiday Inn for the

project, but transferred it to the Joint Venture in 1996. (Exhibit H, Larson Depo, p. 42.)
35.

The promissory note referred to in paragraph 20, above, was signed by

the Defendant Larson after the note was originally entered into by the other parties at
the behest of Defendant Arnold. (Exhibit H, Larson Depo, p. 46.)
ARGUMENT
I.

THE FIF ,T CAUSE OF ACTION FAILS AS AGAINST DEFENDANT LARSON
BECAUSE HE WAS NOT AT ANY TIME A MEMBER OF THE JOINT VENTURE
AGREEMENT.
The First Amended Complaint asserts, as its First Cause of Action, that the

Defendants are in breach of a Joint Venture Agreement. Paragraph 7 of the First
Amended Complaint asserts that u[i]n 1995, the Normans were approached by the
Defendants with a proposal to develop a Holiday Inn Franchise on the subject
property." Paragraph 42 of the Amended Complaint asserts that "[a]t all relevant times,
the Membership of the Joint Venture consisted of the plaintiffs [Robert Norman and
Diane Norman], Duane Barney, Eric Rasmussen, Greg Page, Peter Lanto, Mark Arnold
and Norman Larson." It requires no citation of authority to demonstrate that an
individual who is not a member of the joint venture has no liability for any alleged
breach of the joint venture agreement.
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The only named defendants in this case are Arnold and Larson, and despite the
Plaintiffs' extensive discovery in this case, they have not come forward with a scintilla
of evidence suggesting that Larson was at any time a member of the joint venture.
Indeed, all of the available evidence is to the contrary. There can be no dispute that
Larson was not one of the original members of the joint venture, as he did not execute
the Agreement (Exhibit A.) Paragraph 1.7 of the Agreement provides that "[additional
Joint Venturers may be added to the Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of
the then existing Joint Venturers." Plaintiff Larson at no time consented to the addition
of any new members of the joint venture, and it was always his understanding that the
original members constituted the entire membership in the joint venture. (Norman
depo., 27-29; 98.)

That testimony is fully consistent with Defendant Larson's

testimony that he was not a member of the joint venture. (Larson Depo, p. 42, 59.)
Indeed, at one time, Larson proposed to the Plaintiff that Larson's company, Western
Empire Advisers, Inc., join with the Plaintiff in a joint venture project related to the real
estate development project, but the Plaintiff never accepted that proposal.

(Exhibit D;

Norman Depo, pp. 89-90.)
The leading case in Utah defining the elements essential to a joint venture is
Bassett v. Baker, 530 P.2d 1,2 (Utah 1974). There, the Court held that, to establish
the existence of a joint venture
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there must be a community of interest in the performance of the common
purpose, a joint proprietary interest in the subject matter, a mutual right to
control, a right to share in the profits, and unless there is an agreement to the
contrary, a duty to share in any losses which may be sustained.
Notably, as to Defendant Larson, none of these elements are even alleged in the
Amended Complaint. Nor could they be properly alleged, under the facts of this case
Larson's only involvement with the joint venture was to seek financing for the
construction of the project at the behest of Duane Barney and Greg Page. (Larson
Depo., p. 19.) He clearly had no "joint proprietary interest in the subject matter," no
"mutual right to control," no "right to share in the profits," and no "duty to share in any
losses which may be sustained." As a matter of law, therefore, he was not a member of
the joint venture and assumes no liability for any breach of the joint venture agreement.
The Plaintiffs, seeking recovery for an alleged breach of the joint venture
agreement, seek recovery against Larson, who was never a member of the joint
venture, but the Plaintiffs have failed to bring this action against any of the persons who
were among the original members of the joint venture. This is simply inexplicable. To
whatever extent the Plaintiffs believe they may have a cause of action for breach of the
joint venture agreement, any such cause of action necessarily runs against those who
were members of the joint venture. Defendant Larson was simply not a such a
member, nor is there any evidence in the record from which it can properly be
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concluded that the Plaintiffs were "approached by55 Larson in 1995 with a proposal to
develop the Holiday Inn property (Complaint, fl 7 )
Finally, the Plaintiffs' theory that there was a breach of the joint venture
agreement is fraught with other difficulties the Plaintiffs simply choose to ignore It is
clear that any such breach would create obligations belonging to the joint venture,
which in law is treated as a partnership, Salt Lake Knee & Sports Rehabilitation, Inc v
Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P 2d 266, 269 (Utah Ct App 1995), and
not to the Plaintiffs individually

It is hornbook law that partnership debts and

obligations must be satisfied by partnership assets to the extent any exist before any
creditor can seek satisfaction from individual assets McCune & McCune v Mountain
Bell Telephone, 758 P 2d 914 (Utah 1988) While the Plaintiffs have failed to set forth
any accounting of the partnership assets, it is very clear that at least one of those
assets was the property they themselves contributed

In some unexplained fashion,

that property was ultimately sold by the plaintiffs to a third party, evidently without
obtaining any approval from the other members of the joint venture, let alone from
Defendant Larson Traditional concepts of partnership law would demand that the
obligation, if any, resulting from a breach of the joint venture agreement be satisfied
from the Plaintiffs' own property first. Then, if the property is insufficient to make the
Plaintiffs' whole, they would be in a position to seek contribution from the other
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individual members of the joint venture. Because Defendant Larson was not such a
member, however, they would not, as a matter of law, be able to seek any such
contribution from him.
The Court may grant a Motion for Summary Judgment whenever there are no
genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 56(c); Conder v. Hunt, 1 P.3d 558, 561 (Utah Ct.
App. 2000). That is a standard Defendant Larson has amply met in this case. Indeed,
where, as here, reasonable minds would agree that no substantial evidence supports
each element of the cause of action, the Court may direct a verdict in favor of the
Defendant. Fibro Trust, Inc. v. Brahman Financial, Inc., 974 P.2d 288 (Utah 1999).
II. THE DEFENDANT LARSON IS NOT LIABLE TO THE PLAINTIFFS FOR ANY
ALLEGED DEFAULT OF THE TRUST DEED NOTE BECAUSE THERE WAS NO
SUCH DEFAULT AND, IN ANY EVENT, SUCH LIABILITY AS DEFENDANT HAD
WOULD BE SHARED AMONG THE OTHER SIGNERS OF THE NOTE, INCLUDING
THE PLAINTIFFS.
In their Second Cause of Action, the Plaintiffs assert that they somehow sold the
property which had previously been contributed to the joint venture, that the buyer was
the successor-in-interest on the promissory note executed by Defendant Larson and
the members of the joint venture, and that the purchase price of the property was
"reduced by over $200,000 that was then owing on the Note." They seek damages of
"not less than" that amount.
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First, the promissory note is drawn, not in favor of the Plaintiffs, but in favor of
Ann Young and Norman Young (Exhibit C ) The Plaintiffs have not asserted that they
were third party beneficiaries under that note or otherwise had any interest in it
Rather, they allege that they were damaged through an alleged reduction in the sales
price of their property by the amount of the note The Defendant Larson simply had
nothing to do with the sale transaction and it is wholly unclear how any reduction in the
purchase price of the property is somehow attributable to him and him alone Further
beyond the Plaintiffs' bare allegations, there is simply no evidence in the record
reflecting that any default on the promissory note ever occurred Nor is there any
evidence that the purchase price of the subject property was reduced by the amount of
the promissory note Those allegations of the First Amended Complaint remains mere
speculation
Furthermore, the Plaintiffs have not demonstrated their damages, if any, with
respect to the note Since Defendant Larson is only one of five obligors on the note
(the others were Duane R Barney, Peter 0 Lanto, Gregory A Page, and the Plaintiffs
themselves), any damages attributable to a default would necessarily have to be
apportioned among the obligors on the note, including the Plaintiffs The Plaintiffs
advance no theory concerning how such an apportionment should be accomplished
Since the Plaintiffs' claim does not rest on contract law, it must sound in tort, and the
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concept of joint and several liability has been abolished in Utah. Sullivan v. Secular
Grain Co., 853 P.2d 877, 880 (1993). Thus, the Plaintiffs' second cause of action must
also fail because they have neglected to join indispensable parties, i.e., the other
obligors on the note, whose negligence, if any, must be compared with Defendant
Larson's before any conclusion regarding damages can properly be reached.
Additionally, because the cause of action belongs, not just to the Plaintiffs, but to the
other members of the joint venture, the allocation of damages becomes somewhat
circular, with the members of the joint venture essentially suing themselves.
Most significantly, the Plaintiffs have failed to identify any duty — sounding in
contract, in tort, or on any other basis — owed by Defendant Larson to the Plaintiffs
sufficient to hold him liable for their losses on the sale of their property. Defendant was
never a member of the joint venture; Defendant did not have any separate contractual
arrangement with the Plaintiffs; and the Defendant did not participate in the
negotiations leading up to the sale of the property or the sale itself. Furthermore, on
the limited occasions when the Defendant Larson communicated with the Plaintiffs at
all, he did so in the name of his corporation, Western Empire Advisers, Inc. ("WEA"),
and not as an individual. (Exhibit D.) Yet the Plaintiffs have failed to join WEA as a
party herein. Under these circumstances, the Plaintiffs' cause of action is fatally
flawed: baldly stated, they have utterly failed to come forward with any cognizable legal

Page 14

theory properly asserting liability against the Defendant Larson for their alleged losses.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted by the Court.
DATED this j l J

day of November, 2000.

•

;

£2 /C^^U^-

James C. Haskins
Attorney for Defendant Larson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Motion for Summary Judgment was served
on the;_=2_±L_ day of November, 2000, by mailing the same in U S Postal Service
postage paid envelopes as follows:
Steve Russell, Esq.
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC.
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, Utah 84532
Matthew L. Lalli, Esq.
SNELL&WILMER
15 South West Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

ihomas N. Thbmpsorj
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Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
729 Bartlett Circle
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,
Response to Larson Motion For
Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 9807-116
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson,
Judge Anderson
Defendants.

Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, hereby respond to defendant Norman Larson's Motion
for Summary Judgment.

Response to Defendant's Statement of Facts
1.

Paragraphs 1, 3, 5, 7, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19, 21, 24, 28, 32 are admitted

2.

Regarding paragraph 2, Duane Barney was originally named as a defendant and

served with the Summons and Complaint. Plaintiffs did not actively pursue their claims against
Barney because he thereafter filed for bankruptcy protection.
3.

Regarding paragraph 4, Greg Page was originally named as a defendant but was

not served because the plaintiffs learned his financial obligation regarding the failed joint venture
had been discharged in bankruptcy.
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4.

Regarding paragraph 6, Peter Lanto was originally named as a defendant, but was

not served. Plaintiffs intend to file a separate action against Mr. Lanto prior to March 15, 2001.
5.

Paragraph 8 is denied. Eric Rasmussen provided a biography as a member of the

joint venture and signed the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement dated March 15,
1995. The plaintiffs did not actively pursue claims against Rasmussen initially because they
were told by Greg Page that Rasmussen (Page's brother-in-law) was a "straw man" designated to
hide Page's involvement in the joint venture because he (Page) was then in the middle of a
divorce action. Plaintiffs intend to file a separate action against Mr. Rasmussen prior to March
15,2001.
6.

Regarding paragraph 9, see explanation above.

7.

Paragraph 10 is denied. Plaintiffs are unsure of whom, if anyone, proposed that

the parties enter a joint venture agreement. It is plaintiffs' information and belief that the Moab
Land Development Joint Venture Agreement dated March 15, was prepared by defendant
Arnold.
8.

Paragraph 10 is admitted with the qualification that 4-D Development also

included Duane Barney.
9.

Regarding paragraph 15, the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement

speaks for itself and should be considered, if at all, only as a complete document.
10.

Paragraph 16 is denied. Specifically, though the agreement was signed by Eric

Rasmussen, the plaintiffs were told and believed that Greg Page was the actual member of the
joint venture. With regard to Norman Larson, the plaintiffs were unaware that he had executed
on behalf of Western Empire Advisors, Inc. (WEA), a Service Agreement that provided him with
a potential equity interest in the project, that Norman Larson had been given exclusive
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possession and control of joint venture funds, and that Larson was holding himself out to the
public as a member of the joint venture See also, the Affidavit of Robert Norman
11

Regarding paragraph 17, it is true that Robert Norman never expressly consented

to the addition of joint venturers for the simple reason that he was never consulted or asked
Defendants Arnold and Larson nevertheless became involved in the joint venture and held
themselves out to third parties as members of the joint venture When the plaintiffs learned of
the involvement of Arnold and Larson in the joint venture they acquiesced and thereafter acted in
reliance on the information and belief that Arnold and Larson were members of the joint venture
See also, the Affidavit of Robert Norman
12

Regarding paragraph 20, the promissory note that the plaintiffs signed was in the

amount of $40,000

The note was subsequently altered to the amount of $160,000

The

remaining portions of the paragraph are correct
13

The facts in Paragraph 22 are correct, however, the content is far out of context

Robert Norman's discussion with Ann Young occurred long after the commencement of the joint
venture and execution of the Trust Deed and Note Mr Norman took a great deal of trouble to
find Ann Young after Mark Arnold, acting as counsel, refused to divulge any information about
her (Young was also Arnold's client), or provide the Normans with any information on the status
of payments on and requested extensions of the promissory note
14

Regarding paragraph 23, it is correct that Greg Page was initially the Normans

principal contact regarding the joint venture

However, beginning in August or September,

1995, Greg Page began to systematically and intentionally ignore and avoid the Normans.
Thereafter, the Normans relied pnmanly on Mark Arnold for information, whom they
understood to be counsel for the joint venture

}
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Regarding paragraph 25 it is true that WEA was not named as a party Norman

Larson is the president and principal shareholder of WEA

It is plaintiffs' contention that

defendant Larson and WEA are indistinguishable and that WEA should not be considered a
separate legal entity from defendant Larson

(Larson, for example, held the Holiday Inn

Franchise that was vital to the project individually, and indicated to third parties that he was
personally an equity partner in the project)
16

Paragraph 26 is denied

The statement is too vague foi a specific response

Further, when Diane Norman and Robert Norman, Jr met with defendant Larson in his office on
May 1, 1996, Larson personally promised and agreed that he would pay off the Young note
whether or not the joint venture project was successful
17

Paragraph 27 is denied J'm Winkler was assigned the Trust Deed and Note on or

about August 21,1996 See, Defendant ys Exhibit E
18

Paragraph 29 is denied

Mr Wiunkler purchased just slightly over 7 acres of

plaintiffs' property
19

Regarding paragraph 30, plaintiffs are unaware of who contacted defendant

Larson to seek funding

The Service Agreement dated April 28, 1995 for that purpose was

executed by Norman Larson on behalf of WEA and by Greg Page on behalf of 4-D
Development
20

Paragraph 31 is denied

Though defendant has documents purporting to show

such a commitment, it is clear that defendant Larson was either duped by National Acceptance
Corp, and negligently provided that entity $50,000 in joint venture funds that was never
recovered, or that Larson negligently failed to complete the requirements to secure the funds on
behalf of the joint venture
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21.

Paragraph 33 is denied. Moreover, based on his conduct, representations to third

parties, and documents previously provided to the Court, defendant Larson should be estopped
from denying that he was part of the joint venture.
22.

Regarding paragraph 34, it is true that defendant Larson acquired held the

Holiday Inn Franchise for Moab in March, 1995, and continued to hold it individually until 1996.
At that time he was forced to transfer the Franchise because he had spent the entire $160,000 of
joint venture funds without securing funding for the project. Defendant Larson did not transfer
the franchise to the joint venture, but rather to Greg Page and Duane Barney.
23.

Regarding paragraph 35, plaintiffs are unaware of the order that signatures were

obtained on the promissory note. However, Larson became personally liable on the note at the
request of its maker Ann Young. Plaintiffs assert on information and belief that Larson's
obligation on the note was negotiated and obtained considerably in advance of June 27, 1995
when the plaintiffs signed the note for $40,000.

Plaintiffs' Additional Facts

The following are additional facts relevant to defendant Larson's Motion for Summary
Judgment:
1.

Plaintiffs' additional facts are set forth in the Affidavit of Robert Norman,

attached hereto and incorporated by reference.

5

Argument
I.
Norman Larson was a Member of a Joint Venture Separate From the
Moab Land Development Joint Venture That Also Included the Plaintiffs.
Defendant Larson's Conduct Resulted in Losses That Were Incurred Solely
and Completely by the Plaintiffs.
It is undisputed that Norman Larson, or his alter ego Western Empire Advisors, Inc.
obtained primary control of $160,000 secured by property owned by the plaintiffs.

It is

undisputed that those funds were supposed to be used to further the development of a Holiday
Inn in Moab, Utah on land owned by the plaintiffs. It is undisputed that those funds were fully
expended by defendant Larson with no beneficial effect, and that the plaintiffs solely absorbed a
loss in excess of $200,000. Defendant Larson now asks the Court to excuse his conduct and
release him from liability on the ground that he was not formally a member of a joint venture, the
terms of which he violated and ignored, and the existence of which he arguably destroyed.
The Court should not turn a blind eye to defendant Larson's clear responsibility for
plaintiffs' losses. Principles of equity and estoppel require that the Court deny Larson's Motion
for Summary Judgment and have his conduct considered by a jury.
On March 15, 1995, the plaintiffs executed the Moab Land Development Joint Venture
Agreement. (MLDJV) On April 28, 1995, defendant Larson executed a "Service Agreement"
on behalf of his alter ego Western Empire Advisors, Inc. (WEA), to provide financing for the
MLDJV project in Moab and another Holiday Inn project in Park City. Fni
I Plaintiffs have previously asserted that Larson and WEA are one and the same, that no
corporate veil even exists that needs to be pierced. This assertion has not been controverted.
Moreover, the inclusion or substitution of WEA as a party defendant would cause absolutely no
prejudice to defendant Larson. The relevant facts are all exactly the same. In fact, all of the
conduct attributable to WEA is attributable to Norman Larson, personally. The plaintiffs
requested leave to add WEA as a party defendant, which Motion was denied without an adequate
factual or legal basis. Further references to Larson and WEA herein are intended to be
interchangeable and applicable to both.
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Defendant Larson was aware, or should have been aware that this Service Agreement
which directly contrary to the provisions of the MLDJV Agreement, and would in effect, result
in its dissolution. It is undisputed that on October 27, 1995, Mark Arnold, acting as counsel for
the MLDJV, and who was also counsel for Larson, executed a Agreement wherein Arnold and
WEA purchased any and all interest of Peter Lanto in the two Holiday Inn projects referred to
above. It is undisputed that Peter Lanto was a member of the MLDJV. In fact, he was a vital
member. Lanto was to be the builder for the project. Pursuant to the Purchase Agreement,
Arnold and WEA agreed to indemnify Lanto against any claims arising from the projects,
including tort claims, and specifically including liability for the $160,000 loan which had come
under the sole control of Arnold and Larson. Defendant Larson was aware, or should have been
aware that his control of the $160,000 loan funds was directly contrary to the provisions of the
MLDJV Agreement, and would in effect, result in its dissolution.
In fact, as set forth in the Affidavit of Robert Normanfl[9),defendant Larson acted in all
important respects as though the MLDJV did not exist. (Fn2)

Fn2 Defendants take the intellectually incoherent position that, simply because they did not
attempt to obtain the express consent of the Normans to become Members of and, in fact, control
the joint venture, that they cannot be liable for what plaintiffs have termed a "breach of the jount
venture agreement." Defendants Larson and Arnold were fully aware of the MLDJV and its
terms. By their own admission, the defendants werefinancialand legal professionals supposedly
acting on behalf of the joint venture. The plaintiffs have ample evidence, most of it undisputed
that defendants Larson/WEA and Arnold destroyed the joint venture and completely wasted its
assets. Yet they cannot be held liable for its breach - as a matter of law? Somewhere in that
argument there occurs a short circuit in the flow of reason and logic.
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In any event, it cannot be legitimately disputed that the Arnold/WEA buy-out of Lanto's
interest resulted in the dissolution of the MLDJV. Further, on the same day and also known to
Larson, Greg Page formally dissolved 4-D Development Corporation, the entity that had
contracted the Service Agreement with WEA. These undisputed facts were intentionally kept
secret from the plaintiffs.
Despite these facts, it is undisputed that defendant Larson maintained full control of the
funds necessary for the Moab joint venture, and his efforts to fund and complete the project
continued long after October 27, 1995. In what capacity did Larson continue to maintain full
control of the loan funds if not a participant, his Service Agreement having necessarily expired
with the dissolution of 4-D Development? Clearly, a different joint venture which is nothing
more than "an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a single business
enterprise" existed and was operating with Larson/WEA as an integral member. The undisputed
proof of Larson's membership in the continuing venture is supplied in his own letter to funding
source Trust Guarantee Corp., dated November 3, 1995:
Enclosed are the basic plans and rendering for the Moab Holiday Express. Mark Arnold,
the attorney, and myself will come to Phoenix with a check when you can confirm a closing date
for this project and the purchase of the land in Park City. We are very anxious to proceed sine
we own an equity position in both projects and / have the Holiday Express Franchise.
Referring to the legal definition of a joint venture: "an association of two or more
persons" (yes); "to carry on as co-owners" (so says defendant Larson); "of a single business
enterprise" (definitely). To argue that no question of fact exists for a jury to determine that
Larson was a member of the new joint venture or caused the destruction of (breached) the
MLDJV, is the equivalent of maintaining an unqualified belief that the earth is flat.
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It would be unconscionable for the Court to grant Larson/WEA Summary Judgment
under these circumstances. If one seeks to take comfort in a strict construction of the law, (i.e.,
affirmative consent of all involved as a prerequisite to becoming a member of a joint venture),
that party should be first required to show that he played by the rules.

It would be

unconscionable to rule that the Normans' failure to provide such consent precludes a claim
against Larson when his conduct intentionally kept the facts of his involvement from the
Normans. One principal of our legal system which should be sacrosanct is that a party will not
be allowed to benefit from his own misdeeds. In this case, plaintiffs have presented evidence as
yet uncontroverted, that Larson misappropriated and misused funds that, pursuant to the MLDJV
agreement, he had no business possessing in the first place.
Defendant Larson has termed himself a hired professional. Surely he had fiduciary duties
to someone. It is unconscionable to limit those duties to the MLDJV that he ignored and helped
destroy. Larson knew perfectly well that Robert and Diane Norman, individually, would be the
ones to suffer if the Moab Holiday Inn Venture failed. With regard to the other supposed
Members of the MLDJV:
a.

Larson knew its administrative agent Duane Barney was doing nothing, was in

fact in prison and that he, Larson, was actually acting in the capacity of administrative agent for
the MLDJV;
b.

Larson knew that he had also assumed the role of Greg Page as person in charge

of obtaining funding for the venture;
c.

Larson knew that Eric Rasmussen was a straw man;

d.

Larson knew that he and attorney Arnold had bought out the interest of Peter

Lanto, the builder for the project;
e.

Larson knew that 4-D Development, the organization that had hired him and was

tofinance,build and manage the Moab Holiday Inn, was dissolved.
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funds associated with the Moab venture, continued his attempts to fund the venture nnd publicly
proclaimed his membership and ownership interest in the venture. After October 27, 1995,
Larson was not only a member of a joint venture to develop a Holiday Inn in Moab that also
included the plaintiffs, he was clearly the most important member. For this reason Larson should
be estopped from denying his involvement in the joint venture or objecting to evidence regarding
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Normans), most definitely not the MLDJV, formally called upon Larson, as a fellow partner, to
pay back the $178,000 of joint venture funds that had been entrusted to him and lost

A

subsequent letter dated June 18, 1996 states unambiguously that Arnold and Larson are partners
in the venture See, copies of letter attached And clearly, having been called into account for
his conduct, Larson's May 9, 1996 joint venture proposal to the Normans {Def. Exh. D)
highlights several important factors:
a.

Larson had been the most important member of the Moab Holiday Inn venture

He at least thought he could arrange financing, construction and management if only someone
was willing to hand him enough land and equity to construct a psuedo impression of power and
responsibility,
b.

Larson knew perfectly well who had been harmed by his conduct and who would

individually incur the loss Note that his proposal is offered solely to the Normans, not the joint
venture or any of its members Obviously, Larson could not even think of making such an offer
unless he believed that the MLDJV and subsequent unnamed ventures were defunct, or, more
probably, illusory.
These facts are not disputed
10

Defendant Larson's Motion can only be described as an attempt to use the legal process
to perpetuate a wrong. It should not be allowed. The bottom line is this: Robert and Diane
Norman executed the Moab Land Development Joint Venture in the good faith belief that the
others involved would abide by its terms and act in their mutual best interests. That did not
happen. Instead, the members had other and conflicting interests, and brought in individuals
(Arnold and Larson), whose primary goal was to enrich themselves within the context of the
MLDJV. The terms of the MLDJV were never followed. Another venture evolved with a
purpose of trying to develop the Moab Holiday Inn. This subsequent venture included Larson
and Arnold who had become members secretly and dishonestly. It cannot be disputed however,
that the business of the venture continued and was thereafter controlled by Larson and Arnold.
If the defendants' conduct causes the plaintiffs' claims to fail outside the neat confines of
straight-forward claims and established legal theories of recovery, the defendants should be
prohibited from seeking protection within such theories. Defendant Larson purposefully entered
and pursued a business opportunity including the plaintiffs. Larson felt perfectly comfortable
using the Normans' contribution to the venture and funds secured by their land, in the hope of
obtaining very substantial personal benefit. Larson knew perfectly well that the failure of his
efforts would fall squarely and solely on the plaintiffs. This Court should allow the plaintiffs to
present their case, based on the actual facts.
This Court should require the defendant to try to prove to a jury that he was not
purposefully involved in a joint venture to develop a Holiday Inn in Moab. Defendant Larson
should be the one required to appeal a fair and common sense ruling that people have to accept
the consequences of their own conduct because the law will not provide that shield for them.

11

FL
Defendant Larson Should Be Held Proportionately
Responsible For the Trust Deed Note as a xMatter of Law.
Defendant Larson's argument regarding liability under the note underscores the legal and
logical absurdity of his entire effort to avoid responsibility. If the law can be bent so cynically to
such a position that no reasonable person could accept, then for honest people like the Normans
who get taken by "hired professionals," the legal system has no value.
Norman Larson signed the promissory note as an obligor. The testimony is undisputed
that the Youngs demanded his signature on the note because he had apparently fooled them into
believing he was reputable and had the financial means to back the note. Under Larson's logic,,
the Normans would have been forced to wait, with 18% interest continuing to accumulate, until
the Youngs or Winkler chose to foreclose, and then go through the time, expense and reduced
return of a foreclosure sale, before seeking proportionate contribution from him. A creditor with
less ethics and compassion than Mr. Winkler could simply have waited until the accrued interest
was greater than the value of the Normans property and then taken it free and clear. Surely the
law does not require the Normans to be placed in such a helpless and untenable position.
Larson complains that the Normans have not sued Page, Barney and Lanto for their
liability under the note, knowing perfectly well why the plaintiffs have not pursued those claims,
and also having failed to exercise his own right to assert cross-claims against them.

The

plaintiffs, for their part, have lost enough without violating Rule 11 by suing Page and Barney
who slunk away to the deadbeats' reprieve of Bankruptcy, and Lanto, whose interest and
responsibility was purchased by the present defendants. Why require the slight of hand of suing
Lanto who was smart enough to get out of the mess, in order to get at the parties who willingly
assumed his responsibility? It would be a huge w'aste of time, expense and judicial resources.
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The Normans were forced to sell their property at a loss because they were first taken
advantage of and then abandoned by these defendants. To then come into this Court and ask to
be excused as a matter of law is an intolerable perversion of the concepts of justice and fairness.
This Court has stated on several occasions that the least the plaintiffs should be entitled to is a
proportionate recovery from the co-obligors under the note.
There should be absolutely no question about this. If we are to dispose of all aspects of
this case as a matter of law, the only fair and reasonable decision the Court can make with
regard to the note is that Norman Larson is liable for 175th of the loss incurred by the Normans by
retiring the note ($42,400) as a matter of law. Nor should it require a jury to decide whether
Larson/WEA is liable for the proportion of Lanto's share of the note which he expressly
purchased and assumed. So, for reasons stated above, Larson /WEA, should also be tagged for
50% of the Lanto interest ($21,200) as a matter of law.
Perhaps it should be for a jury to determine which parties should bear the loss of the
bankrupt obligors, but the plaintiffs would be willing to accept a ruling, as a matter of law, that
the bankrupt shares should be split equally as per partnership law, and the loss apportioned:
Robert & Diane Norman (1/3*)

$70,666.67

Norman Larson {113rd + 1/2 of 1/3) $106,000.00
Mark Arnold (1/2 of 1/3)

$35,333.35

Such a ruling would wrap up the plaintiffs' promissory note claim fairly and equitably in
an appealable package that at least apportions the risk of loss in a manner the parties might have
expected and/or deserve. Unless the Court properly assigns this defendant some of his quite well
deserved risk of loss, it is likely we will have to endure more arguments like - just because I
signed that promissory note doesn V mean I %m liable for it - as this case continues.
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Conclusion
Defendant Larson's Motion for Summary Judgment should be Denied- Instead the Court
should rule that, based on his own conduct, defendant Larson is estopped from denying that he
was a member of a joint venture with the plaintiffs, the purpose of which was to develop a
Holiday Inn on property owned by the plaintiffs. The Court should further rule that WEA be
held responsible as a party defendant both because it is the alter ego of Norman Larson, and
because its inclusion would result in absolutely no prejudice to either party.
Dated this

day of /)'r?> //>?^€<L

2000.

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that on the/5 day of Iv'Ji/frnotjC , 2000, a true and correct copy of
the foregoing Response to Larson Motion for Summary Judgment was mailed, postage
prepaid to:
James C. Haskins
Attorney for Norman Larson
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Matthew Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT NORMAN
State of Utah )
) ss.
Grand County)
Robert Norman, being first duly sworn deposes and states that:
1.
I am a plaintiff in the action Norman v. Arnold, et al, Case No. 9807116, pending in the Seventh District Court for Grand County.
2.
I am over 21 years of age and make this Affidavit based upon
personal knowledge.
3.
On or about March 15, 1995,1 executed a document entitled the Moab
Land Development Joint Venture Agreement (MLDJV), in conjunction with a plan
to develop a Holiday Inn on property I owned.
4.
The MLDJV Agreement was also signed by my wife, Duane Barney
(Administrative Agent), Eric Rasmussen and Peter Lanto (Contractor/Builder).
5.
My wife Diane and I were to be considered as one party for all intents
and purposes concerning the joint venture. We had no separate interests.
6.
Prior to the execution of the agreement I had dealt with Greg Page. I
had never met and knew nothing about Eric Rasmussen. When I inquired about
him, Greg Page explained that Eric Rasmussen was his brother-in-law, and that
Page had Rasmussen sign the agreement in order to hide his interest in the project
from his wife who had or was expected to file for divorce.
7.
Greg Page stated that he was the real member of the joint venture and
would be responsible to obtain financing. I accepted that and thereafter considered
and treated him as a Member of the joint venture.
8.
In April of 1995, I first met Norman Larson and Mark Arnold at my
home. I was told that Mark Arnold was an attorney who would represent the joint
venture or "group." I learned that Norman Larson had some expertise in financial
matters, though his participation in the joint venture was not made clear.

9.
To my knowledge the provisions of the Moab Land Development
Joint Venture Agreement were never followed, and were in many respects
disregarded and/or violated. For example:
§1.2 Purpose provides that the sole purpose of the joint venture was to
develop investments on my property. Unknown to me, the other partners were also
attempting to develop a Holiday Inn in Park City of which I had no knowledge or
interest.
§1,6 Term establishes that the Moab Land Development joint venture,
if it ever existed, terminated not later than March 15, 1996. As a practical matter,
evidence uncovered in the course of this litigation establishes that the Moab Land
Development joint venture, terminated on October 27, 1995, with ArnoldAVEA buyout of Peter Lanto, the dissolution of 4-D Development, and the return to prison at or
about ;at time of Administrative Agent Duane Barney. Also, the "LLC to be
formed' as set forth in §1.5,1.6 and 7.1 was never formed.
§2.1 Appointment of Administrative Agent provided that Duane
Barney would act as administrative agent for the joint venture. To my knowledge,
Mr. Barney never acted in that or any other capacity, and in fact, unknown to me at
the time, spent most of the period relevant to this case in federal prison.
§2.2 Duties and Powers of Administrative Agent provides that
Duane Barney shall manage the assets and invest the funds of the joint venture.
Discovery in this litigation has disclosed that defendant Norman Larson had sole
control of the assets of the joint venture and in turn relied on defendant Mark Arnold
for approval of all joint venture expenditures.
§2.3 Compensation of Administrative Agent provides that the
administrative agent shall not receive any fees. Discovery in this litigation revealed
that Mark Arnold and Norman Larson, acting in the capacity of administrative agent,
as one of their first acts, paid themselves $8,000 each in fees for securing the
$160,000 Young loan.
§5.1 Selection provides that funds of the joint venture will be used
only for investments approved by an affirmative and unanimous vote of the joint
venturers. Unknown to me, the other partners were also attempting to develop a
Holiday Inn in Park City of which I had no knowledge or interest, and used joint
venture funds for that purpose.

§8.1 Bank Accounts provides that a bank account shall be opened in
the name of the joint venture and any checks therefrom signed by the administrative
agent. In fact, no joint venture account was opened. Instead, the joint venture funds
were deposited in an account under the sole control and check signing authority of
Norman Larson.
§8.4 Entire Agreement provides that the MLDJV agreement embodies
the entire agreement among the parties with respect to the joint venture.
10. If I had known or been informed of these violations of the joint venture
agreement and the truth of what had been done with the Young Loan proceeds, I
would have immediately terminated my involvement with the joint venture.
11. Based upon my knowledge and information, much of which was only
disclosed in the course of this litigation, the joint venture that unsuccessfully
attempted to develop a Holiday Inn on my property in 1995-1996 was not the Moab
Land Development Joint Venture, but rather a different, unnamed joint venture or
other entity operating on completely different terms than as set forth in the MLDJV
Agreement.
12. It is my information and belief that Norman Larson was a member of
that different joint venture, based on the following:
a.
The initial meeting with Norman Larson at my home where I
understood he had been consulted in some fashion regarding financing for the Moab
Holiday Inn project.
b.
Norman Larson's involvement was substantiated to my
satisfaction when his name appeared as a co-obligor on the promissory note secured
by my property that was the sole asset of the joint venture. This occurred in early
July, 1995.
c.
My subsequent knowledge that Norman Larson was solely
responsible for obtaining financing for the Moab Holiday Inn project and would be
entitled to a 25% equity interest in the project.
d.
On or about April 10, 1996, I received a letter written by Greg
Page identifying the partners of the then existing joint venture as (the Normans),
Greg Page, Duane Barney, Mark Arnold and Norman Larson.

e.
My belief that Norman Larson was a member of the joint venture
attempting to develop a Holiday Inn on my property has been completely
substantiated by documents obtained during the course of this litigation wherein he
and others expressly state that he is a partner.
13. I was never asked to approve or object to the extensive participation of
Norman Larson in the Moab Holiday Inn project. In fact, I acquiesced, and at no
time did I object to Norman Larson's involvement as a partner in the project. In fact,
I took it as a positive development having been given to understand that Norman
Larson had considerable expertise in obtaining financing for large projects.
14. It is my information and belief that Mark Arnold was a member of that
different joint venture, based on the following:
a.
It was my understanding from the start that Mark Arnold was
counsel for the joint venture.
b.
In December, 1995, I had a conversation with Peter Lanto
regarding some drawings I had previously provided. At that time, Mr. Lanto
informed me that Mark Arnold had purchased his interest in the joint venture.
c.
On or about April 10, 1996, I received a letter written by Greg
Page identifying the partners of the then existing joint venture as (the Normans),
Greg Page, Duane Barney, Mark Arnold and Norman Larson.
d.
On May 1, 1996 in a meeting in his office, Mark Arnold
personally and expressly confirmed to my wife and son that he had purchased an
interest in the joint venture and had been a member since October 27, 1995.
e.
My belief that Mark Arnold was counsel for and a member of the
joint venture attempting to develop a Holiday Inn on my property has been
completely substantiated by documents obtained during the course of this litigation
wherein he and others expressly state that he is a partner.

15. I was never asked to approve or object to the extensive
participation of Mark Arnold in the Moab Holiday Inn project. In fact, I
acquiesced, and at no time did I object to Mark Arnold's involvement as a partner
in the project. In fact, I thought at the time it would be a very good thing to have
an attorney as a partner,
believing he would bring valuable expertise to the venture and act in its best
interests.
16. At no time did my wife and I formally transfer our property to the
Moab Land Development Joint Venture or any other entity.
17. Since the 18%, $160,000 Young loan was secured by my property, I
was very concerned regarding the progress of efforts to obtain project financing
and other matters.

18. I depended initially upon Greg Page, and then beginning about
September, 1995, on Mark Arnold for information about the project.
19. Both Page and Arnold actively ignored and/or avoided me. In the
course of this litigation, I have discovered that much of the information that was
provided by Page and Arnold was false.
20. I was extremely concerned that my property would be foreclosed and
had Mark Arnold negotiate extensions of the Young note on at least two occasions.
21. In March, 1996, there was a fire at my waterpark adjacent to the
proposed Holiday Inn Development. I desperately needed some short term funds for
expenses to open the Park and requested that some of the funds from the Young loan
be provided for that purpose.
22. On or about April 10, 1996, I received the attached letter from Greg
Page and learned that Norman Larson had been in complete control of the Young
loan funds and had been assigned the responsibility to obtain financing for the
project.
23. On or about May 1, 1996,1 learned that all of the loan funds had been
expended without beneficial effect.
24. On May 1, 1996, Mark Arnold as attorney for and member of the joint
venture promised that he would recover the $50,000 that had been sent to Arizona for
a financing commitment.
25. To my knowledge, Mark Arnold subsequently did nothing to recover
those funds.
26. On May 1, 1996, Norman Larson promised and agreed that he would
personally see to it that the Young loan was fully repaid, regardless of whether he
obtained financing for the Moab Holiday Inn project.
27.

Norman Larson has never paid anything toward the Young loan.

28. On or about May 9, 1996, I received the joint venture proposal from
Norman Larson referred to in Fact #24 of his Motion for Summary Judgment. The
proposal was ridiculous, requiring me to contribute all of the land and equity in my
waterpark to Larson and unidentified "affiliates" for a l/3rd interest, on the chance
that Norman Larson would obtain financing for a larger project. The proposal
contained absolutely no risk for Norman Larson nor any valuable consideration to be
contributed by him. Given our experience with Mr. Larson to that point, I considered
the proposal a very poor joke.
29. By mid-summer, 1996, I had been completely abandoned by my
"partners" Larson, Page and Barney. The 18% Young loan remained outstanding
with no reasonable prospect of any development on my property. Mark Arnold
informed me that the Youngs intended to foreclose on the promissory note, and
that he had negotiated an assignment of the note to another client, Jim Winkler.

30. Mark Arnold had the Holiday Inn Franchise transferred to Jim Winkler
without discussing or offering it to me, and then completely abandoned the project.
31. At no time did any person or entity involved with the joint venture
(Norman Larson, Western Empire Advisors, Mark Arnold, Greg Page, Duane
Barney, Peter Lanto or Eric Rasmussen) provide or offer any assistance in paying off
the Young loan, and my wife and I were unable to do so ourselves.
32. I knew that Jim Winkler, at his option, could either foreclose or
continue to let interest accumulate until I would owe him everything I owned.
33. Under these circumstances, I had no option other than to try to persuade
Mr. Winkler to purchase my property.
34. I had previously done land sales comparisons on nearby properties and
estimated the value of my property to be approximately $100,000 per acre. The
ability to control the development of that land, situated immediately adjacent to my
existing waterpark, made the property worth that much to me or more.
35. In May, 1998, Mr. Winkler purchased 7 acres, more or less, for
$420,000. (Approximately $60,000 per acre) From that price he deducted the
outstanding balance of $212,000 from the original June, 1995 Young loan. I
absorbed the entire loss without assistance or contribution.
36. This loss deprived me of my property and the ability to control the
development of the land adjacent to my existing business. In addition, it resulted
in extreme financial hardship on myself and my family which continues through
the date of this Affidavit.
Dated this / , r day of ^

) fh^j,

, 2000.

Robert Norman

Notary's Verification
On the fs'

day of ^-~f]

<^/

__, 2000, personally appeared before me

Robert Norman who confirmed that the statements set forth in the foregoing
Affidavit are his own, and are true to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief. Robert Norman signed the Affidavit in my presence.

<_
HELEN G. OAVI^

Seal:

/

Ad\
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Oecemoerl2 2001

Notary Public
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ORIGINAL

NUAU LAND DEVELOPMENT
J01N1 VENTURE AGREEMENTIhis Joint Venture Agreement
(the "Agreement") is made and
entered into by and among those persons whose names are set
forth on the signature page or pages attached hereto (the
"Joint Ventures")I he joint Ventures hereby agree as
follows:
WITNESSETH:
1.1
Name.
The name of the Joint Venture is Moab Land Development.
1.2 Purpose The Joint Ventures wish to create a Joint Venture solely to
develop, manage and maintain certain investments
(the
"Investments") Lo be developed from the 8.33 acres north of
Moab, Ut.
(See Schedule * C )
This agreement will be
superseded by a Limited Liability Company hereafter created.
1.3
Office.
The principal office of the Joint Venture shall be located
at 4770 So. 900 East tt200, SLC, Ut. 84117.
1.4 Powers.
The Joint Venture has all powers reasonably necessary
incidental to carry out its purpose.

or

1.5
Requirements to Conduct Business.
The Joint Venture will execute and file all certificates,
and take all other action, which may be required to conduct
the business of the Joint Venture and the succeeding LLC in
the necessary counties and state. In the event that the
Joint Venture is unable to secure a Franchise Agreement with
any mutually acceptable lodging concern within one (1) year
after execution of this agreement, this Joint Venture will
terminate and all commitments and agreements will terminate
as wel1.
1.6
Term.
The term of this Agreement shall commence on the execution
hereof and shall end on the date of the succeeding LLC
created, or one (1) year after execution unless terminated
earlier by agreement of a unanimous interest of the Joint
Venturers.
1.7
Additional Joint Ventures.
Additional Joint Venturers may be added to the Joint Venture
at any time upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint
Venturers.

(ORIGINAL
Article 11 - Administration of the Joint Venture
2.1
Appointment of Administrative Agent.
Duane Barney, will act as the administrative agent (the
"Administrative Agent'1) of the Joint Venture. The term of
the agency hereby created shall be for the term of the Joint
Venture, but subject to termination at any time by an
affirmative vote of a majority in interest of the Joint
Venturers.
2.2
Duties and Powers of Administrative Agent.
The Administrative Agent shall manage the assets and invest
the funds of the Joint Venture. Any action of the
Administrative Agent may be overruled by a vote of a
majority in interest of the Joint Venturers.
2.3
Compensation of Administrative Agent.
The Administrative Agent shall not receive
any fees.
Article 111 - Capital

Contributions

3.1
Capital Contribution.
Each Joint Venturer shall make a contribution(s) to the
Joint Venture in cash, property or expertise.
The
percentage ownership for the Hotel Development is shown in
Schedule A, the percentage ownership for any other projects
utilizing the remaining land and artesian well is shown in
Schedule B. In the event additional capital is required to
finance any project development, the Administrative Agent
has the right to sell a portion of the development to secure
the needed capital for such project by an unanimous
affirmative vote of the Joint Venturers.
3.2 Voluntary Assessments.
The Administrative Agent will not call for additional
capital contributions from the Joint Venturers without a
unanimous vote.

Article IV ~ Allocations
4.1
Allocations
All profits and losses of the Joint Venture shall be
allocated among the Joint Venturers in accordance
with their
relative contributions as set forth on Schedules % A' & % S '
attached hereto.

''ORIGINAL
Article V - Developments/Projects
5.1
Selecti on.
Development/Projects may be presented to the Joint Venturers
far consideration by a Joint Venturer, the Administrative
Agent or a third party. Funds of the Joint Venture will be
used only for Investments approved by an affirmative and
unanimous vote of the Joint Venturers.

Article VI - Distributions
6.1
Distributions of Investment,
If an Investment is sold to a bona fide purchaser, the
proceeds shall be used to pay all sums outstanding in
connection with the investment, and thereafter, the net
proceeds (less all expenses of the sale, including closing
costs, attorney fees, and broker commissions) shall be (1)
used toward the payment of any other debts and liabilities
of the Joint Venture, and thereafter (2) distributed to the
Joint venturers according to their respective interests as
set forth in Schedule *A' & % B ' hereof.
Article Vll 7.1

At

Formation-

Termination.

Qn termination of this Agreement, all assets of the Joint
Venture shall be transferred to the succeeding Limited
Liability Company.
Article Vlll - Miscellaneous Provisions.
B.l
Bank Accounts.
All sums received from the Capital Contributions and from
any distributions from Investments shall be deposited in the
bank account of the Joint Venture. Checks may be drawn and
signed by the Administrative Agent.
8.2
Not a Partnership.
This Agreement shall not be deemed to create a partnership.
8.5
Governing Law.
This Agreement shall be governed by
Utah.

the laws of the State of

8.4
Entire Agreement.
This Agreement embodies the entire agreement among the
parties with'respect to the Joint Venture. All prior
Agreement, representations, and statements are merged into
this Agreement.

^R\G\HA
8.5
Surviva1.
All the representations and covenants contained in this
Agreement shall Survive Lhe acquisition of the Investment
(s) and the termination of the Joint Venture and this
Agreement.
8.6
Amendments.
This Agreement may be amended in writing only. All
amendments must be approved by the Joint Ventures' unanimous
decision.
8.7
Counterparts.
This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of
which shall be deemed an original.

0RI61NA
*jj5,m5-

Joint

Robert

Venturers:

R.

Norman

Sr.

*v.

/^J^^cc^fU^M^

ssit 4-54-2^1^(4

RRttSZ2-54-3t>H-2.

A. Diane Norman

ssn 5^-S^-^U)

SStt
Peter,Lanto

SStt
Eric A. Rasniussen

Type of Ownership is Individual
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SCHEDULE

JUINT VENTURERS

'A'

PERCEN TAGE

CONTRIBUTION
(See Exhibit A)
8-33 Acres

Robert R. Norman Sr &
A. Diane Norman

257.

Duane R. Barney

257,

Peter 0. Lanto

257.

Expertise &
Consideration

Eric A. Rasmussen

257.

Expertise &
Consideration

Expertise &
Consideration

ORIGINAL
SCHEDULE

JOINT VENTURERS

' LT

PERCENTAGE

CONTRIBUTION

Robert R. Norman Sr.&
A. Diane Norman

407.

Duane R. Barney

207.

Expertise &
Consideration

Peter 0. Lanto

207.

Expertise &
Consideration

Eric A. Rasmussen

207,

Expertise &
Consideration

Acreage
(See Exhibit A)
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County
flLED

Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C.
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, Utah 84532
Telephone: (435) 259-7321

BY,

NOV 3.0 2000

CLERK OVTJME COURT
Dfeputv

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial
Summary Judgment
Plaintiffs,
v.

Civil No. 9807-116
Mark E. Arnold & Norman ML Larson.
Judge Anderson
Defendants.
Plaintiffs, by and through counsel, move the Court for Partial Summary Judgment
concerning liability under a Trust Deed Note.

Statement of Facts
1.

On or about June 27, 1995, a Note secured by a Trust Deed on property owned by

the plaintiffs was executed in favor of Ann & Norman Young. The Note was in the principal
amount of $160,000, carried interest at a rate of 18% per annum, and was due on September 27,
1995. Exhibit L
2.

The note was executed by Robert & Diane Norman, husband and wife, Duane

Barney, Greg Page, Peter Lanto and defendant Norman Larson. Id
3.

On October 27, 1995, before any payment of principal or interest had been made

on the note, defendant Mark Arnold and defendant Larson's alter ego company Western Empire

Advisors, purchased the interest of Peter Lanto, specifically assumed his obligation under the
note and expressly indemnified him from any liability under the note. Exhibit 2.
4.

The Youngs interest in the note was purchased by Jim Winkler in August, 1996.

5.

Other than partial interest payments to the Youngs by Norman Larson, no obligor

made any principal or interest payments under the note.
6.

In May, 1998, the Normans paid the note in the context of a sale of the secured

land to Jim Winkler, and thereby solely incurred a loss of $212,000 which was the then
outstanding balance of the note.
7.

The obligations of Greg Page and Duane Barney as obligors under the note were

subsequently discharged in bankruptcy proceedings.

Argument
I.

Defendant Larson is Personally Liable Under the Note.

Norman Larson executed the note as a joint and several obligor. It is undisputed that Ann
and Norman Young specifically required Mark Arnold to secure Larson's obligation because the
Youngs (not knowing anything about the other obligors) believed that Larson's liability would
ensure repayment. The testimony of defendant Arnold is instructive. After explaining that he
prepared the Trust Deed and Note at the request of his client Ann Young, Arnold testified:
Q.
A.

. . . did you direct that a signature block be included for Norman Larson?
Yes.

Q.
And why did you include Norm Larson?
A.
Ann Young knew Norm Larson from I think some dealings that he had with her
brother-in-law, and I think she felt Norm Larson was a man of some substance, she didn't know
any of the other people, and I think she may have known Mr. Norman was financially strapped,
and as a precautionary measure she said, other than the "group," I'd also like Norm Larson's
signature on (the note).
Q.
Would you agree as an attorney, that everyone who signed this note is responsible
for its repayment?

2

A
I'm not going to give you a legal opinion on that, but I'll tell you what the intent
was It was to obligate all of them
Q
Well, that's obvious, right?
A
Yes It's very obvious
ArnoldDepo at 45-46
Q
Why did you have (Larson) sign the note? Does he have any liability under the
note for anything?
A
You bet he does. That's why I had htm sign the note.
Id. at 145
Larson himself admits signing the note to provide security for the Youngs
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

Do you know why you signed the note?
Mr Arnold asked me to sign the note as additional security for the Youngs
And you were OK becoming obligated on it?
He was my attorney and I took his recommendation, or requirement, yes sir
Larson depo. at 47.

Q
How did it come about that you were persuaded or convinced to sign the
promissory note?
A
Mr Arnold indicated it was additional security for the Youngs, they wanted my
signature on there
Q
Having signed the note, what do you understand your liability to be on that note?
A.
/ think everybody on t/iat note has the same liability.
Id. at 78.
There is no question of fact regarding Larson's liability under the note Nothing more is
required to establish Larson's liability under the note as a matter of law
H.
Defendant Arnold and Western Empire Advisors are Liable Under the Note as a
Consequence of their Purchase of Lanto's Interest and Express Indemnification of Lanto
From Liability Under the Note.
The original obligors of the Young note anticipated the construction of a Holiday Inn on
the Normans' property that secured the note

Indeed, the $160,000 loan was to be used to

facilitate and finance the project Peter Lanto was to be the builder of the project On October
27, 1995, Mark Arnold and WEA purchased "any and all interest" of Peter Lanto in the project
As part of the transaction, Arnold and WEA expressly assumed and indemnified any subsequent
liability of Lanto under the note

Based on previous arguments before this Court, we should expect that Arnold's counsel
will agree that the terms of the Purchase Agreement, as a fully integrated and completely
unambiguous document, may not be altered by parol evidence. Mark Arnold, an attorney, in fact
the attorney representing the obligors involved in the project, prepared the purchase and
indemnification agreement. Again, Arnold's own testimony tells the story:
Q.
Would you agree that to the extent Peter Lanto is responsible under this note, that
the purchasers of his interest on October 27, 1995 became responsible?
A.
I believe it obligates Mr. Lanto and all the signators to the lender. Yes.
Q.
That's not the question. The question is: Do you agree that after the Purchase
Agreement, Exhibit 36, NL 72, was executed, that the persons who acquired his interest also
acquired his liability under the note?
A.
Same answer.
Q.
Yes?
A.
To the extent there is any liability with the lender.
Q.
That, in fact, was the specific purpose of the Purchase Agreement numbered
paragraph 2, wasn't it, to transfer that liability?
A.
The specific purpose for the last paragraph was to ensure that Ann Young and the
lenders were paid back. That was the discussion.
ArnoldDepo. at 46-47
Q.
Pete Lanto,he vanishes into thin air. What happened to his liability?
A.
I don't know. But apparently it was assumed by the remaining partners who
wanted his interest. That's what they wanted. That's what they got.
Id. at 146.
Larson's testimony leaves absolutely no doubt:
Q.
A.

Do you know what happened to (Lanto's) participation in the project?
Yes. It was purchased by Mr. Arnold.
Larson depo. at 23.

A.
(Arnold) was going to accumulate legal time and expenses to offset the $8,500 for
Mr. Lanto's equity position.
Q.
But nevertheless he acquired Mr. Lanto's position?
A.

I don't know if he acquired it or if it was an attempt to acquire it. Id. at 48.

The foregoing testimony was before the Purchase Agreement was produced, or been seen
by the plaintiffs or their counsel. The document then surfaced and the deposition continued.
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Q.
Let's clear up one of the issues that was a little bit muddled . . . Turn to (NL) 72
. . . Document entitled "'Purchase Agreement." Does that clarify the issue in your mind as to
whether or not Mr. Arnold bought Mr. Lanto's interest in the Moab Express project?
A.
Does it clear up my mind . . .
Q.
Yes.
A.
Arnold and Western Empire bought Lanto 's position.
Q.
Yes?
A.
Yes, that was the intent.
Id. at 90.
Larson knew he was liable both under the note and the Lanto Purchase Agreement and
actually asked Arnold for a release.
Q.
When you say you were asked to leave (the partnership), was that in writing?
A.
I don't recall that it was in writing. I don't recall seeing a document to that effect.
The document that I signed was to relieve me of the franchise. With that I could have assumed
that - and I asked to be relievedfrom all liability and asked Mr. Arnold to prepare a document to
that effect. I don't recall him ever doing so.
Id. at 125.
There is no question of fact about the purchase of Lanto's interest and assumption of his
liability under the note. Nothing more is needed to establish the liability of Arnold and WEA
under the note in this regard as a matter of law.
Ill,

WEA is the Alter Ego of Defendant Larson.

WEA is the alter ego of Norman Larson, its president. In the course of the failed project,
Larson as an individual and WEA as an entity alternately appeared as the same party. For
example, WEA was hired to obtain financing for the project.

However, if WEA secured

financing Norman Larson was to receive a 25% equity interest in the project. Norman Larson,
individually, owned the Holiday Inn Franchise, a vital prerequisite to the project. Nowhere in
the record or any documents associated with this case is there any evidence of WEA acting as a
corporate entity.

All of the conduct attributed to WEA was undertaken solely by Norman

Larson. No corporate minutes, resolutions or otherwise have been produced to indicate WEA
acting as an entity separate from Norman Larson.

* t\

Though the Lanto Purchase Agreement names WEA as the purchasing entity, less than a
week later, Norman Larson stated in writing to a prospective lender that he personally owned an
equity interest and the Holiday Inn Franchise. Exhibit 3. Subsequent to the purchase of the
Lanto interest, the other partners in the project unanimously called upon Larson, individually, as
a partner, to repay the Young loan proceeds that had been in his sole control. Exhibit 4.
Under these circumstances, the Court should, as a matter of law, rule that WEA is the
alter ego of Norman Larson and that the two are, for all intents and purposes, the same party.
Failing that, Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, dictates that this Court should
exercise its discretion to allow the plaintiffs to amend their Complaint to name Western Empire
Advisors as a party defendant. Such leave to amend is necessary in the interests of justice and
can result in no conceivable prejudice to the defendant since it has been fully cognizant of the
nature of plaintiffs claims since the case was filed.

IV.

It is Unnecessary and Inefficient to Require the Plaintiffs to Obtain a Judgment
Against Lanto as a Prerequisite For Asserting Their Liability Under the Note,

Arnold and WEA entered and completed the purchase of Lanto's interest without
informing the plaintiffs. Arnold and WEA thereafter conducted themselves as partners in the
project with plaintiffs' acquiescence. The defendants have stated on previous occasions that the
plaintiffs should be required to establish liability against Lanto as a means of perfecting their
claim under the indemnification agreement. Such a requirement would be a waste of time,
money, effort and judicial resources.
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Lanto's liability as an obligor under the note is established as a matter of law for the same
reason that Larson's liability is established, i.e., he signed the note. The assumption of liability
and indemnification of Lanto by Arnold and WEA is clear, unambiguous and further bolstered
by the fact that it was prepared by an attorney who knew, or should have known exactly what the
terms meant.
The Court should rule as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs may seek to recover in
contribution for Lanto's proportionate share of liability under the note from Arnold and WEA.
V.

The Lack of Foreclosure From a Holder of the Note is Not a Bar
to Plaintiffs' Claims.

Defendants have also suggested that the plaintiffs have no right to seek contribution from
other obligors under the note because the note was not formally declared in default, no holder
ever commenced foreclosure and/or the note was not collected by an attorney.
The fact is that the note was almost continuously in default. It was extended twice
through defendant Arnold at the frantic urging of the plaintiffs who feared foreclosure. The
plaintiffs were informed that the note was sold to Jim Winkler because the Youngs were
threatening foreclosure. ("I told (Winkler) the situation, and told him that I thought the Youngs
were going to foreclose on the property, and that there was a substantial possibility that he could
come in with Bob Norman and do a hotel if he would take care of that note." Arnold depo. at
149)

By mid-1996, defendants Larson and Arnold had expended the entire $160,000 in loan

proceeds without advancing the Holiday Inn Project. Eventually, all of the note obligors simply
abandoned the Normans without paying or offering to pay anything on the note.

Meanwhile the note, secured solely by the plaintiffs' property remained outstanding and
accruing interest at 18%, and the Normans, as a direct consequence of the failed venture were
financially incapable of paying off the note. Under defendants' contention then, and given the
fact that their property was worth considerably more than the note balance, the Normans would
be forced to wait indefinitely for the creditor (earning 18%) to decide to foreclose. That position
as a legal requirement is intolerable.
Instead, the Normans were forced to take action in order to avoid losing the entire value
of their property. It is through the Normans' initiative and good fortune that they were able to
convince Mr. Winkler to purchase the subject property, agreeing that the entire note balance
would be deducted from he purchase price. This was certainly not a favorable option to the
Normans, who thereby lost any hope of participating in a potentially lucrative hotel project, as
well as control over the property immediately adjacent to their existing waterpark. The Normans
action was one of absolute financial survival, made necessary because the defendants had spent
the entire loan proceeds and then abandoned the project.
This Court has previously stated on several occasions that the least the Normans should
be entitled to is proportionate contribution from other parties liable under the note. The plaintiffs
hereby request that the Court now make that ruling as a matter of law.
VI.

For Purposes of Proportionate Liability Under the Note, Robert & Diane Norman
Should be Held to be a Single Party as a Matter of Law.
Robert & Diane Norman are husband and wife. The appear as separate parties on the

Trust Deed and Note solely because they were joint owners of the secured property.

No

evidence exists to suggest that they were viewed for any purpose as separate entities or
individual partners. Indeed, in the Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement, Robert &
Diane Norman are listed jointly with respect to their contribution and equity share.
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Consequently, the Court should rule as a matter of law that there are 5 parties or shares of
liability under the note, i.e., Robert & Diane Norman, Duane Barney, Greg Page. Norman Larson
and Mark Arnold and WEA for Peter Lanto.
VII.

The Liabilty of Page and Barney Under the Note Should Be Divided Proportionately
By the Non-Immune Parties.
Since Greg Page and Duane Barney have obtained protection from liability pursuant to

bankruptcy proceedings, an issue remains as to which parties should be responsible for their
portion of liability under the note. Defendants claim that the Normans should have intervened in
the bankruptcy proceedings or otherwise protected themselves. However, since liability under
the note is joint and several, the defendants could have availed themselves of the same protection
and/or filed cross-claims against Page and Barney.
Moreover, several very good reasons exist to hold Arnold and Larson/WEA responsible
for their fair share of Page and Barney's liability.
1.

On the same day as the Arnold/WEA purchase of Lanto's interest, Greg Page,

from Arnold's office, sent a letter to Norman Larson dissolving 4-D Development Company. It
was 4-D that had contracted for Larson's services to obtain funding for the project.
2.

Pursuant to that Service Agreement with Larson, Page had assigned his sole

responsibility and/or supposed contribution to the project to Norman Larson/WEA
3.

At or about the same time as the Lanto purchase and 4-D dissolution, Mark

Arnold prepared a General Power of Attorney for Duane Barney in favor of Greg Page. The
Power of Attorney was necessary since Barney had returned to federal prison for a parole
violation on a previous fraud conviction.

»il

4.

The above facts were contemporaneously known to Arnold and Larson, while the

plaintiffs were completely uniformed.
5.

Despite this knowledge, Arnold and Larson thereafter conducted themselves as

partners in the Moab Holiday Inn project.
Based on the foregoing, Arnold and Larson were fully aware that Page had contributed
nothing and done nothing to advance the project, and that Barney had done nothing and had gone
to prison. Their eventual abandonment of the project and bankruptcy were entirely foreseeable
to Arnold and Larson. One the other hand, the Normans were informed by these same defendants
that the project was on track, progressing and that Page and Barney were fully involved.
Thus there is ample justification to hold Arnold and Larson/WEA liable for a
proportionate share of Page and Barney's liability under the note. On the other hand, as it
presently stands, the Normans have incurred 100% of the loss from the note and there is no
justification for why they should be liable for contribution of any other obligor. Nevertheless, as
a means of resolving this dispute, the plaintiffs are willing to be bound by a ruling that they must
accept a proportionate share of the Page and Barney liability under the note.
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Conclusion
Plaintiffs' present Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is concerned solely with
liability under the Young-Winkler Trust Deed Note. It is axiomatic that liability for the note
must be the responsibility of its obligors. It is established by undisputed facts and documents
that the obligation of Peter Lanto as a signatory on the note was purchased and assumed by Mark
Arnold and WEA.
Fairness and equity dictate that liability under the note fall as follows:
Robert & Diane Norman
Duane Barney
Greg Page
Norman Larson
Mark Arnold (for Pete Lanto)

20%
20%
20%
20%
10%

WEA

10%

(for Pete Lanto)

Though Page and Barney have obtained bankruptcy relief, their proportionate share of
liability nevertheless had to be paid and was paid by the Normans. Principles of fairness and
equity require that the liability of Page and Barney be assumed proportionately by the remaining
obligors. The total liability assumed by the Normans under the note was $212,000.
Wherefore, the plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court, as a matter of law based on
undisputed facts, apportion liability under the note as follows:
Robert & Diane Norman

331/3%

$70,666,67

Norman Larson

331/3%

$70,666.67

Mark Arnold

16 2/3%

$35,333.33

WEA

16 2/3%

$35,333.33

Request For Oral Argument
Plaintiffs request that this Motion For Partial Summary Judgment be set for oral
argument at the conclusion of the briefing.
Dated this nt»* day of f\)c/^e^ht/Z^

, 200"

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs

Mailing Certificate
This is to certify that on the jc>h day of Ntwenb**^*

2000, a true and correct copy

of the foregoing Motion For Partial Summary Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid, to:
James C. Haskins
Attorney for Norman Larson
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Mr. Matthew Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
15 West South Temple^
Salt Lake

,2
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DEC G k 2000
CLERK OF THE COURT

BY_
Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., and DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs,

REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS'
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT
LARSON'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 9807-116

vs.
MARK E. ARNOLD, DUANE R. BARNEY,
PETER LANTO, ERIC A. RASMUSSEN,
GREGORY A. PAGE, and NORMAN
M. LARSON,
Defendants.

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Although the Plaintiffs dispute many of the factual allegations in the Defendant
Larson's Motion for Summary Judgment, their disputations are simply bare allegations
virtually unsupported by any citation to the record in this case. Instead, they oppose
the Defendant's motion on the basis of a new affidavit by Plaintiff Robert Norman.
Unfortunately, however, this new testimony conflicts with the Plaintiffs' own prior
testimony in his deposition in this case, and is of no assistance to them in opposing the

Defendant Larson's motion.
Defendant Larson has demonstrated that the first cause of action in the
amended complaint must fail because Larson was never a member of the Moab Land
Development Joint Venture, which membership by Larson is alleged in paragraph 7 of
the Amended Complaint. Both Plaintiff Norman and Defendant Larson testified that
Larson was not a member of the joint venture. (Norman Depo., p. 27-29; 98; Larson
Depo., p. 42, 59.) Nor was Larson's company, Western Empire Advisers, a member of
the joint venture, despite proposals by the company to become such a member.
(Exhibit I; Exhibit J, Norman Depo, pp. 89-90.) Now, contrary to the allegations
contained in the amended complaint, Plaintiff Robert Norman seeks to salvage his case
by asserting, for the first time, that Norman was a member of some other joint venture
which attempted to develop the Holiday Inn project. (Norman Affidavit, unpagihated, p.
2.) There is simply no evidence in the record supporting the existence of this other
joint venture, and the Plaintiffs have not named the other members of that venture, nor
have they brought suit against them. Even assuming, arguendo, the existence of such
an additional entity, the amended complaint nowhere refers to it and does not base any
cause of action on the conduct of any such additional entity. Where such a potential
cause of action goes unalleged in a complaint, the complaint is subject to dismissal.
Madsen v. Borthick, 850 P.2d 442, 443 (Utah 1993). In any event, if such an
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additional joint venture existed at all, any damage to the Plaintiff caused by such a joint
venture would be allocable among all of its members, see Salt Lake Knee & Sports
Rehabilitation, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Knee & Sports Medicine, 909 P.2d 266, 269 (Utah
J?

Ct. App. 1995), and with the exception of Defendant Larson noneihe alleged members
of the "other" joint venture have even been identified, let alone made defendants in the
present action.
Plaintiff Norman supports his allegation that Defendant Larson is a member of
this "unnamed joint venture" by alleging, in his Affidavit (pages 3 and 4), that:
1.

Larson was consulted regarding financing for the Holiday Inn Project;

2.

Larson's name appeared as a co-obligor on the promissory note secured
by the Norman's property which had been contributed to the joint venture;

3.

Plaintiff Norman had "subsequent knowledge" that Larson was "solely
responsible for obtaining financing" and that "he would be entitled to a
25% equity interest in the project;"

4.

Plaintiff Norman received a letter written by Greg Page identifying parties
of the "then existing joint venture" as the Plaintiffs, Greg Page, Duane
Barney, Mark Arnold, and Norman Larson;

5.

Plaintiff Norman believes that Larson was a member of this "other" joint
venture based upon "documents obtained during the course of this
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litigation wherein he [Larson] and others expressly state that he is a
partner."
The Defendant admits that he was consulted regarding financing on the project,
but, for the reasons stated below, it is clear that he did not do so as a member of any
joint venture. The other allegations are without any evidentiary support in the record
The Plaintiff now contends that he acquiesced in and had no objection to
Larson's alleged "involvement as a partner in the project." (Norman Affidavit,
unpaginated, p. 4.) This testimony flies in the face of his testimony at his deposition
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) Handing you what has been previously marked as
Deposition ExhibitMR. RUSSELL: Nine.
Q. (BY MR. HOWE) - 9 , and ask you to take a look at that and tell me if
you recognize it?
MR. RUSSELL: This is a letter dated May 9,1996 from Norman Larson to
you, regarding the joint venture-a joint venture proposal for the
development of a franchise motel and refinancing of the waterpark
located in Moab, Utah.
THE WITNESS [Plaintiff Robert Norman]: I remember the letter, yes.
(BY MR. HOWE) You recall seeing the letter?
A. Yes. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you respond to the letter?
A. No, sir.
Page 4
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Q. Why didn't you respond to that letter?
A. What we're talking about a partner, joint venture partner, no reference
in this letter here to our joint venture partnership. And sticking to the
subject of our partnership, it sounds like it was going off on a tangent
somewhere. It just didn't make any sense to me. This proposal, it
doesn't even fit our agreement that we have in joint venture, operating
agreement. We have all our rules about the joint venture, we're supposed
to notify each other and keep each other informed, and this is off on a
tangent of everything that our agreement calls for, as far as I can tell.
And I just didn't think it was relevant to even answer it. Too farfetched as
far as I was concerned.
Q. Did the proposal seem-aside from whether it would be against the
spirit of any partnership, did the proposal seem sc jnd to you?
A. What?
Q. Did the proposal seem sound to you, to your recollection?
A. I didn't pay much attention to that aspect of it. I just rejected and
didn't see any need of pursuing it. I didn't even answer at the time.
(Exhibit J, Norman Depo, pp. 89-90.)
Far from acquiesing in Larson's participation in the project, Plaintiff Norman
actively thwarted such participation by refusing to even respond to Larson's proposals
for participation in the project.
The Plaintiff also states that "[o]n or about April 10, 1996, I received a letter
written by Greg Page identifying the partners of the then existing joint venture as (the
Normans), Greg Page, Duane Barney, Mark Arnold and Norman Larson." (Norman
Affidavit, unpaginated, p. 3.) He further suggests that, from the April 10, 1996, letter,
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he learned uthat Norman Larson had been in complete control of the Young loan funds
and had been assigned the responsibility to obtain financing for the project." (Norman
Affidavit, unpaginated, p. 6.) A copy of the letter is attached hereto as Exhibit K, and it
does not expressly identify the partners of any "existing joint venture," nor does it
suggest that Larson was "in complete control of the Young loan funds." Further, it is
notable that Plaintiff's testimony in his affidavit about the import of the letter is now
significantly more pointed than what he offered in his deposition. There, he asserted
only as follows with respect to the letter:
THE WITNESS: I remember the letter, but I don't know when I received it,
what the purpose or what Mr. Page's reason for sending this letter that
are the details connected with this. He knew what he was asking for, I
assume, but I don't know what-anything more than that.
(Exhibit J, Norman Depo, p. 78.)
Further, in Larson's own deposition, he testified that he never achieved any
equity position in the joint venture as the result of his failure to obtain the requisite
financing:
Q
And in the second paragraph, it says that we have decided to
terminate our agreement with you to find financing for these projects. In
regards to your share of the partnership — what was you share of the
partnership?
A
I didn't have a share of the partnership because I hadn't provided
financing. I wasn't the author of the document.
(Exhibit L, Larson Depo, p. 107.) At best, therefore, Defendant Larson had only a
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potential interest in any joint venture regarding the Holiday Inn Project, which potential
interest never materialized because the Larson was unable to provide the financing for
the project.
Plaintiff Norman now insists that "[o]n May 1, 1996, Norman Larson promised
and agreed that he would personally see to it that the Young loan was fully repaid,
regardless of whether he obtained financing for the Moab Holiday Inn project." The
Plaintiff makes no citation to the record in support of this assertion. However, from his
testimony in his deposition, it is clear that this testimony is hearsay and refers to an
alleged meeting among Larson, Arnold, Page, Barney, David Longnecker, and Diane
Norman. (See Exhibit M [Norman Depo. Exh. 23], attached.) Plaintiff Robert Norman
was not present at the alleged meeting:
Q.
Do you recall the meeting May 1 st and 2nd in Salt Lake City,
regarding the Holiday Inn project?
A.
I remember there [sic] going up there. We had a fire and that's the
reason why we went up there, to see if they could made some contacts.
But I wasn't there to —
Q.

You didn't attend the meetings?

A.

That's right.

Q.

Your wife and son, Bob, Jr. attended. Is that correct?

A.
That's right. She wrote this up, wrote this, apparently. I haven't
read it.
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Q.
What did either your wife or your son report back to you, if
anything, regarding the contents of the meetings on May 1 st and 2nd?
A.
The only thing I recall is that they had — they went to see Mr
Larson during the course of the meeting. But I don't know what took
place, who was there or anything.
(Exhibit J, Norman Depo., pp. 83-84.) Given his lack of attendance at the meetings.
and his own admission that he has no personal knowledge concerning what was said,
what took place, or who attended the meetings, the proffered "evidence" is clearly
inadmissible hearsay. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(e) provides that affidavits submitted in
summary judgment proceedings "shall be made on personal knowledge," and shall "set
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence." In the absence of admissible
evidence, the Court should reject the Plaintiff's proffer. D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775
P.2d 420, 421 (Utah 1989).
The Plaintiffs' assertions that Defendant Larson is somehow liable for their
losses is simply insufficient to support the causes of action in the Amended Complaint.
The Plaintiffs now appear to concede, as they must, that the Defendant was not a
member of the Moab Land Development Joint Venture. But now, for the first time, they
allege that the Defendant was a member of some other, unidentified joint venture, and
that as such the Plaintiffs were somehow damaged. The Defendant is entitled to notice
of what the Plaintiffs claim in the Complaint they filed with the Court, and that notice
has not been forthcoming. Their various motions to further amend the Complaint have
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been denied by the Court, and they should not now be heard to raise entirely new
theories of recovery in a belated effort to defeat the Defendant's motion for summary
judgment This is particulary true when the Plaintiffs have failed to join indispensable
oarties to the litigation. Notably, the Defendant Larson at all times acted on behalf of
Western Empire Advisers, Inc. ("WEA"), which corporation is not a party herein. The
p

ia t ntiff seeks to avoid having to join WEA by asserting that Larson is the mere "alter

^qo' of the company. Much more is required than this bare assertion, however to
defeat a motion tor summary judgment. The Plaintiffs have offered virtually no
evidence. To make a showing that the company is the alter ego of Defendant Larson,
the Plaintiffs must show that there is such a unity of interest and ownership between
the corporation and the individual that the separate personalities of the company and
the individual no longer exist. They must also show that the observance of the
corporate form would sanction a fraud or promote injustice See, e.g., Norman v.
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). The Plaintiffs have
offered no evidence whatsoever in support of their claim.
Similarly, the Plaintiffs offer no evidence to support there outlandlish claims
concerning Larson's "knowledge." They simply assert what they suggest he knew with
nc citation to the record in this case. (Plaintiffs' Response, pp. 9-10.) Such
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unsupported assertions are simply insufficient to survive a motion for summary
judgement.
The Plaintiffs also insists that the Defendant "should be held proportionately
responsible for the trust deed note as a matter of law." The Defendant has already
addressed this argument in his Motion for Summary Judgment, and will not re-address
that issue here.
For all of the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted by the Court.
DATED this 1 st day of December, 2000.

.. James C. Haskins
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Reply to Plaintiffs'
Response to Defendant Larson's Motion for Summary Judgment was served on
the 1 st day of December, 2000, by mailing the same in U.S. Postal Service postage paid
envelopes as follows:
Steve Russell, Esq.
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER, P.C.
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, Utah 84532
Matthew Lalli, Esq.
SNELL & WILMER
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT NORMAN, SR., and DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,

OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No. 9807-116

MARKE. ARNOLD, DUANE R. BARNEY,
PETER LANTO, ERIC A. RASMUSSEN,
GREGORY A. PAGE, and NORMAN
M. LARSON,
Defendants.

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

COMES NOW Defendant Norman M. Larson, by and through his undersigned
counsel, and objects to the Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Plaintiffs suggest that, as a matter of law, Defendant's Arnold is liable to the
Plaintiffs for a proportionate share of a promissory note signed by Defendant Arnold
and others. The Plaintiffs' motion comes only after the Defendant has already moved
for summary judgment with respect to this very issue, and only after the Plaintiffs'

response to that motion has been filed with the Court. It is very clear that the Plaintiffs'
motion is designed to fill in the evidentiary holes in their case pointed out to them in the
Defendants own motion for summary judgment. As such, the Plaintiff's purported
"evidence" comes too late and should be rejected by the Court.
Even if the Plaintiffs' new motion is considered on its merits, however, it is wholly
unpersuasive and fails to demonstrate why summary judgment should be granted in
their favor on this issue.
The fact is that the holders of the note, Ann and Norman Young, never
foreclosed on the note at all and thus the Defendant incurred no direct liability with
respect to the note. Nor have the Plaintiffs at any time maintained that they were thirdparty beneficiaries under the note. The Plaintiffs maintain, however, that they were
forced to sell the underlying realty and reduce the selling price by the amount of the
note. There is simply no credible evidence in the record to support this assertion. Nor
is there any evidence to show that the sale between the Plaintiffs and Winker was an
arm's length transaction. If it was not, then the Plaintiffs are unable to support their
assertion of the amount of damages based on the sale.
The Plaintiffs also make numerous other unsupported factual allegations, such
as that Defendant Larson was the alter ego of Western Empire Advisers, Inc ("WEA").
They make this bare assertion because they never bothered to join WEA as a party
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herein and because Larson's activities in connection with the project were undertaken
on behalf of WEA, a bona fide corporate entity with which he was admittedly
associated The Plaintiffs also insist that WEA (the alleged but unproven alter ego of
Defendant Larson) assumed, with Defendant Arnold, the obligation of Peter Lanto
under the promissory note, and suggest that Arnold and Defendant Larson "expressly
indemnified [Lanto] from any liability under the note." Plaintiffs' Motion, p. 2 This
assertion is demonstrably incorrect. Exhibit 2, attached to the Plaintiffs' Motion, is not
signed by Defendant Larson or by any representative of WEA; rather, it appears to be
signed by Defendant Arnold as an agent of WEA. There is simply no evidence in the
record to suggest that Arnold somehow acted as the agent of Larson in this transaction,
Nor is there any evidence to support the Plaintiffs' assertion that Larson is the aiter-ego
of WEA. Rather, the aiter-ego theory is a mere afterthought which is nowhere raised in
the Plaintiffs' pleadings. As noted in the Defendant's Summary Judgment Reply,
To make a showing that the company is the alter ego of Defendant
Larson, the Plaintiffs must show that there is such a unity of interest and
ownership between the corporation and the individual that the separate
personalities of the company and the individual no longer exist They
must also show that the observance of the corporate form would sanction
a fraud or promote injustice. See, e.g., Norman v. Murray First Thrift &
Loan Co., 596 P.2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). The Plaintiffs have offered
no evidence whatsoever in support of their claim.
(Reply to Plaintiffs' Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 9.)
The Plaintiffs also assert that their alleged damages are to be computed as the
Page 3

full amount of the promissory note. They arrive at this startling proposition by insisting
that they volunteered to pay off the note in connection with the sale of the subject
property to a third party. As the Defendant Larson has tirelessly pointed out, however,
the Plaintiffs have not at any time asserted in their pleadings or elsewhere that they
were third party beneficiaries under the note. If they were not, their voluntary decision
to pay off the note in connection with the sale gives them no right to enforce the terms
of the note and no cause of action in their favor. See, e. g., Harper v. Great Salt Lake
Council, Inc., 976 P.2d 1213 (Utah 1999), where the Court held that a purchaser was
not a third party beneficiary of an agreement and thus had no standing to enforce the
terms of the agreement. To establish that they were third party beneficiaries under the
promissory note, the Plaintiffs must show that the parties to the note intended to confer
separate and distinct benefits upon them. Id. They have not remotely made such a
showing. See also, Broadwater v. Old Republic Sur., 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 1993);
Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). More importantly,
however, they have failed even to raise this issue in any of the pleadings they filed
While the Plaintiffs correctly point out that Arnold and WEA "expressly assumed
and indemnified any subsequent liability of Lanto under the note," Plaintiffs' Motion, p.
3, this is of no help to them, since (a) the note was never foreclosed; (b) they do not
claim to be, and are not, third party beneficiaries under the note; (c) Lanto is not a party
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herein; and (d) WEA is not a pany herein. Each of these immutable facts is
independently fatal to their cause of action.
The Plaintiffs attempt to show that WEA is the alter-ego of the Defendant Larson
by belatedly asserting that there is no evidence in the record to suggest that WEA ever
acted as a corporate entity, and that no corporate minutes or resolutions have been
produced in this litigation. Because such corporate minutes or resolutions have not
been requested, however, it is unsurprising that they have not been produced.
But the Plaintiffs are flatly wrong in asserting that WEA never acted as a
corporate entity. Clearly, it did so when it purported to purchase, with Arnold, the
interest of Lanto in the Holiday Inn project. (Plaintiffs' Motion, Exhibit 2.) Further, the
purchase of the franchise was accomplished with a check on the account of Western
Empire Financial Advisors, Inc., see Exhibit A, attached. Correspondence with Holiday
Inn Worldwide Corporate Headquarters was written on the letterhead of the
corporation, see Exhibit B; attached. An income and expense reconciliation for the
project was prepared on the letterhead of the corporation, see Exhibit C, attached. The
letter from Gregory Page expressing displeasure with Defendant Larson's financing
efforts is directed to the offices of Western Empire Advisors, not to the individual
defendant at his home, see Exhibit D, attached. The letter from the Defendant Larson
to the Plaintiffs, offering to become a member of the joint venture, is written on Western
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Empire Advisors, and the proposal is on behalf of that entity, not the Defendant Larson
see Exhibit E. attached. In short, the Plaintiffs were at all times on notice that Larson s
participation in securing financing for the project was undertaken by Western Empire
Advisers, and not by Larson in his individual capacity.
The Plaintiffs seek to persuade the Court that Larson held himself out as an
"equity owner" in the Holiday Inn Franchise, citing his letter to Trust Guarantee
Corporation dated November 3, 1995. (Plaintiffs' Motion, p. 6 ) The letter, however, is
on the letterhead of Western Empire Advisers, and Larson, who admittedly was
President of that entity, does not at any time hold himself out as acting for his own
account and not on behalf of WEA. See Exhibit F, attached. Additionally, however, as
Larson has acknowledged, the potential 'equity position" never materialized because
the financing efforts were unsuccessful. (Exhibit G, Larson Depo., p. 107.)
The Plaintiffs also suggest that the Court should allow yet another amendment to
the Complaint to permit them to name WEA as a party. The Plaintiffs' other motions to
add additional parties have all been denied by the Court and, treating their suggestion
to the Court as an informal motion, the Court should simply not allow the addition of a
new party defendant at this late date. This is particularly true where the Plaintiffs have
offered no explanation for the tardiness of their request. See Chadwick v. Nielsen,
763 P.2d 817, 820 (Utah App. 1988).

Page 6

The Plaintiffs aiso suggest that Peter Lanto is not an indispensable party and
that it should not have been necessary to include him as a Defendant herein. Rule 19
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, inter alia, that a party must be joined if
he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the
dispos.tion of the action in his absence may operate to his prejudice Lanto was an
original member of the joint venture project and, by a purchase agreement dated
October 27, 1995, purported to sell that interest to Defendant Arnold and to WEA. One
consideration for the agreement was that the purchasers agreed "to hold [Lanto]
harmless from any and all claims arising out of the development of the abovementioned projects, including but not limited to tort claims and claims on any notes for
money's previously borrowed totaling $160,000.00 * See Purchase Agreement, Exhibit
H. In the instant case, it is notable that the Plaintiffs assert liability against Arnold and
WEA based upon this provision, but it is clear they do not seek recovery directly on the
note Rather, their claim is based on the loss allegedly occasioned by their subsequent
sale of the property. Because that loss is not one directly based upon the note, the
Plaintiffs may subsequently argue that Lanto is not protected by Defendant Arnold's
"hold harmless" clause and is thus still liable to them in his own capacity. This is
precisely the harm that Rule 19 was intended to prevent. Lanto is an indispensable
pany because, without his presence in this litigation, it is possible that liability may still
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be imposed upon him in subsequent litigation with one cr another of the parties herein,
A party is "indispensable" and must be joined in litigation uto guard against the entry of
judgments which might prejudice the rights of such parties in their absence." Cowen &
Co. V. Atlas Stock Transfer Co , 695 P.2d 109, 114 (Utah 1984). Lanto is just such a
party.
Finally, the Plaintiffs suggest that they may pursue an action based upon the
promissory note without joining the obligees and despite the fact that the obligees
never foreclosed on the note. As a general rule, joint obligees are deemed
indispensable parties in a suit against an obligor. Seftef v. Capital City Bank, 767 P.,2d
941, 94S (Utah Ct App. 1989), citing Bracken Tie, Lumber & Chip Co. v. McLarty
Farms, inc., 704 F.2d 585, 586 (11th Cit 1983). If, as the Plaintiffs contend, they are
seeking recovery on the promissory note itself, then the obligees are plainly
indispensable parties. If they seek recovery on some other basis (e.g., a claim that
they are somehow third party beneficiaries under the note), that theory has simply
never been pleaded and cannot be raised at the eleventh hour-
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For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment should
be denied by the Court
DATED this 13th day of December, 2000

, JCZ- r^Al*/^
^-' '"
(^ ....-•'

. „--"James C. Haskins
Attorney for Defendant Larson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Objection to Plaintiff's Motion for Partial
Summary Judgments/as served on the 13th day of December, 2000, by mailing the
same in U.S. Postal Service postage paid envelopes addressed as follows
Steve Russell, Esq.
GRAND COUNTY LAW & JUSTICE CENTER, P.C.
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab. UT 84532
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Matthew L Lalli, Esq
SNELL & WILMER
15 West South Temple. Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, UT84101
This is further to certify that a copy of the foregoing Objection to Plaintiff's
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment was sensed on December 12, 2000, vis
facsimile to Mr. Russell at (435) 259-7321; and via facsimile to Mr. Lalli at (435) 2571800.

\Thomas N. Thompson |
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Matthew L.Lalli (#6105)
Amy F. Sorenson (#8947)
SNELL & WILMERL.L.P.

Gateway Tower West
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR, & DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,

DEFENDANT MARK E. ARNOLD'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
REQUEST FOR HEARING
vs.
Civil No.: 9807-116
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

Pursuant to Rule 4-501(2) of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and Rule 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") hereby moves this Court
for an Order granting partial summary judgment on the First and Second Causes of Action of
plaintiffs Robert and Diane Norman's ("the Normans") Amended Complaint, such that final
judgment in this action shall award judgment as follows:
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1.
Arnold is not liable to the Normans for breach of contract
as alleged in the Normans5 First Cause of Action; and
2.
Arnold is not liable to the Normans for default of trust deed
note as alleged in the Normans' Second Cause of Action.
This motion is made upon the ground that there are no triable issues of material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to partial summary judgment on the Normans' two remaining
causes of action as a matter of law. This motion is based upon the memorandum of points and
authorities, the statement of material undisputed facts, the affidavits and exhibits, all of which
are concurrently filed and served herewith.
By agreement of all parties during a telephonic hearing before this Court on December
12, 2000, Arnold's motion for summary judgment will be heard concurrently with defendant
Norman Larson's motion for summary judgment, scheduled for 10:00 a.m. on December 15,
2000.
DATED t h i s y ^ / j d a y of December, 2000
SNELL &

WILMERLLP.

Matthew L. Lalli
Amy F. Sorenson
Attorneys for Mark Arnold
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on this _ .

day of December, 2000, I caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing to be sent by Federal Express or delivered by hand, to.

Steve Russell, Esq
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, UT 84532
Attorney for Plaintiffs

James C Haskins, Esq.
Haskins & Associates, P.C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Norman M Larson
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Matthew L Lalli (#6105)
Amy F Sorenson (#8947)
SNELL& VVrLMERL.L.P.

Gateway Tower West
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT MARK E. ARNOLDS
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
vs.

Civil No.: 9807-116
MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") hereby moves this Court for an order granting
partial summary judgment on the First and Second Causes of Action in plaintiffs Robert and
Diane Norman's (the "Normans") amended complaint.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In a previous motion for partial summary judgment, the Court correctly concluded on the
law and undisputed facts that Arnold never acted as the personal attorney for the Normans, and
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therefore never owed them fiduciary duties. The Court accordingly dismissed the third claim in
the Normans' complaint for breach of fiduciary duty. Because the fourth claim for punitive
damages was predicated entirely on the fiduciary duty claim, the Court dismissed that as well.
Since the Court heard and granted the previous summary judgment motion, the parties
have concluded discovery, prepared for trial, briefed and argued motions in limine and two
motions to amend the complaint, and indeed began the trial, which unfortunately ended in a
mistrial because of a juror's nondisclosure. During those arguments, it became clear that the
Normans lack the factual evidence and legal authority to support even their remaining two claims
for breach of the joint venture agreement and breach of the trust deed note. Accordingly, and at
the Court's suggestion, Arnold now moves for summary judgment on these remaining two
claims.
The first claim, for breach of the joint venture agreement, (the "Agreement") fails as a
matter of law because Arnold never became a party to the agreement he is accused of breaching.
It is undisputed that he never signed the agreement and never assented to be bound by its terms.
Moreover, Arnold did not become bound by the agreement by becoming a partner in the joint
venture. To become a partner, both Utah law and the agreement itself require unanimous
consent of the remaining partners. It is undisputed that the Normans "never" consented to admit
Arnold to the partnership. Nor is there any evidence that any of the other partners consented to
admit Arnold to the partnership. Arnold simply could not have breached an agreement to which
he was never a party, and he is entitled to summary judgment on the Normans' first claim for
that reason.
The second claim for breach of the trust deed note fails as a matter of law as well. The
note was made by six co-obligors - Robert Norman, Diane Norman, Greg Page, Duane Barney,
Peter Lanto, and Norman Larson - in favor of the Youngs, who loaned the joint venture
$160,000. Like the joint venture agreement, Arnold is not a signatory on the note and never
2
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agreed to be bound by it. The Normans admit this, but contend instead that Arnold became
liable on the note through the back door. Four months after the note was executed, Arnold and
Western Empire Advisors entered into a "Purchase Agreement" under which they purported to
purchase Lanto's interest in the joint venture and to indemnify him against liability on the note.
The Normans ask the court to overlook basic concepts of privity and standing, and treat Arnold's
indemnification of Lanto as an indemnification of them. There is no precedent for such a theory,
of course, because Arnold's duties under the Purchase Agreement run only to Lanto, not the
Normans, and Lanto's obligations under the note run only to the Youngs, not his co-obligors, the
Normans. If Lanto were found liable on the note, he could sue Arnold and Western Empire
Advisors for indemnification, but under no circumstances do the Normans have a cause of action
against the indemnitor - Arnold and Western Empire Advisors - of one of their co-obligors,
Lanto. Arnold therefore is entitled to summary judgment on the second claim as well.
II.

UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS

A,

Background.

1.

On March 15, 1995, the Normans, Barney, Lanto, and Rasmussen executed a

document entitled "Moab Land Development Joint Venture Agreement" (the "Agreement") A
true and correct copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit l.1
2.

The members of "the group," the original joint venture partners, were Robert and

Diane Norman, Duane Barney, Pete Lanto, and Greg Page. 3/30/00 D. Norman Dep. 24:17-25:8,
true and correct excerpts from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 2.
3.

Each of these individuals had "a different role" to play. Ex. 2, 3/30/00 D.

Norman Dep. 34:20-23. The Normans were to donate the real property, Page was to "arrange for

1

Unless otherwise indicated, the exhibits referred to in diis memorandum are authenticated by the
Normans' deposition testimony. Deposition excerpts authenticating the exhibits are located immediately
behind each exhibit
3
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financing/' Lanto was to construct the Holiday Inn, and Barney was to oversee the "operation
and management" of the Holiday Inn once construction was complete Id_ at 34 20-36 1
4

Page hired Norman Larson to assist in obtaining financing Larson in turn

introduced the joint venture partners to Mark Arnold, who became the lawyer for the joint
venture Affidavit of Mark E Arnold ("Arnold Aff'), a true and correct copy of which is filed
concurrently herewith
5

The first step toward development was to obtain short-term financing to purchase

two things the Holiday Inn Franchise for 540,000 and another larger sum of money to cover
miscellaneous up-front costs and to use as seed money to obtain a construction loan Ex 2, D
Norman Dep 59 24-60 5, see also 3/30/00 B Norman Dep 61 2-7, true and correct excerpts
from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 3 Arnold introduced the joint venture partners to Ann
and Norman Young, who would provide this short-term financing Arnold Aff, ^ 7, Ex 3,
3/30/00 B Norman Dep 32 13-19
6.

The Youngs agreed to make a short-term loan for $160,000, payable in 90 days, at

18 percent interest and with loan fees totaling 12 points Arnold Aff, U 7 A true and correct
copy of the promissory note is attached hereto as Exhibit 4
7

The Normans, Page, Barney, Lanto, and Larson all signed the promissory note,

Arnold did not See Am Compl, ^ 18, a true and correct copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit 5
8.

The Normans agreed to pledge their property as collateral, and signed a deed of

trust in the Youngs' favor Arnold Aff, p

A true and correct copy of the deed of trust is

attached hereto as Exhibit 6 The loan proceeds were placed into a trust account owned by
Larson, and Larson was the only person with signature authority Id.
9

On October 27, 1995, pursuant to a "Purchase Agreement," Lanto purported to

sell his interest in the joint venture to Mark Arnold and Western Empire Advisors, a company
4
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ownedby Larson, for $8,500. Ex 3, 3/30/00 B Norman Dep. 6422-66:13. The Purchase
Agreement does not mention or identify the Normans in any way. A true and correct copy of the
purported purchase agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit 7.
10.

The purchase agreement provides that "[i]n consideration of Seller selling his

interest, Purchaser agrees to hold Seller harmless from any and all claims arising out of the
development of [the Moab Holiday Inn project], including but not limited to tort claims and
claims on any notes for moneys previously borrowed totaling $160,000." See Ex. 7, ^f 2.
11.

Larson obtained the Holiday Inn franchise and over the next year Page and Larson

attempted to obtain financing, but to no avail. 8/25/99 B. Norman Dep. 52:13-23, true and
correct excerpts from which are attached hereto as Exhibit 8; Arnold Aff. ^ 9. Although Arnold
persuaded the Youngs to extend the promissory note several times, when Larson's financing
efforts failed, foreclosure on the note was imminent. Arnold Aff. ^ 9; Ex. 2, 3/30/00 D. Norman
Dep. 65:5-18.
12.

In an effort to help the joint venture avoid foreclosure, Arnold introduced them to

Jim Winkler, who purchased the property from the Normans and paid off the Young note. Ex. 3,
3/30/00 B. Norman Dep. 71:14-73:4. At the closing on Winkler's purchase, $212,000 of the
sales proceeds was paid to the Youngs for release of their trust deed. Arnold Aff, ^ 10.
B.

The Normans Did Not Consent to Arnold's Admission as a Partner.

13.

The Agreement provided that "[additional Joint Venturers may be added to the

Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint Venturers" Ex. 1
(emphasis added).
14.

Mr. Norman has twice testified that u[n]obody asked [him] about" Arnold

becoming a member of the joint venture, and that he never consented to Arnold's admission:
Q: [By Mr. Lalli]. . . . You never gave your consent for Mark
Arnold to become an owner in the hotel part?
5
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[By Mr Norman] Nobody asked me about that

Q Okay So because nobody asked you, you therefore never
consented, right9
A Right
Ex 3, 3/30/00 B Norman Dep 71 7-13
Q [By Mr Howe] Did you ever give your consent for any other
individual to become a member of the joint venture?

A [By Mr Norman]

The answer is no

Ex 8, 8/25/99 B Norman Dep 28 23-29 3
15

Diane Norman also testified that she never consented to Arnold becoming a joint

venture partner
Q [By Mr Lalli]
becoming a partner7

Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold

A [By Mrs Norman] Never
Q Okay Did you ever consent to Mark Arnold purchasing
Lanto's interest9
A Never
Ex 2, 3/30/00 D Norman Dep 95 13-18
ni.

ARGUMENT

The judgment sought in a motion for summary judgment "shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law " Utah R Civ P 56(c) Under this standard, as

6
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demonstrated below, Arnold is entitled to summary judgment on the Normans' First and Second
Causes of Action.
A.

Arnold Is Not Liable for Breach of the Joint Venture Agreement Because
He Did Not Become a Joint Venture Partner As a Matter of Law.

In the first cause of action, the Normans contend that Arnold breached the Agreement in
a number of ways. As a predicate to establish liability for breach of the Agreement, however, the
Normans first must prove that Arnold became a party to the Agreement and voluntarily assumed
the rights and obligations under the Agreement. See, e.g., Vasels v. LoGuidice, 740 P.2d 1375,
1377 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (observing that mutual assent of parties to a contract is "essential" to
create binding contract); Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962) ("[a] binding contract
can only exist where there has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be
bound by its terms.") The undisputed facts negate this fundamental element of the Normans'
breach of contract claim, and conclusively demonstrate that Arnold was not a party to the
Agreement and never became a partner in the joint venture.
It is undisputed that Arnold never signed the Agreement or assented to its terms. The
face of the Agreement itself demonstrates that Arnold is not a signatory. .See Ex. 1. Neither is
there any evidence that Arnold signed or assented to any amendment to the Agreement. Thus,
there is no evidence on which the Normans can base a claim that Arnold expressly became a
party to the Agreement.
Even if Arnold had signed the Agreement or intended to become a partner in the joint
venture, the undisputed facts further demonstrate that Arnold was not a partner as a matter of
law. In Utah, "subject to any agreement between them . . . [n]o person can become a member of
a partnership without the consent of all the partners." Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-15(7) (supp.
1999); see also 59A Am.Jur.2d §§ 109, PARTNERSHIP ("[N]o person can become a member of a
partnership without the consent of all partners.") In Folsom v. Fernstrom, 134 P. 1021, 1024
7
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(Utah 1913) the Utah Supreme Court upheld a verdict for the plaintiff finding that the defendant
had not become a member of the plaintiffs failed real estate partnership because there was
insufficient evidence that the plaintiff had consented to the defendant's admission to the
partnership. In so doing, the supreme court observed that "[o]f course [defendant] could not
become a member of the partnership without the consent of both [the plaintiff] and [the codefendant], the original members of the firm." Fo[som, 134 P. at 1024.
Here, the Agreement specifically provides that "[additional Joint Venturers may be
added to the Joint Venture at any time upon agreement of all of the then existing Joint
Venturers." Ex. 1, Article 1.7 (emphasis added). Mr. Norman has twice testified that "[n]obody
asked [him] about" Arnold becoming a member of the joint venture, and that he never consented
to Arnold's admission. Def's Statement Undisputed Material Facts ^ 14. Likewise, Diane
Norman testified that she "never" consented to Arnold's admission as a joint venture partner. Id
at ^ 15. In addition, the Normans' breach of contract claim itself specifically acknowledges that
if Arnold became a joint venture partner, he did so "contrary to [the Joint Venture Agreements]
provisions." Ex. 5,ffij31(e), 43(e).
It is undisputed that the Normans did not consent to Arnold becoming a joint venture
partner. Moreover, the Normans have adduced no evidence that the other joint venture partners
consented, even if the Normans did. As a result, the Agreement and Utah Code § 48-1-15(7)
provide that Arnold cannot claim membership in the joint venture, and cannot have any rights or
obligations whatsoever under the Agreement. It is black-letter law that Arnold cannot breach a
contract - the Agreement - to which he was never a party, for an obligation he never undertook.
See, e.g., Soule v. Weatherbv, 118 P. 833, 834 (Utah 1911) ("[i]n the obligation assumed by the
defendant is found his duty, and his failure to comply with the duty constitutes the breach");
Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (Utah 1962).
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As a result, the Normans' claim for breach of the Agreement against Arnold fails as a
matter of law.
B.

The Normans' Claim for Default of Trust Deed Note Fails Because Arnold
Did Not Become Liable to the Normans Under the Trust Deed Note.

In their second cause of action, the Normans claim that Arnold became liable to them
under the trust deed and promissory note because ^defendant Arnold purchased and/or acquired
the position of defendant Lanto" in the joint venture. Ex. 5, Am. Compl., 1{ 48. Furthermore,
because the note provides for ujoint and several liability," the Normans claim that any obligor on
the note - except themselves - is therefore liable for the foil amount of the note plus interest, a
number allegedly in excess of $200,000. Id atffij51-52. In order to establish such a claim, the
Normans must prove that (1) Arnold became obligated to the Normans under the trust deed note;
(2) that the trust deed note was called due and went into default; and (3) that Arnold was
obligated to and failed to pay part or all of the amounts due under the trust deed note. See, e.g.,
Grossen v. Dewitt 982 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1999) (appellants defaulted on promissory
note and trust deed where they failed to pay principal and interest installments, property taxes,
and fire insurance on the property as required by the trust deed and note.) As shown below, the
Normans cannot establish the first element of their claim as a matter of law.
In the first place, the promissory note was made in June 1995. It was signed by Robert
and Diane Norman, Page, Barney, Lanto, and Larson. The note is payable to the Youngs, who
loaned the $160,000 to the joint venture. It is undisputed that Arnold did not sign the promissory
note and therefore cannot be liable as a signatory. See Ex. 5, Am. Compl., % 18.
Acknowledging that Arnold is not directly liable on the note, the Normans claim that
Arnold became obligated on the note indirectly when he and Western Empire Advisors entered
into the Purchase Agreement some four months later. The Purchase Agreement, however, does
not make Arnold liable to the Youngs, as holders of the note. And it certainly does not make
9
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Arnold liable to the Normans, who are co-obligors on the note. Rather, the Purchase Agreement
provides that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors "agree[d] to hold Seller [i e , Lanto]
harmless from any and all claims . . . on any notes for moneys previously borrowed totaling
$160,000." Ex. 7. Thus, assuming the Purchase Agreement is enforceable at all, at most it
creates a duty in Arnold and Western Empire Advisors to indemnify Lanto, for Lanto \s liability
under the promissory note. If Lanto were ever found to be liable to the Youngs under the note,
therefore, he may have a claim against Arnold and Western Empire Advisors for
indemnification. Absolutely nothing in the Purchase Agreement or the law establishes any
contractual privity or contractual rights and obligations between Arnold and the Normans. *kIt is
axiomatic in the law of contract that a person not in » rivity cannot sue on a contract." Shire Dev
v. Frontier Invs.. 799 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Nor can the Normans establish that they are intended third party beneficiaries of the
Purchase Agreement. Miller v. Martineau & Co., 983 P.2d 1107, 1114 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). In
order "to have enforceable rights under the contracts," the Normans must "establish that [they]
[were] intended beneficiarfies] of one or more of those contracts." Id Moreover, "the intent of
the contracting parties to confer a separate and distinct benefit [on a third party] must be clear."
American Towers Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical Inc.. 903 P.2d 11182, 1188 (Utah
1996). Thus, third parties who benefit "only incidentally from the performance of a contract
[have] no right to recover." Miller, 983 P.2d at 1114-15, quoting Broadwater v. Old Republic
Sur, 854 P.2d 527, 537 (Utah 1993). Here, far from being "clear" on this point, the Purchase
Agreement nowhere indicates that the Normans were its "intended beneficiaries." In fact, the
Purchase Agreement does not mention the Normans at all. Ex. 7. There is no evidence outside
the Purchase Agreement to suggest that the Normans were intended third party beneficiaries
either. In short, the Normans cannot establish that they were intended third-party beneficiaries of
the Lanto purchase agreement. As a result, they have no means of asserting Lanto's purported
10
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rights of indemnification against Arnold and Western Empire Advisors The Normans' second
cause of action fails as a matter of law
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Normans' complaint attempts to assert claims for breach of the Agreement against
Arnold and Larson, who never became partners in the joint venture. It seeks repayment in full of
an obligation the Normans are partially liable for themselves from Arnold, who never signed the
promissory note or otherwise agreed to be liable with or for them for that debt. As matters of
law, neither of these claims may proceed. Accordingly, Arnold respectfully requests that the
Court enter summary judgment in his favor on the First and Second Causes of Action in the
Normans' complaint.
DATED this /2-

day of December, 2000.
SNELL&WILMERLL.P

Matthew L. Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify on this /2s

day of December, 2000, I caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing to be sent by Federal Express or hand-delivered to:
Steve Russell, Esq.
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, UT 84532
Attorney for Plaintiffs
James C. Haskins, Esq.
Haskins & Associates, P.C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Norman M. Larson
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COUfi
Grand Countv
LED

DEC 1 3 2C0C
CLERK OF THE COURT

Matthew L. Lalli (#6105)
Snell & Wilmer L.L.P
15 West South Temple, Suite 1200
Gateway Tower West
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1004
Telephone: (801)257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICUL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,

AFFIDAVIT OF MARK E. ARNOLD

Plaintiffs,
vs.

Civil No.: 9807-116

MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

SORENSA\SLC\l 29438

Mark E. Arnold, having been first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am a real estate and land use lawyer licensed to practice law in the state of Utah

and a defendant in the above-entitled action. I am competent in every respect to make this
affidavit, and do so on the basis of my personal knowledge.
2.

I am a partner at the law firm of Arnold & Wiggins, L.C. Neither my law firm

nor I have ever provided legal services of any kind to Robert or Diane Norman individually.
3.

Neither my law firm nor I have ever received payment for legal services of any

kind from Robert or Diane Norman individually.
4.

I am not a signatory to the March 15, 1995 joint venture agreement at issue in this

5.

I never sought nor received the consent of the joint venture partners to become a

action.

partner of the Moab Land Development joint venture.
6.

In 1995, Norman Larson introduced me to Greg Page and Duane Barney, who

were partners in the Moab joint venture. Subsequently, I performed various tasks for the joint
venture.
7.

I introduced the joint venture partners to Ann and Norman Young. The Youngs

provided the joint venture with initial financing in the form of a short-term loan for $160,000,
payable in 90 days, at 18 percent interest and with loan fees totaling 12 points.
8.

As collateral for the short-term financing, the Normans agreed to pledge the 8.33

acres of property they had previously contributed to the joint venture, and signed a deed of trust
on the property in the Young's favor. The loan proceeds were placed into a trust account owned
by Larson, and only Larson had signature authority.

SORENSA\SLCM 29438

2

JL

9.

Larson obtained the Holiday Inn franchise and over the next year Page and Larson

attempted to obtain financing, but were unsuccessful. I persuaded the Youngs to extend the
promissory note several times. When Larson's financing efforts failed, I believed that
foreclosure proceedings were imminent.
10.

In an effort to help the joint venture avoid foreclosure, I introduced the Normans

to Jim Winkler, who purchased the property from them and paid off the Young note.

DATED this _5^_ day of May, 2000.

Mark E. Arnold

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to this ^ £ _ day of May, 2000.
C^C^i^j^

NOTARY PUBLIC
2-1^

KAREN A. BUTTON
111 East Broadway #900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Commission Expires
June 10, 2000

I^>CJL^A

(yy^j

Notary Public
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify on this /I

day of December, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing to be mailed, postage prepaid, to:

Steve Russell, Esq.
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, UT 84532
James C. Haskins
Haskins & Associates
357 South 200 East, #300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

,£^
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Matthew L.Lalli (#6105)
Amy F. Sorenson (#8947)
SNELL & WlLMER L.L.P.

Gateway Tower West
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1200
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 257-1900
Facsimile: (801)257-1800
Attorneys for Defendant Mark E. Arnold

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ROBERT NORMAN, SR., & DIANE
NORMAN, husband and wife,

1 MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

vs.
Civil No.: 9807-116

MARK E. ARNOLD & NORMAN M.
LARSON,

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

Defendants.

Defendant Mark E. Arnold ("Arnold") respectfully submits this memorandum in
opposition to plaintiffs Robert and Diane Norman's (the "Normans") motion for partial
summary j udgment.

I.

INTRODUCTION

In their motion for partial summary judgment, the Normans argue that, by virtue of
signing an October 27, 1995 Purchase Agreement (the "Purchase Agreement"), Arnold and
defendant Norman Larson's company, Western Empire Advisors, "specifically assumed" Pete
Lanto's liability as a co-obligor on a June 1995 promissory note. Norman Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment ("Norman Motion") at 2. They conclude that Arnold and Western Empire
Advisors therefore are liable to the Normans on the note as a matter of law. IcL Convenient as
this argument is for the Normans, the Purchase Agreement in no way accomplishes such a feat.
In fact, as Arnold's motion for summary judgment demonstrates, the Purchase Agreement at
most creates a duty in Arnold and Western Empire Advisors to indemnify Lanto for his liability
under the note to the Youngs. See, ej*., Arnold Motion for Summary Judgment ("Arnold
Motion") at 11. The Purchase Agreement creates no obligation for Arnold to pay any money to
the Youngs, who were holders of the note, and it certainly creates no obligation for Arnold to
indemnify the Normans, who were co-obligors on the note.
Despite making such an untenable legal argument, the Normans do not cite even one case
on which they might base their claims to judgment "as a matter of law." Instead, they have
chosen to set forth irrelevant deposition testimony and to recycle arguments already fully briefed
and ruled upon by this Court in Arnold's favor. The Normans' motion should be denied on its
face, and also for the reasons cited in Arnold's renewed motion for summary judgment, which is
incorporated by this reference.
II.

RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS

In support of their motion, the Normans set forth seven paragraphs of "facts." However,
only the first three facts indicate their source. See Norman Motion at 1-2. Accordingly, Arnold
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generally objects to "facts" four through seven as completely lacking in foundation, and further
specifically responds to the Normans' Statement of Facts as follows:1
2.

Disputed that the note was signed by "Robert and Diane Norman, husband and

wife." Norman Motion at 1. The note was indeed signed by Robert Norman, Diane Norman,
Greg Page, Duane Barney, and Larson, as the Normans state, but nothing on the face of the
document itself indicates that the Normans signed it in any other than their individual capacities.
6/00 Promissory Note, Norman Motion, Exhibit 1.
3.

Disputed that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors "specifically assumed

[Lanto's] obligation under the note," by virtue of signing the Purchase Agreement, as the
Normans claim. Norman Motion at 1-2. In fact, the Purchase Agreement provides only that
Arnold and Western Empire Advisors are to "hold Seller [Lanto] harmless from any and all
claims arising out of the development of the above-mentioned projects, including . . . claims on
any notes for moneys previously borrowed totaling $160,000." 10/27/95 Purchase Agreement,
Norman Motion, Exhibit 2. The Normans' claim that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors
somehow replaced Lanto as a signator on the note by virtue of signing the Purchase Agreement
has no basis in law or fact.
6.

Disputed that the Normans "incurred a loss of $212,000" in the sale of the

property to Jim Winkler to retire the note. Norman Motion at 2. In fact, other than this very sale
to Winkler, no evidence of the property's fair market value has yet been introduced in this action
at all. However, the precise value of the property - the security for the note - is not material to
determining Arnold's liability on a note which he did not sign, as shown below.

1

Arnold's numbering corresponds to the numbering used in the Normans' motion for summary judgment.
3

III.
A.

ARGUMENT

The Purchase Agreement Does Not Create Any Rights in the Normans As a
Matter of Law.

Despite the undisputed fact that neither Arnold nor Western Empire Advisors signed the
note, the Normans claim that Arnold and Western Empire Advisors nevertheless are liable as c o obligors to the Normans "as a consequence of their purchase of Lanto's interest and express
indemnification of Lanto from liability under the note." Norman Motion at 3. Contrary to the
plain language of the Purchase Agreement, the Normans claim that Arnold and Western Empire
Advisors "expressly assumed and indemnified any subsequent liability of Lanto under the note"
somehow making Arnold and Western Empire Advisors liable to the Normans, rather than to
Lanto, or even to the Youngs. Id. The Normans' interpretation of the Purchase Agreement is
wrong.
The Purchase Agreement provides that "Purchaser [Arnold and Western Empire
Advisors] agrees to hold Seller [Lanto] harmless from any and all claims arising out of the
development of the above-mentioned projects, including .. . claims on any notes for moneys
previously borrowed totaling $160,000." See Norman Motion, Exhibit 2; Arnold Motion at f 9.
The Purchase Agreement does not mention or identify the Normans, and Arnold and Western
Empire Advisors nowhere agree to "expressly assume . . .any subsequent liability of Lanto under
the note," within the document, as the Normans claim. Norman Motion at 3. At most, the
Purchase Agreement creates in Arnold and Western Empire Advisors a duty to indemnify Lanto,
for Lanto's liability under the promissory note to Ann and Norman Young, the note's obligees.
See Norman Motion, Exhibits 1 and 2. Thus, if Lanto were found to be liable to the Youngs
under the note, he may have a claim against Arnold and Western Empire Advisors for
indemnification. Nothing in the law, or in the Purchase Agreement itself, renders Arnold and
Western Empire Advisors liable to any of the note's other co-obligors besides Lanto. The

4
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Normans cite no caselaw or language in the Purchase Agreement which would allow the Court to
so find.
Instead, the Normans set forth excerpts from Arnold's and Larson's depositions, claiming
that this testimony "establishes] the liability of Arnold and [Western Empire Advisors] as a
matter of law." Norman Motion at 4-5. More likely, the Normans are trying to create a question
of fact where none exists, because none of the testimony cited supports such a conclusion. For
example, the Normans quote Arnold's consistent response to Mr. Russell's repeated questions
about whether "the purchasers of [Lanto's] interest" became liable on the promissory note,
apparently as evidence that Arnold believed he became liable on the note through the Purchase
Agreement. The testimony they quote, however, supports the exact opposite conclusion: "I
believe [the Purchase Agreement] obligates Mr. Lanto and all signators to the lender." Norman
Motion at 4. This was so, Arnold explains, in order to "ensure that Ann Young and the lenders
were paid back." Id, Arnold's testimony that the Purchase Agreement continued to "obligate
Mr. Lanto and all signators" on the note to the Youngs is entirely consistent with the language of
the agreement itself, which describes only a duty of indemnification. Indeed, if Arnold and
Western Empire Advisors had "assumed" Lanto's obligation on the note, as the Normans claim,
indemnification of Lanto would not be necessary at all.
The Normans then relate equally inapposite portions from Larson's deposition,
apparently setting forth Larson's understanding that the "intent" behind the Purchase Agreement
was for Arnold and Western Empire Advisors to acquire Lanto's partnership interest in the joint
venture. Norman Motion at 5. Setting aside the testimony's obvious lack of foundation,
Larson's statement goes only to whether Arnold ever became a partner, and the Normans have
not moved for summary judgment on that claim. Larson's alleged belief that Arnold bought an
interest in the partnership has no bearing on Arnold's liability as a co-obligor on a note which he

5

did not sign. Moreover, even if the partnership claim were at issue here, the testimony would be
equally useless, because in order to prevail on a breach of partnership agreement claim, the
Normans must establish that all of the joint venturers consented to Arnold's admission, and they
have repeatedly testified that they "never" did so. See Arnold Motion at TfiJ 13-15; see also Utah
Code Ann. § 48-1-15(7) (supp. 1999).
The Purchase Agreement, if anything, is a contract between Arnold, Western Empire
Advisors, and Lanto. At most, it creates a right of indemnification running from Arnold and
Western Empire Advisors to Lanto. That it somehow could render Arnold a co-obligor with the
Normans on the note to the Youngs - or worse, that it could render Arnold liable to the Normans
themselves - is a legal and logical impossibility. The Normans' motion for summary judgment
on this basis should be denied, and Arnold's granted.
B.

Even If Lanto's Right of Indemnification Somehow Could Run to the
Normans, the Court Cannot Adjudicate Lanto's Liability Without His
Presence.

The Normans next claim that, without Lanto's presence in court and "as a matter of law,"
the Court somehow can find Lanto liable to the Normans, and then pass that "proportionate share
of liability" directly on to Arnold and Western Empire Advisors. Norman Motion at 7.
According to the Normans, Lanto is necessarily liable to them (apparently, in an amount of their
counsel's choosing) simply because "he signed the note." Id. After having assessed Lanto's
liability in this manner, the Normans contend that the Court can pass that liability on to Arnold
and Western Empire Advisors by virtue of the Purchase Agreement. The infirmities in this
argument are numerous and profound.
As shown above, Arnold did not "assume" Lanto's liability on the note by signing the
Purchase Agreement. At most, he agreed to indemnify Lanto, necessarily indicating that Lanto
would not be released under the note. It does not follow that this right of indemnification
6
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somehow translates into co-obligor liability to the Normans on the note. The Normans are
strangers to the Purchase Agreement, and they cite no authority which would allow the Court to
"rule as a matter of law" that they may recover direc'ly from Arnold and Western Empire
Advisors for Lanto's share of liability under the note. Norman Motion at 7.
In addition, it is elementary that no court can adjudge the liability of a party in his
absence. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 110-11 (1969). Instead,
"[t]he consistent constitutional rule has been that a court has no power to adjudicate a personal
claim or obligation unless it has jurisdiction over the person of the defendant...." Id. Not only
can the Court not transform Lanto's arguable right of indemnification from Arnold into liability
to the Normans, but the Normans' insistence that the Court can do so without securing Lanto's
presence in court is nothing less than unconstitutional.
Finally, Arnold has successfully opposed this very argument in his previous opposition to
the Normans' "Motion Regarding Lanto Interest." There, like here, the Normans sought to have
the Court rule that "Arnold and/or [Western Empire Advisors] should be held liable to the
plaintiffs in contribution for the share of the Young note representing Lanto's interest," without
the "inconvenience" of securing Lanto's presence. Motion Regarding Lanto Interest ("Lanto
Motion") at 4. Thus, the Court already has rejected the Normans' concerns for "judicial
resources" once, denying their "Motion Regarding Lanto Interest" on October 10, 2000. The
Normans' concerns for judicial efficiency are curious in light of their willingness to resubmit
losing arguments to this Court.
C.

The Normans' Arbitrary "Contribution" Analysis Is Unsupported by Law
and Not Capable of Resolution on Summary Judgment

The Normans' last three arguments attempt to persuade the Court that it should rule, as a
matter of law, that (i) the Normans are entitled to "proportionate contribution" from their coobligors on the note; (ii) for purposes of assessing this "proportionate liability," the Normans
7

should be considered to be a single party; and (iii) that, in addition to whatever the Normans
would assess them individually, Arnold and Western Empire Advisors should bear Page and
Barney's liability under the note exclusively. Norman Motion at 7-10. As throughout the
memorandum, each of these points is bereft of legal authority or citation to the record, and seems
only to represent whatever arbitrary outcome the Normans feel they should receive. Three
further points dispense with what is left of the Normans' contribution argument entirely.
First, (he Normans' complaint does not contain any cause of action for "contribution,"
proportionate or otherwise, only a claim for "default of trust deed note." See Am. Compl., fflf
45-52. The Normans already sought leave to amend their complaint to include a contribution
claim. See, e.g., Proposed Amended Complaint atfflj38-49, 54-55. After the parties fully
briefed and argued the Normans' motion to amend, the Court refused to allow them leave to do
so. The Normans' "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment" is really yet another thinly disguised
motion to amend.
Second, in order to prevail on this claim for "default" of the note against Arnold, the
Normans must show that (1) Arnold became obligated to the Normans under the trust deed note;
(2) that the trust deed note was called due and went into default; and (3) that Arnold was
obligated and failed to pay part or all of the amounts due under the trust deed note. See, e.g.,
Grossen v. Dewitt 982 P.2d 581, 582 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Regardless of the Normans'
undisputed inability to show that the note was in fact foreclosed upon, they cannot meet the first
element. Arnold was not and never became a co-obligor on the note. Accordingly, any attempt
to recover from him - whether for default or for contribution - is necessarily futile as a matter of
law, and Arnold seeks summary judgment on this basis.
Finally, even if the Normans' default claim were found to be, in effect, an action for
contribution, such a claim would not present undisputed issues of material fact sufficient to allow
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this Court to apportion liability under the note as a matter of law. The note, secured by property
contributed to the joint venture in order to "facilitate and finance the [joint venture] project,"
would be a partnership loss, necessitating a partnership accounting. An accounting by definition
requires the assessment of both partnership losses and gains, fact-finding that is entrusted to the
jury. In addition, the only partnership gain here seems to be the Normans' sale of the property
(undisputedly donated to the joint venture) for more than $400,000. The Normans' arbitrary
"contribution" assessment ignores this entirely. Presumably, any accounting of partnership gains
and losses would be hotly contested by the Normans and the other partners, and as such would be
inappropriate for resolution through summary judgment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth in Arnold's Motion for Summary
Judgment, Arnold respectfully requests that the Normans' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
be denied.
DATED this / ^

day of December, 2000.
SNELL&WILMERLL.P.

Matthew L. Lalli
Attorney for Mark Arnold

Q

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify on this / ^

day of December, 2000,1 caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing to be faxed and sent by federal express or hand delivered to:
Steve Russell, Esq.
Grand County Law & Justice Center, PC
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab, UT 84532
Attorney for Plaintiffs
James C. Haskins, Esq.
Haskins & Associates, P.C.
357 South 200 East, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Norman M. Larson
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT - MOAB COURT
GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT SR NORMAN Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
ORAL ARGUMENTS

vs.

Case No: 980700116 CN

MARK E ARNOLD Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

LYLE R. ANDERSON
December 15, 2 000

pamelaab

PRESENT
Plaintiff(s): ROBERT SR NORMAN
Plaintiffs Attorney(s) : STEVE RUSSELL
Defendant's Attorney(s): MATTHEW LALLI
JAMES C. HASKINS
Video
Tape Number:
00-73
Tape Count: 10:04

HEARING
TAPE: 00-73
COUNT: 10:04
Mr. Haskins presents his arguments to the court.
TIME: 10:17 AM Mr. Lalli presents his arguments.
TIME: 10:35 AM Mr. Russell presents his arguments.
TIME: 11:19 AM Mr. Russell asks that court reconsider allowing
complaint to be amended.
TIME: 11:24 AM Mr. Haskins presents further arguments.
TIME: 11:27 AM Mr. Lalli presents his additional arguments.
TIME: 11:33 AM Mr. Russell presents his reply.
TIME: 11:36 AM The court makes it's ruling. Court grants
summary judgment on theory that there is a joint venture. Court
grants Norman Larsen motion for summary judgment. Mr. Haskins to
prepare the final judgment.
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SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT
Grand County

Grand County Law & Justice Center P.C.
Steve Russell, Attorney (#2831)
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
729 Bartlett Circle
Moab,Utah 84532
Telephone: (435) 259-7321

FILED

By

JAN 0 8 2001
C-ERK OF THE COURT
Deputy

IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR GRAND COUNTY, UTAH
Robert Norman, Sr., & Diane Norman,
husband and wife,
Plaintiffs' Objection to
Proposed Orders
Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 9807-116
Mark E. Arnold & Norman M. Larson.
Judge Anderson
Defendants.
On December 15, 2000, the Court heard oral argument on the parties' cross-motions for
summary judgment, at the conclusion of which, defendants' motions were granted and plaintiffs'
motion denied. Counsel for defendant Larson has filed a Proposed Order from which this
objection is taken. (Defendant's cover letter for the Proposed Order is dated 1/3/01 and was
received by plaintiffs counsel on 1/6/01. It indicates that the Proposed Order may be submitted
for signing by the Court on 1/8/01. This is incorrect.

Under Rule 4-501, Operation of the

Courts, plaintiffs should have until at least 1/11/01 to file objections to the proposed order.)
The proposed order is not accompanied by findings of fact or conclusions of law, and is
completely deficient and insufficient as a matter of law to support the Court's rulings.

Background
This case went to trial in January, 2000, but a mistrial was declared due to the failure of a
prospective juror to disclose a prior felony conviction The trial was rescheduled to commence
on January 15, 2001 The plaintiffs have previously stated their intent to appeal the Court's prior
ruling granting defendant Arnold's motion for summary judgment on plaintiffs claim against
him for professional liability In October, the Court invited all parties to submit motions for
summary judgment on the remaining trial issues so that those could be decided and the entire
case made ready for one appeal
Legal Requirement For Summary Judgment
While proceeding in this fashion may be convenient, it works a gross distortion of the
rules of civil procedure Rule 56, which goes unacknowledged in defendant's proposed order,
requires that a moving party must establish that there are no material facts in dispute and that the
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law Neither of these prerequisites were established
by either defendant, and no attempt has been made to even pretend that they were

The

plaintiffs, on the other hand submitted undisputed facts which should have resulted in a ruling
granting their motion for summary judgment as a matter of law
Plaintiffs9 First Cause of Action
Plaintiffs' first cause of action was that defendants Arnold and Larson caused the failure
of a joint venture resulting in losses suffered solely by the plaintiffs in excess of $200,000
Defendants' sole defense to this claim is that they could not be responsible for the failure of the
joint venture because they were never members of the joint venture Defendants' sole basis for

the claim that they were not part of the joint venture was the fact that the plaintiffs did not
affirmatively consent to their participation.
In order to grant the defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim, it was
necessary for the court to ignore, not just some of the facts, but all of the facts and documentary
evidence that detailed defendants' extensive participation in the joint venture. See, e.g., exhibits
and deposition abstracts submitted in conjunction with plaintiffs9 motion and in response
to defendants' motions. Plaintiffs' extensive recitation of facts both in conjunction with the
subject motions is not and cannot be disputed. Consequently, the facts simply are not addressed
in defendant's proposed order. However, the implication, necessarily contained in an order
granting summary judgment, that there are no material facts in dispute as to whether these
defendants participated in a joint venture with the plaintiffs is absurd.
Plaintiffs undisputed facts establish, among other things, that:
1.

Defendants Arnold and Larson had sole possession and control over the only

assets of the joint venture, to wit: loan funds secured by plaintiffs' property and the Holiday Inn
Franchise which was owned by defendant Larson individually.

Defendants' Deposition

Testimony/
2.

On October 27, 1995, the defendants purchased all right and interest of joint

venture partner Peter Lanto. It is this transaction to which defendants claim the plaintiffs did not
affirmatively consent. However, defendants' own testimony establishes that they relied on other
partners, Page and Barney, to inform the Normans regarding joint venture business. Therefore,
the defendants would have had to presume that the plaintiffs knew they had become partners. Id.
3.

From and after, October 27, 1995, the defendants held themselves out to the

public as partners in the Moab Holiday Inn joint venture. In written documentation in the record

the defendants refer to themselves as partners and are referred to by others in the venture as
partners

See, e.g., letters dated November 3, 1995 and April 10, 1996, attached as exhibits

D & F to defendant Larson's response to plaintiffs' Motion.
4

The plaintiffs have maintained from the start that they became aware and

approved of the participation of Arnold and Larson in the venture Defendants made no attempt
to counter the Affidavit of Robert Norman dated November 15, 2000, and filed in association
with these subject motions, that details these facts
5

The plaintiffs provided undisputed proof that defendants Arnold and Larson were

directly responsible for the dissolution of the original Moab Land Development Joint Venture
(l e by taking control of its funds, purchasing the interest of its builder, etc ), but there is no
question that a joint venture including Arnold and Larson thereafter continued in operation
The truly ironic aspect to defendants' escape hatch for plaintiffs' first cause of action
(that the plaintiffs did not affirmatively consent to their becoming partners in the venture) is the
undisputed fact that the defendants intentionally and dishonestly concealed the transaction from
them, having stolen the money from the loan proceeds to purchase their interest in the venture1
And the truth of the matter as stated in Robert Norman's deposition and made a part of the record
is that the plaintiffs did not give their express consent, only because no one asked them Robert
Norman Deposition at 28-29.
The plaintiffs made numerous requests of the Court to invoke equitable doctnnes such as
estoppel and unclean hands

The Court never directly addressed these requests, despite the

overwhelming assemblage of facts that would support a ruling that the defendants be estopped
from denying their participation in the joint venture

Lven if the Court were unwilling to do so, plaintiffs contend that a jury should have been
allowed to hear the evidence and determine for themselves whether the defendants were
members of the joint venture.
Defendant's proposed order states,
"The Court . . . finds that the plaintiffs' First Cause of Action, for alleged breach of a
joint venture agreement, fails as to defendant Arnold and defendant Larson for the reason
that neither Arnold nor Larson were at any time members of the joint venture and thus
owed no duties to other members of that joint venture for any alleged breach of the joint
venture agreement."
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs object to the proposed order because it is incorrect
and fails to demonstrate that there are no material facts in dispute, or that defendants are entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. The reality on both requirements for summary judgment is quite
to the contrary.
Plaintiffs5 Second Cause of Action
The plaintiffs second cause of action is for liability under a promissory note secured by
plaintiffs' property for loan proceeds to be used by the joint venture. Again, defendant's
proposed order lacks any basis for its validity under Rule 56, and agaia, in order to grant
defendants' motion the Court must not only ignore the facts of the case, but also defendants' own
testimony and their independent assumption of liability under the note.
It is undisputed that defendant Larson was a co-obligor, jointly and severally liable under
the note. See, the Note.
It is undisputed that defendant Arnold assumed the liability of Peter Lanto under the note,
and, as an attorney, drafted an agreement wherein he personally indemnified Lanto to liability
under the note. Purchase Agreement, dated October 27,1995.

Defendant Arnold, us Larson's attorney testified that Larson was liable under the note.
Memo in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment at 2-3.
Defendant Larson testified that it was the intent of the purchase agreement with Lanto
that Arnold and his company became liable under the note. Id.
The record before the Court contains a demand from the joint venturers (including
Arnold) to Larson that he repay the loan proceeds. Letters of April 10, 1996 and June 18,
1996.
Robert Norman's testimony and affidavit are undisputed that defendant Larson gave him
his personal promise that Larson would be responsible to repay the Young loan regardless of the
success of the Holiday Inn venture. Norman Affidavit at %26.
With regard to this cause of action, defendant's proposed order states:
"The Court finds that the Second Cause of Action for alleged default of a trust
deed note, fails as to Defendant Arnold because he was not at any time an obligor on the
trust deed note and thus owed no duty with respect to any alleged default of the note, and
fails as to defendant Larson because, while he was an obligor on the trust deed note, any
duty he undertook with respect to that note ran only to persons who are not parties herein,
and he had no duty to the plaintiffs with respect to that note."
Defendants again take an incredible route to safety as a matter of law. That is, having
duped, lied to, taken advantage of and abandoned the plaintiffs to a huge loss resulting from their
conduct, the defendants had no duty to the Normans because the Normans were forced to sell
their property to pay off the note and save themselves. The defense that Larson's duty ran only
to Arnold's clients the Youngs and that Arnold's duty ran only to Lanto is convoluted, devoid of
reason and fails to consider the plain fact that it was defendants' conduct that forced the plaintiffs
to take the course of action they did. (The record would support the conclusion by a jury that
defendant Arnold actively prevented his clients the Youngs from foreclosing by having the note
transferred to another client.)

Under defendants' reasoning, it would have been impossible for them to be liable for the
note under any circumstances (and attorney Arnold may well have considered this when he set
the Normans up) because, even if Arnold's clients had foreclosed, the sale of the Normans'
property would have been sufficient to pay off the note. Indeed, in making its ruling the Court
appeared to accept that theory and went so far as to blame the victims, stating it was a bad deal
from the start and the Normans never should have trusted the other partners.
Also, apparently, the Court must have found that defendant Larson's personal promise to
make sure the loan was repaid created no duty and is not a matter worthy of the jury's
consideration.
If the plaintiffs' eventual recourse in the involuntary sale of their own property to pay the
note was knowing and fully informed, there might be some basis to rule that the defendants owed
them no duty. But under the facts of this case, to find there are no material facts in dispute and
that the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, is wrong. The Normans were told
and expected that their partners would equally share the risks involved in the venture. When
they found Norman Larson's name on the promissory note, they were told he was added for their
protection, that Larson was the guy who would make sure the loan was repaid.
No duty?! Larson and Arnold had no duty to disclose they had spent half the loan
proceeds before the note was even signed?
Arnold had no duty to disclose that almost all the money was gone before the due date of
the note (September 27, 1995), and he and Larson had not even made an interest payment?
Arnold, the attorney, had no duty to disclose that, if they managed to spend the loan
proceeds without accomplishing anything, it was likely that the Normans would have no recourse
regardless of foreclosure?

Arnold, the attor

\\ who arranged the loan for a fee of $16,000, who controlled the

funds, who assumed a position as co-obligor, who was counsel for the joint venture, had no duty
to inform the Normans that the other obligors really weren't taking on any responsibility or
potential liability?
Th result of this ruling and defendant's proposed order is so grossly unfair that it cannot
be justified as a matter of law. No jury in the world would come to the conclusion that
defendants Arnold and Larson have no duty or liability in this case.
The Court previously granted defendant Arnold's motion for summary judgment against
plaintiffs' claim that he had professional liability in his undisputed role as counsel for the joint
venture. The Court was concerned that holding an attorney liable to individual members of a
joint venture would place the attorney in a confusing and conflicting position. It's perfectly
obvious that no such confusion existed in this case, and the suggestion that Arnold had no duty to
these specific people under these specific circumstances is pretty amazing.

But then to

subsequently rule that Arnold has no duty running to the Normans despite a contract assuming
liability creates a situation that greatly imperils the well being of innocent people. Because the
combined effect of these rulings condones and allows attorneys to use their skill and knowledge
of the law to both enrich themselves and take advantage of others without consequence.
For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs object to the proposed order regarding the second
cause of action because it is incorrect and fails to demonstrate that there are no material facts in
dispute, or that defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The ruling represents a
manifest injustice.

Plaintiffs' Motion For Partial Summary Judgment
As stated above, the facts and documentary evidence are not in dispute. Defendants have
not even bothered to try. Plaintiffs requested summary judgment on their second cause of action
dividing liability between the parties consistent with the facts and in a manner which common
sense and fairness dictate. All that was necessary for the Court to reach this decision was a
ruling that the defendants would not be allowed to hide behind their own wrongful and dishonest
conduct; that they would be estopped from denying their involvement in the joint venture; that
they would be required to bear the proportionate responsibility for losses under the note which
they voluntarily assumed, and for which the Normans had every right to rely upon.
These ruling were well within the Court's equitable powers and in no way an abuse of
discretion. The case would then have a result consistent with, rather than flying in the face of
the undisputed facts. Moreover, the decision would be consistent with the reasonable and actual
expectation of the parties. The defendants knew what they were doing. The acted intentionally
in the hope of massive personal benefit. The Court should rule, consistent with the undisputed
facts, that the defendants are responsible for their proportionate share of the Normans' losses as a
matter of law.
Defendant's proposed order regarding the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary
judgment provides no comment regarding the facts or any legal justification, and plaintiffs object
to that aspect of the proposed order as well.

Dated this $ *

day of

.2001.

Steve Russell
Attorney for the Plaintiffs
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